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ABSTRACT

An Examination of the Deaf Effect Response to Bad News Reporting in
Information Systems Project
By
Michael John Cuellar
04/01/2009

Committee Chair:

Dr. Mark Keil

Major Department:

Computer Information Systems

Information systems project management has historically been a problematic area. One
of the reasons for this has been the issue of escalation where resources continue to be committed
to a failing course of action. While many causes of escalation have been proposed, this
dissertation investigates one possible cause: that the project manager may not hear, ignores or
overrules a report of bad news to continue a failing course of action: the Deaf Effect response to
bad news reporting. This effect has not been previously studied within the information systems
literature. In this dissertation, the Deaf Effect is examined through a series of three laboratory
experiments and a case study. It finds that in a conducive environment, where the bad news
reporter is not seen as credible, and the risk of project failure is seen as low, decision makers
tend to view the report of bad news as irrelevant and thus ignore or overrule the report of bad
news and continue the current course of action. Role Prescription of the bad news reporter,
illusion of control and a perception of a highly politicized environment are factors that also
increase the occurrence of the Deaf Effect.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

MOTIVATION

Information systems (IS) project management has historically been a problematic area.
IS projects frequently fail and are notorious for going significantly over budget and falling
behind schedule. The Standish Group, a Massachusetts-based consulting organization,
reports that while software productivity has improved over the past 12 years, software
“value” is still only 59 cents per dollar spent. Nineteen percent (19%) of projects still fail
outright and 46% have cost or time overruns or don’t meet the customer’s needs
(Rubenstein 2007). In some cases, mismanagement of software projects means that
they escalate out of control, continuing to absorb valuable resources without ever
delivering benefits to the organizations that undertake them (Keil 1995). A survey
sponsored by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) found that
30–40% of all software projects undergo some degree of project escalation (Keil and
Mann 1997).
This escalation of commitment to a failing course of action is a well-known phenomenon
in software project management and considerable work has been done to gain a better
understanding of why executives continue to commit resources in the face of negative
signals about the status of projects (Depledge 2003; Keil 1995; Keil and Flatto 1999;
Keil, Tan, Wei, Saarinen, Tuunainen and Wassenaar 2000b; Ross and Staw 1993; Staw
1976; Staw 1981). While many explanations have been explored, recent work has
focused on the communication failures that occur within organizations and how these
may contribute to the escalation of commitment. A small, but growing number of studies
have examined the so-called “Mum Effect” (Keil and Robey 1999; Keil and Robey 2001),
or the reluctance to report bad news. In addition, Keil and Robey (1999, 2001) coined
the term “Deaf Effect” suggesting that executives’ refusal to hear bad news might also
promote escalation. That is, for reasons that are not well understood, executives may
(consciously or unconsciously) ignore bad news even when those who report to them
are bold enough to transmit the message. In those cases, it is important to know why
senior management did not heed those who warned them that the project was in danger
of failing.
Incidences of projects in which the Deaf Effect has occurred are numerous and involve
serious failures. Perhaps the most notorious is that of the Challenger Disaster
(Hauptman and Iwaki 1990) in which a group of engineers attempted to signal to their
management that there would be failure of space shuttle solid rocket boosters if the
shuttle launched at a low temperature. Their objections were ignored resulting in the
destruction of the Challenger and the deaths of seven astronauts. In the management
literature, Wissema (2002) records 14 cases of failure to attend to signals of impending
failure which resulted in failures of executive succession and appointment, product
development, acquisitions, diversification, internationalization and other actions. In the
information systems literature, Keil and Robey(2001) documented three instances in
which auditors attempting to report troubled projects encountered the Deaf Effect. In
another prominent failure, the UK Child Support Agency (CSA) spent 456 million GBP to
develop an enterprise support system which they deployed despite 40 audits of which 28
identified serious concerns and which had at implementation 52 known critical defects
(Computer.Business.Review 2006). The defects in the system resulted in creation of
over 600 workarounds (ZDNet.co.uk 2006), an increase in complaints from clients of
50% (McCue 2004) and 36,000 cases being “stuck” in the system and requiring manual
processing outside of the system (ZDNet.co.uk 2006). The chairman of the Public
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Accounts committee referring to this project said, “Ignoring ample warnings, the DPW
[Department for Works and Pensions], the CSA and IT contractor EDS introduced a
large, complex IT system at the same time as restructuring the Agency. The new system
. . . stumbled and now has enormous operational difficulties” (ZDNet.co.uk 2006). This
disastrous system failure eventually resulted in the shutdown of the agency. Finally, the
Denver International Airport baggage handling system is another example of where the
Deaf Effect occurred. This new airport opened 16 months and $2 billion over budget due
to the failure of the automated baggage handling system development effort. During the
development of this system, “[the baggage handling system development contractor] told
them from the beginning that they were going to need at least one more year to get the
system up and running but no one wanted to hear that” (Montealegre and Keil
2000,p.433). It wasn’t until the baggage system test failed completely that it was
recognized that the system would not be available as planned (Montealegre and Keil
2000).
Failures involving the Deaf Effect thus represent a serious problem. Refusal to act on
reports of bad news can result not only in loss of time and money but waste of resources
and even in the failure of the organization. Thus it is important that the mechanisms that
cause this effect be identified and conditions that predispose this effect to occur be
identified so that practitioners can take action to insure that reports of bad news are
attended to. To this point, the IS and management research disciplines have not devoted
much effort to the study of this phenomenon.
The contribution of this dissertation is to provide the first systematic study of the Deaf
Effect by developing and empirically testing an individual level model of how the Deaf
Effect might occur and investigating a project status reporting system to identify
organizational conditions that might inhibit or encourage the Deaf Effect. It is organized
as follows: this chapter provides a summary of the background literature on the Deaf
Effect.. Chapters 2 through 4 present the results of three laboratory experiments that
develop and test the model. Chapter 5 reports the results of an exploratory case study of
a state government project reporting system.
This chapter is organized as follows. First literature on project escalation and the Deaf
Effect is reviewed to provide a historical and theoretical background to the study.
Second, the Deaf Effect is defined and placed within that literature. It closes with
descriptions of the four studies that comprise this dissertation.

1.2

REVIEW OF THE ESCALATION LITERATURE

In this section, I review the project escalation literature. Staw (1997) has provided a
review of the literature up to that point in time. The discussion that follows summarizes
that review and provides additional information from the literature subsequent to 1997.
Escalation has been defined as
“[a situation] where losses have been suffered, where there is an opportunity to
persist or withdraw, and where the consequences of these actions are uncertain”
(Staw 1997).
The general pattern of escalation that we see has been described by Staw (1997) as a
tendency to become locked into escalation situations: to throw good money after bad. It
is not a singular decision but rather a persistent course of action. This escalation course
of action was found in a number of studies, e.g. Staw (1976), Teger (1980), Brockner
and Rubin (1985), Arkes and Blumer (1985). However, it does not always occur.
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Sometimes withdrawal occurs (McCain 1986). When there are alternatives that are
clearly superior, or clear-cut financial information is available, withdrawal will occur
(Bowen 1987; Northcraft and Neale 1986; Northcraft and Wolf 1984).
Escalation is not solely an IS related phenomenon. What makes it significant within the
IS realm is the nature of information systems projects. Information systems are
intangible objects and information systems projects are complex undertakings. Therefore
the progress of an information systems development project is often not obvious upon
inspection. This leads to considerable uncertainty as to the status of a project even to
the participants. Additionally the nature of information systems development as a service
leads to difficulties in understanding the nature of projects. The creation of a service
arrangement, such as an IT development project, is a transaction that requires an
exchange of information between the customer, and the service provider in order to
define the service to be performed (Chesbrough and Spohrer 2006). This knowledge is
likely to be tacit and difficult to transfer and even when the transfer has occurred it would
be difficult for any one person to have a comprehensive understanding of a project. Thus
different participants might have different conceptions of the goal of the project and thus
different views of the progress toward reaching those goals. The intangibility of the
product, the complexity of the activity and the service nature of the arrangement all
make IS project governance especially challenging and subject to escalation.
Staw (1997) believes that escalation is a multi-determined outcome. That is it is not the
result of a single causal factor but rather is the result of multiple forces operating at
multiple levels of analysis. Individuals facing escalation situations do so in the face of
social and/or organizational forces that surround them.
Staw and Ross (1987; 1989) have developed a classification system for escalation
causes. They divide these causes into different categories dealing with level of analysis.
Keil (1995), and Newman and Sabherwal (1996), following Staw and Ross, sort causes
of escalation into the same categories. The section that follows discusses the literature
that falls into each category.

1.2.1

Project Determinants

These are objective features of a project that affect the financial value or utility of a
course of action. These include the size of the goal or payoff (Rubin and Brockner 1975),
level of costs required to achieve the goal (Brockner, Rubin and Lang 1981), the
availability of alternatives (Northcraft and Neale 1986) salvage value (Northcraft and
Wolf 1984),and the presence of lock-in conditions (a high cost of withdrawal, little
salvage value and high up front expenses already incurred).
An additional project determinant is the presence of real options. A project has real
options when the managers have the opportunity but not the obligation to adjust the
future direction of the project in response to external or internal events. Escalation may
occur as a response to real options embedded in a project. Managers may opt to
continue because they value the options and thus increase the value of the project over
that reported by a strict financial analysis. Second, they value strategic options such as
the opportunity to pursue new strategic options rather than simple operational options
more highly (Tiwana, Keil and Fichman 2006).

1.2.2

Psychological Determinants

Psychological determinants are elements of the decision maker’s psychological makeup
or responses to situations that might cause escalation. For example:
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Optimism and illusion of control. These are biases that distort the evaluation of
situations. Optimism leads the decision maker to overestimate the possibility of positive
events occurring. For example, executives who view themselves as very competent tend
to take more risks (Krueger and Dickson 1994). Illusion of control is held to underlie such
optimism (Staw 1997). Illusion of control has been defined as an expectancy of a
personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would
warrant (Langer 1975). This belief may be based on their perception of their own
competence or of their special skills. Langer and Roth (1975) found that success bred a
belief in their skill in subjects while lack of success lead to the opposite conclusion. This
illusion of control or skill leads to distortions in perception or expectations of the project.
Keil, Depledge and Rai (2007) in a role playing experiment, found a significant inverse
relationship between problem recognition and escalation and that selective perception
and illusion of control were found to significantly affect both problem recognition and
escalation.
Self-justification. Self-justification is one of the oldest explanations for escalation. The
idea behind this concept is that once a decision is made the decision maker will not only
distort information but change behaviors to rationalize their decision (Staw 1976).
Personal responsibility is a key factor in this explanation. Without a sense of
responsibility for the solution, there is no reason for self-justification (Whyte 1986)
Framing Effects. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1982) suggests that people
don’t have the same risk preferences for positive and negative outcomes. When the
decision is framed as a choice between positive outcomes, decision makers become risk
averse. In the opposite case, they become risk-accepting attempting to eliminate the
loss by taking a gamble on a better outcome. Whyte (1986) suggested that prospect
theory provided an explanation for escalation in the absence of personal responsibility.
Sharp and Salter (1997) found that the same framing effects occurred in both North
American and Asian subjects.
Sunk Cost Effects. In this stream of literature, it is recognized that sunk costs, those
costs expended that cannot be recovered, may trigger a psychological response for
decision makers to attempt to recover past expenditures through further commitment of
resources. Arkes and Blumer (1985) with further studies by Garland and colleagues
(1990; 1991) found that sunk costs influence decision makers over time. This applied to
both project continuation and resource allocation decisions.
However, later studies found that in project completion decisions, it might be that sunk
costs are only effective when accompanied by substantial project completion. Conlon
and Garland (1993) found that information about project completion influences allocation
decisions to a far greater extent than does sunk costs. Keil, Truex and Mixon (1995), in a
qualitative analysis of explanations for decisions made in a laboratory experiment, found
that sunk cost was given as a rationale three times more than completion status. Boehne
and Paese (2000) found a strong project completion effect. That is that as a project
nears completion, the goal of completing the project overrides economic considerations
and even accountability. They found no support for sunk cost effects on escalation and
suggest that in a project context, previous sunk cost effects (Arkes and Blumer 1985;
Garland 1990; Garland and Newport 1991) were a confound with the completion effect.
Project completion was not a total explanation, as some of the subjects decided to kill
the project based on failure to meet profitability goals. Moon (2001) also found that there
is an interaction effect between sunk cost and level of completion. At high levels of
completion, the effect of sunk cost approached an exponential curve as the level of
completion increased. Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, and Hofmann (2004) in laboratory
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experiment and an archival field study of the road construction industry found results that
support the Moon study. As a task approached completion, task completion is rated as
increasingly important and economic motives as less important. Keil, Mann and Rai
(2000a) found that the completion effect was a better classifier of projects that escalated
than models constructed from self-justification, prospect theory and agency theory.
Financial and Mental budgets. Financial and mental budgets (Heath 1995; Tan and
Yates 2002) have also been found to have a de-escalating effect on monetary based
decisions. People tend to set budgets for projects and resist exceeding them. Escalation
was only likely to occur when there was no budget or expenses were difficult to track.
Perceived Risk and Risk Propensity. Perceived risk is shaped more by perceived
downside potential than the actual probability of failure. An individual’s willingness to
pursue a risky project appears to be influenced more by risk perception than any innate
propensity to take or avoid risks (Keil and Wallace 2000). Wong (2005) found that risk
propensity had a direct effect on escalation and was only partially mediated by risk
perception.

1.2.3

Social Determinants

Social elements are those elements of the environment in which the nature of social
structures influence the decision process.
External Justification and Binding. Staw (1997) indicates that the social environment
may affect decision makers behavior through a number of mechanisms. There may be
social costs for withdrawal. By advocating the termination or redirection of the project,
they may lose face or be viewed as incompetent. Similarly, the decision maker in
seeking to demonstrate competence may decide to continue on with the project. A highly
politicized environment may make terminating the project infeasible given the desire to
maintain their position. Accountability to others can be as important as the need to
internally rationalize their decision. Managers may hesitate to recognize losing projects
when their external reputations are at risk and when information about a project’s
performance is not widely known. This indicates that commitment to a project is not an
isolated affair (Staw 1997).
Leadership Norms. Leadership norms may influence a decision to continue a failing
course of action. There may be social rewards for persistence on a project so as to turn
a losing project into a winner. If being consistent and successful is strongly valued in the
society or organization then persistence in the face of a losing project may be viewed as
the appropriate behavior (Staw 1997).
Groupthink. Groupthink, when a group of people share opinions and assess situations
in the same manner (Wissema 2002), is a social characteristic that could lead to
escalation. Groupthink forms when a homogenous team is unchanged for a long period
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; Wissema 2002). Groupthink tends to cause rigidity of
response which is acceptable for routine problems but leads to difficulties when the
decision making team encounters novel or ill-defined problems (Filley, House and Kerr
1976; Janis 1972). Groupthink may also be exacerbated by the presence of “yes-men.”
Managers might surround themselves with those who agree with them. The “yes-men”
filter out messages that disagree with the situation as perceived by the managers, thus
preventing the message from reaching the decision makers with the consequence that
bad news reports are not acted on (Dunbar and Goldberg 1978). This not only reinforces
the groupthink, but also leads to a situation in which management perceives the situation
much differently from those at a lower level in the organization.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

15

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect

1.2.4

Organizational Determinants

These determinants are aspects of the organization that influence the decision making
process.
Institutional inertia. Organizations have imperfect sensory systems making them
impervious to changes. They are therefore slow to respond to external stimuli. Missing
cues as to failing projects may result in escalation. Similarly, political resistance to the
idea of terminating or redirecting a project may result in escalation. Similarly an
organization’s identification with a product or project can make withdrawal unthinkable
(Staw 1997).
Agency situations. Agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) suggests that managers
(principals) have imperfect information about the activities of project managers
(agents).They are subject to the risks of adverse selection (a subordinate
misrepresenting their capabilities for a position) and moral hazard (the subordinate
shirking their responsibilities to the principal or acting in their own interests instead of
those of the principal). Studies have shown that agency effects may cause escalation.
Where adverse selection exists, managers who initiated a project and become
associated with the results of that project will tend to continue that project. Information
asymmetry and an incentive to shirk must exist for this to occur. (Harrison and Harrell
1993). Under conditions for moral hazard, IS practitioners tended to implement a system
with quality problems. However, this is modified by ethical considerations: moral equity
(what is right) and relativism (is the behavior acceptable in this ethical context)
considerations (Tuttle, Harrell and Harrison 1997). Sharp and Salter (1997) found that
agency theory had a strong explanatory capability in North American subjects, but not
for Asian subjects.
Organization Structure and Values. An unclear organizational structure or weak
culture could also lead to escalation (Wissema 2002). Where there is an unclear division
of responsibilities, signals indicating problems in a project can be missed as managers
assume that others are attending to those signals. Alternately, one manager may be
overwhelmed and ignore the signal or another may simply pass it on to that manager.
Similarly, where there is a weak culture, the signal may be lost in wrangling over how to
respond or who is to respond to the signal.

1.2.5

Contextual Determinants

Finally, Staw (1997) indicates that extra organizational influences may cause escalation.
For example, in the case of the Shoreham nuclear reactor project, there was external
pressure from the Federal Department of Energy and various pro-nuclear groups for
continuance of the project against the effects of anti-nuclear activist groups (Ross and
Staw 1993).
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1.3

MODELS OF ESCALATION

Four different attempts have been made at creating a model to describe escalation. The
first, was a temporal model of escalation described in Ross and Staw (1986). It was a
stage model in which there were three stages to escalation: 1) Beginning the course of
action; 2) Receiving questionable or negative results and 3) Receiving highly negative
results. In each phase psychological and social forces were described as holding the
decision makers in place in the current course of action. This model did not receive
much empirical support (Staw 1997) and Staw (1997) proposed an alternative
“aggregate” model (figure 1.1).

Project Economics
Positive

Neutral

Negative

Very Negative

Biases
Perceived Project Economics

Commitment to a Course of Action

Psychological

Social

Organizational Contextual

Determinants Determinants Determinants Determinants

Figure 1.1: Staw (1997)’s aggregate model of escalation
Staw’s model portrays commitment to a course of action as the result of behavioral
variables interacting with perceived project economics. The behavioral variables in
addition to directly affecting the commitment to a course of action also influence how the
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decision maker sees the project economics. Commitment is held to be the balancing of
forces between negative economic data and the behavior variables. The key assumption
is that “the behavioral forces must match or exceed the strength of any negative
economic data in order to hold [decision makers] in a failing course of action” (Staw
1997, p. 209).
In an unpublished
article, Royer (2002) proposed an eight phase 243
processMähring andconference
Keil
oriented model of both escalation and de-escalation based on two case studies. Royer’s
model includes four escalation phases: (i) blindly going on, (ii) relentlessness,
(iii)
2: Royer’s (2002) eight phases of escalation and deescalation.a
diagnosis,Figure
and (iv)
verification.
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Mahring and Keil (2008) proposed a process model of escalation (figure 1.3). In this
model, they argue that an escalating project begins with the framing of the project
Phase 1

Drift

Antecedent
Condition

Project
Framing

Phase 2

Unsuccessful
Incremental
Adaptation

Phase 3

Rationalized
Continuation

Within-phase

Within-phase

Within-phase

Escalation
Catalysts

Escalation
Catalysts

Escalation
Catalysts

Ambiguity
concerning
project
charter

Mismatch of
problems and
attempted
solutions

Alternatives
are equally
problematic

Outcome

Deescalation
Initiation
Resulting Phase
Transition Trigger

Problem
Emergence

Resulting Phase
Transition Trigger

Resulting Phase
Transition Trigger

Increased
Problem
Visibility

Imminent
threat to
continuation

Figure 1.3: Adapted from Mahring and Keil (2008)’s escalation process model
which they describe as being ambiguous. This allows the project to drift until conflicts
concerning goal and direction arise signaling problems in the project. Solutions are
attempted without a change in direction but the solutions attempted don’t match the
problems resulting in increasing problem visibility. This results in a movement to the third
stage in which the problems and problem continuation are rationalized. This continues
until the rationalizations lose their credibility at which point de-escalation is enacted.

1.4

DE-ESCALATION STUDIES

Staw (1997) does not include de-escalation studies within his classification scheme. Deescalation studies have investigated how projects have or can be de-escalated. These
studies are of interest to this dissertation since the Deaf Effect can be considered a
failure to de-escalate. Knowing the conditions under which de-escalation occurs may be
enlightening to the study of why de-escalation does not occur.
Simonson and Staw (1992) found that a) making negative outcomes less threatening, b)
setting minimum target levels that if not reached result in change of policy and c)
evaluating decision makers on process rather than outcome were most effective in
making decision makers more responsible to available evidence.
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Montealegre and Keil (2000) found de-escalation is a gradual process vs. a sudden
event. It is not random but a patterned sequence of events. De-escalation is a dynamic
process that is simultaneously constricted by actions in the antecedent episode, yet
capable of constructing new patterns of commitment to alternative courses of action. Deescalation is a four phase process – 1) problem recognition; 2) re-examination of
previous course of action; 3) search for alternative solutions; 4) implementing an exit
strategy. Phase 1 requires a clear understanding that there is a problem. There needs to
be unambiguous signs of issues or external events that trigger a general reassessment
of resource allocation and allow de-escalation to occur. The Deaf Effect would prevent
any of these steps from being taken.
McNamara, Moon and Bromiley (2002) found that increased monitoring of decision
makers and changing decision makers attenuated escalation in commercial lending
decisions. However, this had second order effects in decision makers avoiding
recognition of the problem in order to avoid increased scrutiny or loss of control of the
account.
Heng, Tan and Wei (2003) found that in conditions of low sunk cost, superiors or peers
who assisted in shouldering blame or providing assurance facilitated de-escalation of
commitment to a course of action, However, in case of high sunk cost none of these
options were effective.
Pan, Pan and Flynn (2004; Pan, Pan, Newman and Flynn 2006) investigated how a
manager de-escalated commitment and turned around a government e-procurement
project. In this project, the Deaf Effect occurred because the project manager was
looking at the sunk cost already in the project. The project steering committee was
unwilling to de-escalate the project because they feared reporting their problems to the
cabinet deputy responsible for the area and additionally were unwilling to disappoint
everybody involved in the project. Pan, et al. identified that the manager used the
techniques of behavior disconfirmation, continuous commitment, provision of
psychological safety, development of new attitudes and behaviors, and the alignment
and integration of the new attitudes and behaviors to turn around the project. They
subsequently recast these findings into an evaluation model of escalation and deescalation in IS projects based on the theories of approach-avoidance conflict and
punctuated equilibrium (Pan, et al. 2006). We see in this example, that organizational
aspects such as perception of their management’s expectations of their performance
caused the project steering committee to continue escalation to this failing course of
action.

1.5

COMMUNICATION ISSUES

Recently another stream of research has emerged subsequent to Staw (1997), to
provide another explanation for project escalation: failures of communication. This line of
research finds its inspiration in social psychology theory (O'Neal, Levine and Frank
1979; Tesser, Rosen and Conlee 1972) and the management theories of whistle blowing
(Miceli and Near 1992) and organizational communication (Morrison and Milliken
2000).It has developed an approach to viewing escalation as being caused by a failure
in the organizational communication systems used to report bad news about the project
to the decision maker.
The literature in this section considers how organizational communication systems result
in a) suppression of bad news reports (the Mum Effect) (Keil and Robey 1999; Keil and
Robey 2001; Smith and Keil 2003; Smith, Keil and Depledge 2001), b) distortion of the
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message in project status reporting or through intrusive supervision, or confrontational
regulation (Athanassiades 1973; Smith, Iacovou and Thompson 2005) or, c) the refusal
of the decision maker to heed the report of bad news (the Deaf Effect) (Keil and Robey
2001)

1.5.1

The Mum Effect.

The Mum Effect term was coined by Tesser and Rosen (1972), and the effect has been
investigated in a number of escalation studies (Smith and Keil 2003; Smith, et al. 2001;
Tan, Smith, Keil and Montealegre 2003). The model proposed by Smith and Keil (2003)
holds that perceptions of project situations create an assessment that the status ought to
be reported which in conjunction with personal ethical standards creates an assessment
that the individual has a responsibility to report. Given the assessment of a responsibility
to report, the potential reporter assesses the alternatives to reporting including the
probability of retaliation etc. This final assessment leads to a decision to report or not
report.
Perception
of Project
Situation

Status
Should be
Reported

Personal
Resp. to
Report

Assessment
of
Alternatives

Decision
to Report

Figure 1.4: Smith and Keil (2003)’s model of the Mum Effect

1.5.2

Tourish and Robson’s Theory

Tourish and Robson (2006) have recently proposed a theory that describes how critical
upward communication is suppressed in organizations. Their theory (figure 1.5) argues
that managers by means of the systems they set up or by their reactions suppress
critical upward communication. They may simply ignore critical communications,
question it more severely than supportive messages or may have information systems
that filter out critical message. Thus, they consciously or unconsciously reinforce
ingratiating behaviors and suppress dissenting messages so that potential reporters of
bad news may cease to report it. This results in a disjunction in knowledge of the status
of projects between the employees and the managers so that the managers may make
decisions based on inaccurate information resulting in iatrogenic interventions leading to
project failure.
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Figure 1.5: Tourish and Robson (2006)’s theory of Critical Upward Communication
1.6

THE DEAF EFFECT

The term Deaf Effect was coined by Keil and Robey (1999) and some limited evidence
of the phenomenon as it relates to IT projects was reported in one subsequent study
(Keil and Robey, 2001). They reported on a survey of IS auditors who were attempting to
report bad news. In at least three cases their reports were ignored by decision makers.
The auditors themselves on attempting to report were in some cases terminated.
Another anecdotal report of the Deaf Effect comes from the report of the Challenger
Disaster (Hauptman and Iwaki 1990). There, a group of engineers tried to indicate to
management that the launch of the shuttle at low temperatures might result in a failure of
the O-rings on the solid rocket boosters resulting in catastrophic failure. Despite
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repeated attempts to communicate to management that there were significant risks of
failure, they were ignored and management approved the launch.
The frequency with which the Deaf Effect occurs and the range of factors that may
contribute to the phenomenon remain unknown at this time. The only empirical study
that addresses the Deaf Effect appears to be that of Wissema (2002), who studied 14
cases of management failure. In those cases he identified that managers often ignored
warning signals of impending failure; a phenomenon that he referred to as “red light
running”. He indicated that managers either did not notice, ignored, suppressed or
scorned “warning signals which . . . would have contributed to preventing an incorrect
decision.” (p. 522). He found nine factors that contributed to low red-light sensitivity:
tension between styles of decision making, focusing on a single issue to the exclusion of
all else, haste and impatience, tiredness and stress, overconfidence, groupthink, unclear
structure or culture, poor information systems and ignoring intuition.
Based on anecdotal stories from Keil and Robey (2001) and those of such non-IS
occurrences as those related by Wissema and that of the Challenger Disaster, I formally
define the phenomenon as occurring
When a decision maker doesn’t hear, ignores or overrules a report of bad news
to continue a failing course of action
In terms of bad news reporting, the Deaf Effect is distinct from the “Mum Effect” which
can be defined as the failure to transmit a report of bad news (Keil and Robey 2001).
Where the Mum Effect occurs, the potential bad news reporter is unwilling to report bad
news whereas in the Deaf Effect, the bad news reporter transmits the message, but the
intended recipient either doesn’t hear it or refuses to act upon it.

1.6.1

The Deaf Effect and the Escalation Literature

The place of the Deaf Effect in the escalation literature can be seen from how it is
explained by the models summarized in the literature review. In terms of Staw (1997)’s
model (figure 1.1), the Deaf Effect can be seen as the result of biases that result in
improper project economics being perceived by the decision maker. These biases are
created by the various escalation determinants. Thus the solution to the Deaf Effect is to
prevent the creation of biases by the elimination of the escalation determinants.
Questions remain however, as to what the biases are that result in the Deaf Effect and
which determinants lead to the Deaf Effect.
In Royer (2002)’s model, the Deaf Effect can be seen as blindly going in the face of
negative news about the project and relentlessly continuing in the face of revealers.
Royer’s model does not however provide an explanation for why the decision maker
goes blindly on or continues relentlessly.
In terms of Mahring and Keil (2008)’s model (figure 1.3), the Deaf Effect can be seen as
a factor that prevents correct identification of problems in phase 1. No problems may be
identified or they may be minimized so as to not be considered correctly thus generating
the mismatch between problems and solutions. However, their model does not provide
us an explanatory mechanism as to why the Deaf Effect occurs in the first place.
Finally, in Tourish and Robson (2006)’s model (figure 1.5), the Deaf Effect can be seen
as a mechanism for communicating the idea that dissent or critical upward
communication is not desired. By not acting, this signals to the organization that the
report of bad news is not welcome. This results in suppression of the report of bad news
(the “Mum Effect”) or in the desire of potential reports to report bad news in a low volume
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(attenuation of the salience) or to make the news appear less bad than they really
believe that it is (distortion). This describes more of an organizational level of deafness.
The organization doesn’t respond to the report of bad news. It doesn’t explain why the
decision maker is “deaf” in the first place.

1.7

THIS DISSERTATION

The preceding review of the escalation literature has shown that the Deaf Effect has not
previously received systematic study in either the management or IS literature.
Additionally, the escalation models don’t provide good explanatory purchase for the
occurrence of the Deaf Effect. A gap exists in explaining how the Deaf Effect occurs and
therefore how it can be avoided in project situations. This dissertation seeks to fill that
gap by contributing the first systematic study of the Deaf Effect. As such it is an
exploratory investigation into the phenomenon at the individual level. The first three
studies (chapters 2-4) report laboratory experiments that progressively build up the
parameters of a variance model. The last study (chapter 5) is a case study in which the
history of a project in which the Deaf Effect occurred is explored to determine if the
model developed in laboratory experiments has explanatory power in the field. The
following sections briefly describe the objectives of each study. The final chapter
summarizes what has been learned in this dissertation.

1.7.1

Chapter 2 (Laboratory Experiment 1): Construction and Test of a Model
at the Individual Level

This study constructed a model of the occurrence of the Deaf Effect and tested it in a
laboratory experiment. Using Evans’ Heuristic-Analytic theory of decision making and
Miceli and Near’s whistle-blowing theory, it proposed hypotheses that the Deaf Effect
occurs when the decision maker does not consider the report of bad news to be
sufficiently relevant. Additionally, it hypothesized that the relevance of the message is a
function of the credibility of the bad news reporter. The hypotheses were confirmed, but
male gender was also found to be a factor in increasing the willingness to continue the
current course of action.

1.7.2

Chapter 3 (Laboratory Experiment 2): Effects of Gender, Risk and Role
Prescription on the Deaf Effect

In the previous study, gender was seen to be a significant factor on the decision to
continue a course of action. Additionally, while the contours of the model were found to
be true, the Deaf Effect was not technically observed in that study. In this study, the
model from study 1 is expanded by consideration of the effects of risk propensity and
risk perception to explain the effect of gender on the decision to continue the current
course of action. Role Prescription is added to explain the lack of occurrence of the Deaf
Effect in study 1. The model was tested in a laboratory experiment. Relevance of the
bad news report, Risk Propensity, and Risk Perception were found to be significant in
the explanation of the decision to continue a course of action. Male gender was found to
increase Risk Propensity and decrease Risk Perception.

1.7.3

Chapter 4 (Laboratory Experiment 3): Effect of Societal Collectivism on
the Deaf Effect

The previous studies were conducted in the individualistic culture of the United States. It
is possible that collectivism and its emphasis on allegiance to the group may cause the
occurrence of the Deaf Effect to be diminished. In this study, I considered the effects of
perceived societal collectivism on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect using the GLOBE
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framework of cultural variables. This experiment replicated the study of Chapter 3 in the
USA, Germany and China. This study found that how the decision maker perceives the
values of the culture had little effect on the occurrence of Deaf Effect but the structural
model found in the previous two studies was substantially replicated in all three
geographies. However, while the structural model was replicated, the effect sizes of Risk
Perception and Relevance of the bad news report were reversed in China vs. the
western cultures. This suggests that in China, individuals place more emphasis on the
inherent riskiness of the project rather than the report of bad news in determining
whether to continue a course of action. Additionally, in Germany, Role Prescription was
found to not have a significant contribution to the relevance of the report of bad news. It
is suggested that this occurs because in Germany, internal auditors (the description of
the role prescribed bad news reporter) are viewed as time wasters who don’t add value
to the project.

1.7.4

Chapter 5: A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

The previous studies were conducted in laboratory experiments using student subjects.
In this study, I moved the examination to the study of the occurrence in the Deaf Effect in
an actual project situation. This study examined the occurrence of the Deaf Effect in an
Information Systems project in a state government organization over a time period from
2003 to 2006. Gathering data through interviews of project personnel and observation of
project status review meetings, this study suggests that the pattern identified in the
structural model of the first three experiments holds in an actual project situation among
IS professionals. It also suggests that illusion of control and highly political environments
are potential causes for rejection of the report of bad news. It also found that given the
motivation to shirk, information asymmetries allowed the project director to distort the
status of the project in reporting to the oversight committees.

1.7.5

Chapter 6: Summary

The final chapter reviews the findings from the four studies undertaken in this
dissertation and summarizes them, identifies the contribution, limitations and
implications for research and practice.

1.8

SUMMARY

Escalation of commitment continues to be a serious issue in information systems project
management. While various causal factors have been proposed, recently a new set of
factors based in the communication of project status and critical upward communication
has been proposed as explanatory factors. This dissertation adds to this stream of
research by studying the Deaf Effect, when decision makers don’t hear, ignore or
overrule reports of bad news to continue failing courses of action. In a series of four
studies, it makes an initial exploration of the Deaf Effect by building up a variance model
at the individual level in laboratory experiments and then verifying that model in a case
study.
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2 CONSTRUCTION AND TEST OF A MODEL AT THE
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL1
2.1

ABSTRACT

Project escalation is known to frequently occur in the context of information systems (IS)
projects. The reluctance to hear bad news--a phenomenon that has been labelled the “deaf
effect”--has been suggested as a possible reason for why projects are allowed to escalate for as
long as they sometimes do. The deaf effect response to bad news reporting has received little
research attention, yet may account for many cases of project escalation. The research reported
here provides a description of conditions under which the deaf effect is likely to occur.
Hypotheses regarding factors involved in causing the deaf effect are articulated based on Miceli
and Near’s theory of bad news reporting effectiveness and further elaborated using insights from
the cognitive psychology literature of decision making. The extended theory was then tested
experimentally using a role-playing experiment. Results suggest that when a decision maker
perceives a relevant message, s/he is willing to de-escalate the project. Bad news reporter
credibility and the gender of the decision maker were found to be key factors in the determination
of message relevance.

2.2

INTRODUCTION

Information systems project failures typically exhibit ample warning signs of impending
failure, but for reasons that are not well understood, these warning signs are frequently
ignored. In many cases, there are team members or even a single individual that seek to
call attention to critical issues and ask for a delay or change of course in the project
direction. In those cases, it is important to know why senior management did not heed
the “bad news reporter” who warned them that the project was in danger of failing. This
failure to heed the bad news reporter has been called the “deaf effect” (Keil and Robey
2001).
The information systems discipline is rife with this phenomenon. For example, the UK
Child Support Agency recently spent 456 million GBP on a new system. During the
development period, it received 70 audits of which 70% had identified serious concerns.
Yet it was delivered with 52 critical defects and, three years after delivery, productivity
has fallen from pre-implementation levels and the staff has to use 600 workarounds
(Computer.Business.Review 2006). In the famous Providian Trust case (McFarlan and
Dailey 1997), an internal auditor attempted to signal serious issues with a project and
ended up getting fired for his trouble. The system went on to fail spectacularly.
Failures involving the deaf effect represent a serious problem, and this is an
understudied area. Only one IS study has discussed this failure to respond. While Keil &
and Robey (2001) have demonstrated that the deaf effect does occur, no study has yet
investigated how or why this effect occurs. The research question that we seek to
investigate is “What are some of the causal factors that that create the deaf effect?”
In this research, we propose that credibility of the bad news reporter affects the decision
1

This paper has been published in the e‐Service Journal as Cuellar, M. J., Keil, M., and
Johnson, R.D., “The Deaf Effect Response to Bad News Reporting in Information Systems
Projects,” e‐Service Journal (5:1), pp. 75‐97.
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process behind the response to bad news reporting. This proposition is tested by means
of a laboratory experiment. The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of
relevant literature on whistle-blowing, bad news reporting, and decision making, along
with the hypotheses to be tested. Then, we introduce the experimental design, present
the results of the study, and briefly discuss its implications.

2.3

LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of the literature reveals that only one publication (Keil and Robey 2001) has
dealt with the deaf effect in information systems project management. Keil and Robey
(2001) described the “deaf effect” as a failure to respond to messages of impending
project failure. Based on a survey of internal auditors, they demonstrated that the deaf
effect exists in IS project management situations. The auditors surveyed recounted
instances in which they had reported bad news about projects only to find that their
concerns were ignored by senior management.
Without an existing literature or theory base that bears directly on this phenomenon, we
review reference theories from management and cognitive psychology that can be used
to construct hypotheses regarding factors that may promote the deaf effect. In this
section, we examine the literature related to whistle-blowing effectiveness, and decision
making theory, which can be used to inform a model of the deaf effect response to bad
news reporting.

2.3.1

Near and Miceli’s Model of Whistle-Blowing Effectiveness and the Deaf
Effect

Whistle-blowing as used by Near and Miceli is defined as “the disclosure by organization
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control
of their employers, to person or organization that may be able to affect action” (Miceli
and Near 2002, p. 456). In the IT project context, the bad-news reporter is not
necessarily disclosing illegal, or immoral practices, but rather the fact that they believe
that the present direction of the project is a failing course of action. The question then
arises as to whether this literature has appropriate bearing upon consideration of the
deaf effect.
We hold that the two phenomena are sufficiently similar to allow us to use the whistle
blowing literature to inform our study. While in the case of the deaf effect, nothing illegal
is being disclosed, the reporter is disclosing what s/he perceives to be a failing course of
action that is not being addressed by the project leadership. This failing course of action
is similar to illegitimate acts when sponsored by management because although
management has endorsed the project, continuing a failing course of action is
inappropriate and represents a waste of corporate resources. Reporters of bad news
also face pressures similar to those of whistle-blowers. Whistle-blowers of illegal
activities find that disclosure of the problem is a high risk activity and thus are reluctant
to report (Miceli and Near 1992; Miceli, Near and Schwenk 1991). Reporters of bad
news in projects perceive reporting similarly (Keil and Robey 2001; Smith, et al. 2001).
Thus we find that bad news reporting is conceptually similar to whistle-blowing.
Near and Miceli (1995) describe a model of whistle-blowing effectiveness. They argue
that the effectiveness of whistle-blowing is based on the personal characteristics
(credibility and power) of the whistle-blower and the complaint recipient, moderated by
the support for the whistle-blower and the wrongdoer as well as situational and
organizational characteristics of the wrong-doing. They describe credibility as being
composed of the indicators of the whistle-blower’s perceived motives, ability to convince
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others of their correctness, trustworthiness and power as the whistle-blower’s status,
position in the hierarchy, and perceived value to the organization. Thus a well-respected
whistle-blower in a position of power will be more effective than one who has little
standing and resides in the lower echelons of the organization.
Near and Miceli (1995) further proposed that characteristics of the wrongdoing and the
organization also have an effect on the organizational response. If the organization has
been dependent on the form of wrongdoing, or there is little evidence or legal basis for
complaint about the wrongdoing, the organization’s willingness to change will be lower.
Conversely, if the organization looks favorably on whistle blowing and is less
bureaucratic, their willingness to change will be higher. From the standpoint of the deaf
effect, this seems to indicate that the deaf effect would be more likely to occur when the
decision maker is dependent upon continuance of the current course of the project to
maintain his/her organizational status or reputation.

2.3.2

Cognitive Psychological Theories of Decision-making

Since the deaf effect response is a failure of the decision making process, an
examination of decision making theory is appropriate for building a theory of its
causation. In this section, we examine the cognitive psychology behind decision making
to investigate the factors that come into play when a decision is made.
There are many different psychological theories of decision making. However, current
theory in this area suggests that decision making can be regarded as a two-step process
(Evans 1984; Evans 1989; Kahneman 2003; Stanovich and West 1998, pp. 309-310).
These theories hold that the two-step process arose due to the vast amount of data
available to a decision maker. In any non-trivial problem, finding a solution requires
searching through a vast number of possible solution paths. Thus, humans are
confronted daily with more information than can possibly be processed. To handle this
onslaught of data effectively, they developed heuristic processes to conserve their
scarce processing power. And when one does think about these selected pieces of
information, it is in the context of a mental model of the world rather than the actual
world itself as the world is too large to comprehend totally (Evans 1989). Two major
theories in this area are those proposed by Evans (1984; 1989) and Kahneman (2003).
In both theories, the decision is held to be made in two phases. In the first phase,
(intuition/heuristic), reasoning is performed in a largely automatic, unconscious, preattentive manner. In phase 2 (reason/analytic), reasoning is deliberate, conscious and
monitored. It is generally held that information is selected as relevant or accessed during
the first phase for consideration in the second phase. We adopt the Evans’ HeuristicAnalytic (HA) model for use in this paper.

2.3.2.1.

Heuristic-Analytic Theory

HA theory postulates that thinking is selectively focused on ‘relevant’ parts of problems
and that prior knowledge, heuristics, and schemas are retrieved as determined
necessary by pre-attentive heuristics (Evans,1996). See figure 2.1. Evans (1989)
postulates that the major cause of bias in human reasoning lies in the heuristic
processes adopted to select information for processing. If a heuristic fails to select a key
piece of information or selects an irrelevant piece of information for processing, the
subsequent analysis will be flawed. The analysis itself will be accurate only to the extent
that the mental model of the world that one has constructed is accurate (1989).
In the heuristic phase, two groups of factors affect the selection of relevant information:
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message characteristics and the mental model of the decision maker. The message
characteristics include such components as vividness/salience, comprehensibility and
certain linguistic cues. Vividness/salience refers to how well the message stands out
from competing messages/sensations within the decision maker’s environment.
Linguistic cues signal the decision maker on how to focus their attention (Evans 1996).
The decision maker’s mental model refers to the model that the decision maker has of
the real world including their conception of cause and effect relationships, expectations,
beliefs and other structural factors. In the heuristic phase of decision making these
structures are accessed pre-consciously to assist in filtering relevant from irrelevant
information. From the decision maker’s bank of experience, additional available relevant
information is also accessed.

Heuristic

Bad News
Reporter’s
Message
Salience

Processing

Decision
Relevant
Information

Processing

Decision

Vividness
Linguistic
Factors

Mental
Prior
Knowledge Model

Figure 2.1: Model of Heuristic-Analytic Decision-Making Process

2.4

A RESEARCH MODEL OF THE DEAF EFFECT

In this section, we use the insights from cognitive psychology and Miceli and Near’s
whistle-blowing effectiveness theory to develop a research model (figure 2.2) that
provides the basis for an initial experiment on the causes of the deaf effect. We adopt
the basic process from Evans for the proposed model.
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Bad News Reporter
Credibility

H3 –
H2 +
Relevance
of the Message

Decision
H1 -

Figure 2.2: Research model for this experiment
Evans (1989) states that decision makers pre-attentionally select the information that
they believe will be relevant to making the decision using their mental model heuristics.
Thus the bad news reporter’s (BNR’s) message would be evaluated for relevance using
the decision maker’s mental model heuristics. Once it the message passed the
heuristics, it would be considered in the decision process. From this we see that to be
effective, a BNR’s message must be considered as relevant before it can be actively
evaluated. We therefore propose hypothesis 1:
H1: When the report of bad news is considered relevant, the decision
maker will be more likely to discontinue the present course of action
Part of this pre-attentive processing is to determine whether the bad news report must
be attended to. This is where the credibility of the whistle-blower as postulated by Near
and Miceli (1995) may be processed. If the decision maker determines that the whistleblower is not credible, then the message may be disregarded. We therefore propose the
following hypothesis:
H2: Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will tend
to have their messages considered as relevant
Miceli and Near also indicate that whistle-blowers that who are credible are also more
effective in terminating wrongdoing. The Heuristic Analytic Theory indicates that during
relevance processing, information is selected and passed on to the analytic process for
analysis. Thus the decision makers may bring their assessment of the credibility of the
whistle-blower into their decision process. The effect of the BNR’s credibility may not be
completely mediated by the relevance decision but may also have a direct effect on the
decision. Therefore we propose hypothesis 3:
H3: Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will be
more effective in convincing the decision maker to change their course
of action

2.5

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

2.5.1

Experimental Model

We tested these hypotheses using a role-playing experiment with student subjects.
While the use of student subjects can pose limitations in terms of external validity, there
is ample precedent for using student subjects in studies with organizational decision
making tasks (Sitkin and Weingart 1995) and, specifically, decisions associated with
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project management (Harrison and Harrell 1993; Smith, et al. 2001). There is support in
the literature for using students as surrogates for managers in studies that focus on
decision making and which do not require deep knowledge of particular domain. Remus
(1986), for example, reported no differences in decision making between students and
managers in the context of production scheduling. Locke (1986, p. 6) notes that “both
college students and employees appear to respond similarly to goals, feedback,
incentives, participation, and so forth, perhaps because the similarities among these
subjects (such as in values) are more crucial than their differences.” Liyanarachchi and
Milne (2005) have indicated that in situations where only psychological processes are
being tested and not attitudes and knowledge that would be developed through
experience, students stand as a good surrogate for experienced managers. Additionally,
the role-playing scenario was constructed so as to place the subject in the role of a
recent graduate, which provides a decision making context that is close to what might be
expected from the subject population.

2.5.2

Scenario Description

We created a role-playing experiment that included the elements of the deaf effect
described above. Modeled partially on the Providian Trust case (McFarlan, 1997), the
subjects were cast as a project manager responsible for development of a new system
to be put into production. As part of standard procedures, an internal auditor has
reviewed the project and given a negative report on its readiness for production. The
auditor has not given specific or understandable reasons for why s/he believes the
project will fail and the decision maker was not given enough information to resolve the
problem himself alone, forcing him to rely on the assertions of others. Exogenous factors
were introduced to motivate the subjects in the direction of putting the system into
production. The decision maker can choose to have a known problem in dealing with his
management’s expectations if s/he chooses to delay the project, or an uncertain
catastrophic problem if s/he implements the system and the auditor is right or no pain at
all if the system implementation goes well.
Two alternate case scenarios manipulated the credibility of the auditor (see Appendices
A and B). In creating this manipulation, we made use of source credibility theory.
According to this theory, source credibility is primarily composed of two dimensions:
Expertise, the extent to which a speaker is considered to be capable of making correct
assertions and trustworthiness, the extent to which a speaker can be relied upon to
make true assertions (Hovland, Janis and Kelley 1953). In general, a highly credible
source is more effective in creating attitudinal or behavioral change than a source with
low credibility. The expertise and trustworthy trustworthiness dimensions have
differential weights; in general, trustworthiness has a larger impact than expertise
(McGinnies and Ward 1980). In terms of the construction of the message, evidence and
argumentation used by the source have mixed effects. The presence of unfamiliar
evidence increased increases the credibility of the low credibility source, but left leaves
the high credibility source unchanged (McCroskey 1969; McCroskey 1970). The quality
of arguments changed changes attitudes more for the high credibility source than for the
low and decision makers were are more likely to act based on strong arguments of a
highly credible source and least likely to act when the highly credible source gave gives
weak arguments (Moore et al, 1986).
When the message disagrees with the recipients’ initial opinion, a highly credible source
was is more effective the more the message disagrees with the recipient’s opinions,
while the low credibility sources were are more effective with only a moderate level of
disagreement (Bochner and Insko 1966). When faced with various kinds of threats
Chapter 1 - Introduction

31

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
(physical or social) for non-compliance with the message, the most effective in changing
attitudes was is the strong threat delivered by a highly credible source (Miller and
Basehart 1969). A bias also seems to exist in the message style; low credibility sources
tend to have their negative information rejected more significantly than positive
information. Similarly, a high credibility source has the negative information given more
credence than positive (Czapinski and Lewicka 1979). Language intensity has a
contrasting impact. For high credibility sources, it enhances their message. However, for
low intensity sources it decreases their effectiveness (Hamilton, Hunter and Burgoon
1990).
In the positive scenario for our study, the auditor was portrayed as valuable to the
company and had having a track record of successfully evaluating projects (i.e.,
possessing expertise and trustworthiness). In the negative scenario, the auditor had a
poor track record. Moreover, the subject’s team and manager dismissed his credibility
and the auditor was said to “cry wolf” in order to gain attention (i.e., the auditor lacked
expertise and trustworthiness). As indicated by the source credibility literature, the lack
of evidence produced by the auditor will not hurt him in the high credibility manipulation
nor provide needed enhancement in the low credibility treatment. The scenario uses a
negative message contrasting with the subject’s initial opinion, has extreme language
(“disaster waiting to happen”), and places the subject in a socially threatening
environment, all aspects that should enhance the positively placed auditor and not
enhance the negatively placed auditor.

2.5.3

Operationalization of Variables

The key experimental variables were operationalized using a set of questions with a
Likert scale. The individual scale items for each variable were centered prior to analysis.
Dependent Variable: Decision. The dependent variable, Decision, was operationalized
as a single, eight-point Likert scale question in which the subject was asked to choose to
“Test Further” or “Move to Production”. Anchor points for the variable were “Definitely
Test Further” and “Definitely Move to Production.” Intermediate points were “strongly,”,
“somewhat” and “slightly” on each side of the scale. While it might be thought that
“Decision” is a binary yes/no variable, we wanted to additionally measure the strength of
their decision. We wanted to get a reading on whether they subjects believed strongly in
their decision.
Independent Variables: Relevance, Salience and Perception of Auditor Credibility.
The independent variables were operationalized using multi-item seven-point Likert
scale questions anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end
points and “neutral” in the mid-point. The last relevance question was reverse scaled.
We measured salience as a manipulation check to ensure that there was not a variation
in salience of the auditor’s message between the scenarios.

2.5.4

Instrument

Students were instructed to read the scenario as described above and then were asked
to make a decision as to whether to move the project into production (i.e., implement it)
or delay the project for further testing.
A subsequent questionnaire (Appendix C) then asked for the reasons for their decision.
Demographic data were collected for Gender, Age, and Years of full-time paid work
experience.
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2.5.5

Statistical Controls

A number of demographic variables were statistically controlled for in the study. Gender
was dummy coded (female = 0 and male =1) as was the class from which the samples
were drawn. We also collected age, and years of full-time experience. These variables
were centered prior to the analysis. We also collected information on the salience of the
auditor’s message that we used as a manipulation check to ensure that the salience did
not vary across the manipulations.

2.6

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

This section describes the results obtained from the study. In this study, causal linkages
were noted moving in a single direction from credibility to relevance and from relevance
to Decision. While many behavioral studies are non-directional, there seemed to be only
one logical possibility for movement in this study.

2.6.1

Demographics

The demographics of our subject pool can be seen in Table 1. Subjects had an average
age of 20.5 years and an average work experience of 2.5 years. Fifty-seven percent of
the subjects were female and 43% were male.

2.6.2

Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Checks

We obtained 60 usable responses. Table 2,1 shows the descriptive statistics for the key
variables. Table 2,2 shows the same variables split into treatment groups. Two tailed ttests were performed at 5% alpha in order to determine significant differences in the
scores between the two treatment groups. These are shown in Table 2,3.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

N

Decision

2.83

1.924

60

Relevance

4.95

1.303

60

Salience

4.62

1.025

60

Auditor Credibility

4.472

1.33

60

Table 2,2 shows the same variables split into treatment groups.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Group
Treatment

Variable

Mean

Standard
Dev.

Negative

Decision

3.26

2.016

N=31

Relevance

4.63

1.294

Salience

4.56

1.138

Auditor
Credibility

3.67

1.128

Gender

16 male/15
female

Positive

Decision

2.37

1.712

N=30

Relevance

5.26

1.26

Salience

4.68

.912

Auditor
Credibility

5.28

.995

Gender

11 male/19
female

Two tailed t-tests were performed at 5% alpha in order to determine significant
differences in the scores between the two treatment groups. These are shown in Table
3.
Table 2.3: Results of Two Tailed t-Tests
Variable

Difference

t-score

Significance

Decision

.89

1.859

.068

Relevance

-.62

-1.897

.063

Salience

-.12

-0.438

.663

Auditor Credibility

-1.61

-5.868

.000

These tests show that the perception of the auditor’s Credibility varied significantly
across the treatment groups. The manipulation therefore was effective. Salience, which
was held constant, did not vary significantly indicating that the perception of the salience
of the auditor’s message was stable across the treatments. The Decision variable
changed almost a point across the manipulations indicating that those receiving the
positive manipulation were less likely to move the product into production than those
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receiving the negative manipulation. Similarly, the subjects receiving the positive
manipulation had a higher perception of the Relevance of the auditor’s message and a
higher perception of the auditor’s credibility.
The Decision variable for both treatment groups showed that subjects tended to favor
delaying the product implementation. They also tended to consider the auditor’s
message relevant in both treatments.

2.6.3

PLS Analysis

We subjected the data to a PLS analysis using the SmartPLS program V2 M3 (Ringle,
Wende and Will 2005). Our figure 2.3 shows our structural model. is as shown here: We
analyzed each of the demographic variables against the model constructs to determine
any effects from them as well as the predicted effects. In addition to the PLS analysis,
we executed a bootstrap analysis using the default parameters of 100 sample size and
200 samples.

Figure 2.3: PLS Structural Model (from Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005)

Table 2.4 shows the quality measures from the PLS analysis:
Table 2,4: Quality Measures from the PLS Analysis
AVE
Age
Credibility
Decision
Gender

1.0000
0.6476
1.0000
1.0000
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Comp.
Reliab.
1.0000
0.8455
1.0000
1.0000

R Square Cronbach’s Communality Redundancy
Alpha
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0290
0.7447
0.6476
0.0077
0.6183
1.0000
1.0000
-0.0018
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
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Relevance
YearsFTE

0.7152
1.0000

0.9248
1.0000

0.1920
0.0000

0.8943
1.0000

0.7152
1.0000

0.0399
0.0000

We see that the Reliability reliabilities for both the credibility and Relevance variables are
over .84, the AVE is over .64 and the Cronbach’s alpha is over .74 for each, indicating
that we have good convergent validity for these constructs. PLS performs a confirmatory
factor analysis of the measurement model. The results of this analysis are shown in
Table 2.5:
Table 2.5: Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Age
Credibility Decision Gender Relevance YearsFTE
CAge
1.0000
-0.1353
0.2774
0.1426
-0.2434
0.4564
CYearsFTE 0.4564
-0.0003
0.2550
0.1451
-0.0974
1.0000
Decision
0.2774
-0.4244
1.0000
0.1646
-0.7341
0.2550
Gender
0.1426
-0.0892
0.1646
1.0000
0.0229
0.1451
IAHighlyReg 0.0693
0.7269
-0.2662
0.0553
0.1981
0.1500
IAMostCred -0.1696
0.8955
-0.4389 -0.1143
0.4327
-0.0085
IAOrgLoyalty -0.1628
0.7826
-0.2635 -0.1110
0.2112
-0.1138
RelvDisIA
-0.2024
0.2816
-0.4443 -0.0574
0.5931
-0.1185
RelvHighly -0.1461
0.3602
-0.6097
0.0529
0.9020
0.0111
RelvMorInfl -0.2301
0.4636
-0.7186
0.0674
0.9090
-0.1020
RelvMosInfl -0.2608
0.2685
-0.6717
0.0401
0.8849
-0.1783
RelvVeryImp -0.1856
0.2127
-0.6128 -0.0409
0.8952
-0.0201
From this analysis, we see that all measurement items factored as expected and that we
have no cross-loading. Additionally, the Latent Variable Correlations (Table 2.6) show
that none of the correlations exceeds the square root of the average variance indicating
good divergent validity for the Relevance and credibility constructs. The path coefficients
for the study are shown in Table 2.7. The significant paths are indicated. Figure 2,4
shows the significant paths.
Table 2.6: Latent Value Correlations (with SQRT(AVE) Inserted on the Diagonal)
Relevance Credibility Decision
Gender
Age
Years
FTE
Relevance
0.846
Credibility
0.3838
0.805
Decision
-0.7341
-0.4244
1.0000
Gender
0.0229
-0.0892
0.1646
1.0000
Age
-0.2434
-0.1353
0.2774
0.1426
1.0000
YearsFTE
-0.0974
-0.0003
0.2550
0.1451
0.4564
1.0000
The path coefficients for the study are shown in Table 2,7. The significant paths are
indicated.
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Table 2.7: Path Coefficients and t-Statistics for Bootstrap Analysis
Original
Sample
(O)

Sample
Mean (M)

Standard
Deviation
(STDEV)

Standard
Error
(STERR)

T Statistics
(|O/STERR|)

Age ->
Credibility*

-0.1632

-0.1650

0.0774

0.0774

2.1095

Age ->
Decision

-0.0032

0.0099

0.0771

0.0771

0.0421

Age ->
Relevance*

-0.1973

-0.1909

0.0893

0.0893

2.2095

Credibility ->
Decision*

-0.1586

-0.1548

0.0734

0.0734

2.1612

Credibility ->
Relevance*

0.3648

0.3772

0.0849

0.0849

4.2971

Gender ->
Credibility

-0.0783

-0.0842

0.1090

0.1090

0.7185

Gender ->
Decision*

0.1411

0.1520

0.0657

0.0657

2.1680

Gender ->
Relevance

0.0864

0.0909

0.1049

0.1049

0.8238

Relevance ->
Decision*

-0.6605

-0.6604

0.0526

0.0526

12.5575

YearsFTE ->
Credibility

0.0855

0.0805

0.1058

0.1058

0.8083

YearsFTE ->
Decision*

0.1716

0.1736

0.0590

0.0590

2.9072

YearsFTE ->
Relevance

-0.0198

-0.0192

0.0986

0.0986

0.2003

Drawing the significant paths in a diagram, we see figure 2.4:

Credibility
-1632

-.1586

Years Full Time Exp

.3648

.1716
Relevance
-.1973

Age

Decision
.1411

Gender

Figure 2.4: Schematic diagram of results from PLS analysis
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We find that as the Relevance of the auditor’s message increases, that the willingness of
the subject to decide to put the system into production decreases by approximately 2/3
of a point for each point increase in the Relevance score. Additionally, we find that as
the credibility of the auditor increases, the Relevance of the message to the subject’s
decision making process increases. Age tends to have a negative effect on the
Relevance of the auditor’s message. Male subjects and those who have full time work
experience tend to be more likely to put the system into production.

2.7

DISCUSSION

Three hypotheses were tested:
H1: When the report of bad news is considered relevant, the decision maker
will be more likely to discontinue the present course of action
H2: Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will tend to
have their messages considered as relevant
H3: Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will be more
effective in convincing the decision maker to change their course of
action
We found evidence supporting all of our hypotheses. We found that relevant messages
from the auditor were strongly significant and decreased Decision by approximately 2/3
point for each point increase in the Relevance score. This result indicates that to the
extent that the message is found to be relevant, the likelihood of changing course in
information systems projects is significantly increased. Thus hypothesis 1 was
supported. It was found that the credibility of the bad news reporter does co-vary with
the Relevance measure. Bad news reporters with higher credibility tended to have their
messages viewed as relevant in the context of information systems projects. Hypothesis
two was thus confirmed. We also found that credibility co-varies with Decision with 40%
of its effects being on Decision, which confirms hypothesis three. Thus, the whistleblower’s credibility not only affects how the subjects view the relevance of the message
to their decision, it also directly influences the subjects’ decisions.
Both treatment groups were strongly in favor of delaying the project. Even in the
negative treatment group, where the credibility of the auditor was significantly
questioned, the subjects opted to delay. One explanation for this effect stems from the
position of the auditor. Miceli and Near (2002) found that whistle blowing is more
effective when role-prescribed. In the descriptive comments section of the questionnaire,
several of the subjects referred to credibility that accrued to the auditor as a result of his
that role or the unwillingness to contradict the auditor even in the face of negative
comments by their team members and manager.
In an unexpected result, it was found that Gender had an effect on Decision. Women
were more likely to delay the project than men. One possible explanation for this
difference is that women are more willing to accept personal negative impacts in order to
avoid negative impacts to the organization. Additionally, we note that age tended to
decrease the credibility of the auditor and the relevance of the message and that
increasing full time work experience tended to increase the likelihood of putting the
system into production. These effects could be a result of socialization in the workplace.
It might be that as employees gain experience in organizations, they learn to defer to
managerial pressure and do what they perceive that their manager wants done when
they are in situations of uncertainty.
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Because the bad news reporter’s credibility was not fully mediated by perceived
Relevance and because Gender had an effect on Decision, we must modify the
experimental model by adding Gender as an effect on Decision and an effect from bad
news reporter credibility to the decision point.
Auditor Credibility

Years of Full Time Exp

Message Relevance

Decision

.

Age

Gender

Figure 2.5: Revised model
2.7.1

Implications for Research

The results on bad news reporter credibility results also support Miceli and Near’s
proposal that whistle-blowers that who are more credible are more effective in
terminating the offending behavior. The experiment has shown that when an internal
auditor is perceived as credible, the subjects are more likely to stop the project for
further testing.
Additional research is required to provide further development of this theory. The study
should be repeated with other subjects to test for generalizability. Active IS
professionals, especially project managers, should be studied to determine if the effect
occurs as described in that population. Variations of the study should be conducted with
subjects asked to play roles that do not have a role prescription for bad news reporting
to see whether this influences the deaf effect. More research is also needed to explore
the effects of age, full time work experience and Gender that was were observed in this
study.
The other areas of the model also need to be explored. Does the presence of additional
“noise” in the communication channel contribute to the decision maker not perceiving
that a message is trying to be sent? Are perceptual features critical to the relevance
determination? What other heuristics are used to determine relevance? The entire
analytic processing section needs to be researched. What is the process in by which the
decision is made? How is credibility considered? What factors beyond credibility are
considered in the analytic portion of the decision?
Additional research should be done on the organizational antecedents of the deaf effect.
What organizational factors favor the occurrence of the deaf effect? Are there actions,
deliberate or inadvertent, that managers take that incent subordinate decision makers to
continue failing courses of action in spite of bad news reports? Do organizational politics
make decision makers more likely to ignore bad news reporters? Does the cohort at the
top of a project have an effect on the occurrence of the deaf effect? Does homogeneity
or heterogeneity of the cohort modify the response to bad news?
While many questions remain to be answered, this study has shown evidence that the
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deaf effect response to bad news reporting is founded in the perceived relevance of the
bad news reporter’s message, which in turn is influenced by his/her perceived credibility
and salience of the message.

2.7.2

Implications for Practice

In terms of implications for practice, this study suggests that managers should seek to
raise the credibility of bad news reporters within the organization. Particularly for
auditors, who have to provide project assessments, efforts should be made to make
them credible to project teams. Raising their expertise and trustworthiness could do this.
They should have a significant knowledge base in the project’s technology and in
assessing project risk factors. Management should also provide indications of their
confidence and trust in them auditors by utilizing their services and providing support for
their bad news reporting actions. Auditors should also work with project teams in nonthreatening situations by becoming information resources to members of project teams,
thereby providing assistance in terms of providing proactive support in preventing or
mitigating project risk factors.

2.8

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we examined the deaf effect response to bad news reporting in information
systems project management in terms of Miceli and Near’s (2002) work on whistleblowing effectiveness, and Evans’ Heuristic-Analytic theory of decision making. We
developed a research model that hypothesized that the credibility of the bad news
reporter affected how relevant the decision maker found the bad news reporter’s
message. We tested the model in a role-playing experiment and found support for the
basic propositions of the theory examined. Bad news reporter credibility is partially
mediated by the relevance processing and has an effect on the decision.
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3 EFFECTS OF GENDER, RISK AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION ON
THE DEAF EFFECT
3.1

INTRODUCTION

The first paper in this dissertation found that the credibility of the bad news reporter has
a negative effect on the decision to continue the current course of action. The effect of
credibility was mediated by the perceived relevance of the bad news report. These
effects are illustrated in figure 3.1.

Years of
Experience
-.159
T=2.16*

Credibility

0.365
T=4.30**

Message
Relevance
R2=. 192

-0.163
T=2.11*

-0.197
T=2.21*

Age

0.171
T=2.91*

-0.660
T=12.56**

Decision to
Continue
R2=. 618

0.141
T=2.17*

Gender

Figure 3.1: Relationships between Credibility, Relevance and Decision to
continue a course of action
adapted
from of
paper
1
The
Credibility
the auditor
and the Relevance of the message were associated with a
decision to discontinue the failing course of action. When the auditor was credible and
his/her message considered relevant to their decision, the subject was more likely to
consider changing the course of action to hold the project for further testing. The
Credibility of the auditor also positively impacted the Relevance of the message of bad
news so that more credible auditors tended to have their message considered as
relevant. Male gender was found to decrease the willingness to change course of action.
One limitation of paper 1 was that in spite of the manipulation, the Deaf Effect was not
actually induced in a technical sense. While the relevance of the message was
positively associated with the strength of the decision, most of the subjects elected to
change the prior course of action regardless of the manipulation (i.e., few subjects
exhibited a true Deaf Effect whereby negative feedback was ignored in the decision
process). One possible explanation for this is that in the scenario, the bad news reporter
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was portrayed as an auditor (i.e., someone who is role prescribed to report bad news)
and this may have lent a certain level of credibility to the message, irrespective of the
attempt to manipulate the auditor’s credibility.
An additional issue with the previous paper is the occurrence of gender as a significant
factor in the decision to continue a failing course of action. The phenomenon that males
were significantly more likely to continue the current course compared to females was
unexplained by the proposed model.
The research presented here, seeks to address and propose explanations for these
issues. The research questions addressed here are:
1) What is the effect of Role Prescription on the Credibility of the bad news
reporter and the relevance of their message and,
2) What factors are there that might account for the finding that female
decision makers were more likely to discontinue the current course of
action?
This paper is organized as follows. First, the literature that provides insights on the
research questions is examined and new hypotheses and an expanded research model
are proposed. Then this model is subjected to a laboratory experiment. Finally, the
results of the model are discussed.

3.2

RESEARCH MODEL

In order to examine both of those questions, the whistle blowing effectiveness literature
as well as literature on the relationship of Gender and risk in decision making are
examined.

3.2.1

Insights from the Whistle-blowing Literature:

In paper 1, it was seen that the whistle-blowing phenomenon was sufficiently similar to
that of project status reporting to be able to apply its insights to the this research. In the
whistle-blowing effectiveness literature, Miceli and Near (2002) in two secondary
analysis studies, one of anonymous survey data of the US Merit Systems Protection
Board and one of anonymous survey data from federal government agencies, found that
Role Prescription was positively associated with effectiveness in whistle blowing.
Whistle-blowers who indicated that they believed that their complaints were resolved or
expected them to be resolved tended to indicate that it was part of their job to blow the
whistle on wrongdoing.
Extending this to the Deaf Effect, I can therefore hypothesize that
H1a: Role Prescription of a bad news reporter is negatively associated with
continuance of the current failing course of action
Miceli and Near believed that this effect occurred as a result of their position power. Role
prescribed bad news reporters therefore are inherently held to be more legitimate or to
have higher expertise as a result of their roles. Pornpitakpan (2004) saw that perceived
expertise was a component of Credibility. Thus the fact that in paper 1, an auditor was
used as the bad news reporter could explain why they did not strongly induce the Deaf
Effect. Thus the following can hypothesize:
H1b: Role Prescription of a bad news reporter is positively associated with
the reporter’s Credibility.
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Additionally, it may be that the effect of Role Prescription is not only to increase
Credibility and decrease willingness to continue the current course of action. It may also
be that the report of a role prescribed reporter is considered to be more important than
one from a non-role prescribed bad news reporter and thus more relevant and must be
considered simply because of their position. Near and Miceli (1995) following French
and Raven (1959) indicate that role prescribed whistleblowers (such as internal auditors)
may possess perceived power to reward or punish organization members. Therefore
their reports of bad news may take on more importance and relevance than those who
are not role prescribed to report bad news. I therefore hypothesize:
H1c: Role Prescription of a bad news reporter is positively associated with
the Relevance of the report of bad news.

3.2.2

Effects of Risk on Decision Making.

The experiment reported in paper 1 also found that Gender had a significant role in the
decision process; males were significantly more likely to ignore the report of bad news.
To explain how this finding might arise, solutions were sought in the cognitive
psychology literature. This literature indicated that women differed significantly from men
in the area of risk propensity. I therefore investigated the literature on risk and decision
making to understand how risk propensity and risk perception might affect a decision
maker’s willingness to continue a course of action in the face of bad news. This section
therefore describes first, Sitkin and Weingart’s(1995) model of risk effects in decision
making. I then follow with a discussion of the literature on the relationship between
Gender and risk propensity.
Sitkin and Weingart (1995) found that risk propensity and risk perception mediated the
effects of outcome history and problem framing on decision making behavior. The more
risk a subject perceived, the less likely they were to engage in risky decision making
behavior. In turn, the perception of risk was found to be negatively impacted by the
subjects’ risk propensity and the nature of the problem framing. These results have been
replicated in studies of escalation (Keil, et al. 2000b) and the willingness to report bad
news (Smith, et al. 2001). Therefore, I make the following hypotheses:
H2a: The level of Risk Propensity is inversely related with Risk Perception.
H2b: The level of perceived risk is positively related with discontinuance of
the current course of action.
H2c: The effect of Risk Propensity on Decision will be completely mediated
by Risk Perception.

3.2.3

Effects of Credibility and Role Prescription on Risk Propensity and Risk
Perception

Sitkin and Weingart(1995) did not consider the effects of Credibility or Role Prescription
on the perception of risk or Risk Propensity. Those relationships are addressed in this
section.
Risk Propensity. I argue that Credibility and Role Prescription have no effect on Risk
Propensity as that construct is developed over the decision maker’s history (Sitkin and
Pablo 1992). The effects of this decision making situation will not have an effect on
propensity until the decision is made and the results seen.
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Role Prescription. Similarly, a bad news reporter either is or is not prescribed to report
bad news. This construct does not seem to be dependent upon Risk Perception or Risk
Propensity. However, Risk Perception being a determination of the potential of
unfavorable events occurring in the project would not seem to depend on whether the
bad news reporter was role prescribed because any effect that it would have on Risk
Perception would be mediated through the Credibility of the reporter or the relevance of
the message.
Risk Perception. In terms of Risk Perception, the questions seem to be whether
credibility is antecedent or subsequent to the perception of risk. In the Credibility to Risk
Perception relationship, it could be argued that where the decision maker perceives the
risk as high then they might consider a reporter of bad news as credible. However, in the
case of the Deaf Effect, the scenario is that the decision maker previously had a
perception of low or no risk prior to the report of bad news. Therefore, it seems in the
case of the Deaf Effect, that Credibility is antecedent to Risk Perception. That is, that
where a bad news reporter is credible, his message tends to increase the perception of
risk. I therefore hypothesize the following:
H2d: The Credibility of the bad news reporter is positively associated with
the perception of risk in the situation.

3.2.4

Gender and Risk

Sitkin and Weingart (1995) did not consider the effects of gender in their study. They
noted that researchers had identified this as a potential factor, and suggested that
gender might be integrated into future studies. The effects of gender on risk taking are
now considered.
Prior to 1980, the literature on the effects of gender on risk propensity suggested that
females were more risk averse than males (Johnson and Powell 1994). After 1980,
research continued to confirm findings that women are less confident in their decisions
than men and that they are therefore more cautious risk takers, although the differences
appeared to be less clear-cut than before. In an important meta-analysis of 150 studies
of gender differences in risk taking, Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999) found that males
were more likely to take risks than female participants although the gender differences
varied according to context and age level. In studies of hypothetical choice tasks similar
to Cuellar, et al. (2006), the 25 studies analyzed suggested a strong gender influence
with males being more risk accepting. There was also a significant decline in risk
acceptance as the subjects became older. In a subsequent study, Nicholson, Soane,
Fenton-O’Creevy and Willman (2005) again found that men report higher rates of risk
taking than women although women took greater risk in the career dimension (defined
as quitting a job without another one to go to) and the social dimension (defined as
publicly challenging a rule or decision).
On the basis of these findings, I argue then, that the gender effect that was observed in
paper 1 was a result of the fact that women in the United States have historically been
more risk averse than men. This situation derives from the fact that women have had
less confidence in their decision making abilities compared with men (Johnson and
Powell 1994). While the Nicholson, et al. study reported that women did take more risks
in publically challenging a rule, that would apply more to willingness to report bad news
(the Mum Effect) than it would to being willing to hear bad news (the Deaf Effect). This
should be reflected in the model by a decreased Risk Propensity and increased
perception of risk among women. It is therefore hypothesized that following the Johnson
et al. study:
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H3a: Male gender is negatively associated with Risk Perception.
H3b: Male gender is positively associated with Risk Propensity.
Extending the Sitkin and Weingart study with the insights from the effects of Gender on
Risk Propensity, it can hypothesized that:
H3c: The effect of Gender on Decision is mediated by Risk Perception
and Risk Propensity.
The final research model is displayed in figure 3.2.

Role
Prescription

H1c+

H1a -

H1b +
Message

Decision to
Continue

Relevance

Credibility

H2c

H2b-

H2d+
Risk
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H2a -

H3b +

Risk
Perception

H3a -

H3c+

Gender

Figure 3.2: Research Model for the Experiment
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The basic contours of the research model from paper 1 were retained in this study. As
reported in paper 1, the bad news reporter’s Credibility is held to have a negative effect
on the decision to continue the current course of action that is partially mediated by the
perceived Relevance of the report of bad news. The perceived Relevance of the report
of bad news itself is held to have a negative association with the decision to continue the
current course of action. The new hypotheses show the Role Prescription construct
having a positive association with both Credibility and Decision. Risk propensity is
negatively associated with Risk Perception which is in turn negatively associated with
the decision to continue the failing course of action. Additionally, if the gender of the
decision maker is male, this is positively associated with Risk Propensity and negatively
associated with Risk Perception.

3.3

DESIGN AND VALIDATION OF THE LAB EXPERIMENT

The research model was tested using a laboratory experiment in a 2x2 fully factored
design in which Role Prescription and Credibility were independently manipulated .

3.3.1

Development of the Materials and Instruments

The scenarios utilized (Appendices A-D) were modified versions of the scenarios used in
paper 1. For this study, language was introduced to manipulate the Role Prescription of
the bad news reporter. In the positive manipulation, the bad news reporter was an
auditor as in paper 1. S/he was also described as having the specific responsibility to
report on project problems. In the negative manipulation, the bad news reporter is a peer
project leader who volunteers to review the project. S/he is specifically described as not
role prescribed to review projects and report on their findings. Additionally, the scenario
was modified to specifically state that insufficient time was left in the schedule to do
further testing and still make the implementation date. This change was made because
in the study reported in paper 1, some subjects chose to delay and then commented that
they would do the testing prior to the implementation
The instrument was improved by rewording one question to match the revision of the
scenario and adding two more items measuring Credibility. I did this to improve the
reliability of the construct over that reported in paper 1, which was somewhat low,
although acceptable. I drew on the source credibility literature (Pornpitakpan 2004) to
add two measurement items dealing with the key dimension of Credibility:
trustworthiness and expertise. Additionally, I revised an item to reflect the effect of
organizational power on Credibility by asking about the bad news reporter’s perception
in the organization. I added items on Risk Perception, Risk Propensity and Role
Prescription to the instrument. The risk items were adapted from Sitkin and
Weingart(1995) to fit into a seven point Likert scale format. I added a single item to
assess the subject’s perception of the Role Prescription of the bad news reporter.

3.3.2

Scenario

These scenarios (Appendices A-D) were modeled in part on the Providian Trust case
(McFarlan, 1997) and the Challenger Disaster scenario (Hauptman and Iwaki 1990). In
both cases I saw some common features that are incorporated into this scenario. In both
cases, there were pressures external to the decision maker that moved the decision
maker to continue the current course of action. There was also a decision maker who
could not perform the evaluation on his/her own and a bad news reporter or reporters
who could not communicate the potential disaster situation in terms that unambiguously
indicated a coming disaster. Additionally, the decision maker was led to believe there
were severe time constraints on the length of time to evaluate the situation and make a
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decision. Each of these four items is included in the scenarios.
Contents of the Scenario. The subjects were instructed to play the role of a project
manager responsible for development of a new application system to be put into
production. The development team has indicated that the project is complete. A bad
news reporter has reviewed the project and given a negative report on its readiness for
production. To manipulate Role Prescription, the bad news reporter is described as an
internal auditor, whose job is to assess projects and report bad news in the positive
manipulation or a project manager from a different development team whose role
specifically does not include examination of projects and reporting bad news. The bad
news reporter does not provide understandable reasons for why S/he believes the
project would fail and the subjects are thus placed in a situation in which they must
decide to what extent they should rely on the assertions of others. The manipulation of
Credibility is performed by describing the bad news reporter as expert and highly
regarded in the organization (positive manipulation) or inexpert and not highly regarded
(negative manipulation). Additionally, the subject is informed that the environment in
which they work stresses the meeting of dates and budgets by word and reward and
punishment system. Additionally, the management chain above the subject is said to be
pressing for on time implementation of the system. The subject could choose to delay
the project and face the known problem of dealing with their management’s
expectations, or the subject could choose to implement the system and face the
uncertain prospect of a catastrophic problem. The subject is then asked to decide
whether s/he would continue with the scheduled deployment or delay the project for
further testing.

3.3.3

Procedure

The experiment was administered in a classroom setting. Access was obtained by
permission of the instructors. The time obtained was usually in the last part of a class or
in time remaining after the administration of a test. Prior to administration of the
instruments, instructions for completing the instrument were given to the class. Subjects
were informed that this was an experiment on decision making and that their
participation was completely voluntary and they could terminate their involvement at any
time. They were randomly selected for one of the treatment groups. Subjects were
instructed to read a scenario describing an information systems project and then to
make a decision as to whether to move the project into production (i.e., deployment) or
delay the deployment to allow time for further testing and then answer several questions
about their decision. Following their completion of the survey, they returned the materials
to the administrator and left the classroom. Subjects had approximately 20-30 minutes to
complete the experiment. The subjects were not time constrained in responding to the
instrument, the time constraint arose from the text, which indicated that there was no
time to test prior to the implementation date.

3.3.4

Subjects

This experiment was conducted using undergraduate student subjects. The scenario
was constructed so as to place the subject in the role of a recent graduate, which
provides a decision making context that is close to what might be experienced by the
subject shortly after entering the work force. While the appropriateness of student
subjects has been debated, there is ample precedent for using student subjects in
studies with organizational decision making tasks (Sitkin and Weingart 1995) and,
specifically, decisions associated with project management (Harrison and Harrell 1993;
Smith, et al. 2001). From a philosophic perspective, the question comes down to the
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issue of how much emphasis to place on external validity: should the subjects of the
experiment function as exact surrogates for practitioners? While some scholars insist on
having external validity for every study (Lynch 1982; 1983), Calder, Phillips and Tybout
(1981; 1982; 1983) argue that external validity is not a requirement for a rigorous theory
test. Based on what the study is designed to demonstrate, the requirement for external
validity varies. If the study is to show how the theory can be applied to real world
situations, then there is a requirement for the subjects, testing and variables to be
analogous to the real world. If, however, the study is designed to be a test of theory,
then the requirement is to produce the strongest possible test in an attempt to falsify the
theory. External validity is not required and may be sacrificed to achieve internal and
construct validity. In this case homogenous samples such as student subjects and
laboratory experiments are stronger. For theory testing, external validity is best
addressed during theory development. After internal validity is achieved, external validity
is addressed by testing across multiple contexts. Cook and Campbell (1979) also make
this point saying:
The priority among validity types varies with the kind of research being
conducted. For persons interested in theory testing, it is almost as important to
show that the variables involved in the research are construct A and B (construct
validity) as it is to show that the relationship is causal and goes from one
variable to the other (internal validity). Few theories specify crucial target
settings, populations, or times to or across which generalization is desired.
Consequently, external validity is of relatively little importance. In practice, it is
often sacrificed for the greater statistical power that comes through having
isolated settings, standardized procedures and homogenous respondent
populations. For investigators with theoretical interests our estimate is that the
types of validity, in order of importance, are probably internal, construct,
statistical conclusion, and external validity (p. 83)
Therefore in this situation, the question is whether student surrogates act similarly
enough to actual practitioners to provide internal validity. Ashton and Kramer (1980)
citing Zelditch and Evan (1962), indicate that students are to the behavioral researcher
what the fruit fly is to the geneticist, a being that is different from the one desired to be
studied but has a mechanism that operates in fundamentally the same manner as the
target being. The question is therefore, whether the decision making processes of
students are sufficiently similar to that of experienced professionals to enable a similar
set of responses to be received in a decision situation. This question is an empirical one
(Liyanarachchi and Milne 2005).
Looking at the empirical literature, Birnberg and Nath (1968) indicate that student
subjects are likely to differ from real world subjects in terms of skills, experience and
personality traits. The effects of experience are manifested in terms of enhanced facility
with and development of job related skills, routinized patterns of behavior and attitudes
toward certain situations. Some empirical studies have shown support for using students
as surrogates for managers in studies that focus on decision making and which do not
require deep knowledge of particular domain. Ashton and Kramer (1980) in a review of
the literature to that date found at least moderate support for using student surrogates in
decision making tasks although not in studies of attitudes. An example of the disparity in
attitudes is shown by a study of attitudes toward corporate social responsibility by
Ibrahim, Howard, and Angelides (2008). In this study, students were found to be more
attuned to the ethical and philanthropic areas of social responsibility, while practicing
managers were more attuned to the economic responsibilities. This shows the
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differences in attitudes between students and managers as an effect of experience.
Having been subject to the pressures of the marketplace, managers are necessarily
more attuned to economic reality while students who haven’t had that experience put
more stress on ethics and philanthropy (Ibrahim, et al. 2008).
Ashton and Kramer report that psychological studies show that students and real world
decision makers show “extremely similar information processing characteristics and
biases” (p.3). In an experiment to test students as surrogates for experienced auditors in
decision tasks, they found that students matched the auditors’ decisions 67% of the time
and only 7-13% of the difference was attributable to experience. Further, they found that
students and auditors responded similarly in a number of different situations. They argue
that students can act as surrogates in terms of theoretical studies as opposed to
application studies, a conclusion similar to that described by Calder, et al. In more
recent work, Remus (1986), reported no differences in decision making between
students and managers in the context of production scheduling. Locke (1986,p. 6) notes
that “both college students and employees appear to respond similarly to goals,
feedback, incentives, participation, and so forth, perhaps because the similarities among
these subjects (such as in values) are more crucial than their differences.” Liyanarachchi
and Milne (2005) found that accounting students making experimental investment
decisions react similarly to practitioners with respect to environmental disclosures.
In this discussion, an important recent study that must be considered is that of Chang
and Ho (2004). Chang and Ho ran an experiment comparing student and manager
escalation behavior when project completion and market information was manipulated.
Their results show that managers and students had statistically the same likelihood to
continue projects on 60% of the tests with managers having a higher likelihood on the
remainder. More importantly, the direction of the responses was similar between the
managers and students. Both tended to have lower likelihood of completion when the
project was less complete than when it was more complete. The managers and students
had different responses and response patterns for the funds allocation issues. These
patterns are highly influenced by attitudes developed by managers’ experience in the
business world in which they learn that meeting profitability targets is a key to success.
Students, however, without that experience, have not been so conditioned and therefore
have different attitudes towards allocation of funds. The results of the Chang and Ho
study are therefore consistent with the Ibrahim study. Thus we see that in an escalation
situation, students responded similarly to practitioners in the escalation decision where
experience was not a factor. In the funds allocation issues, where experience is a factor,
their choices were different.
Based on the literature, it would appear that student subjects can stand as surrogates for
managers in decision making studies where economic issues are not involved. The
studies surveyed show that students are in statistical agreement with the responses
provided by managers approximately 60% of the time and the rest of the time while
statistically different follow the general trend of the response pattern.

3.3.5

Operationalization of Variables

With two exceptions, the constructs in the research model were operationalized using
multi-item measures with Likert-type or semantic differential scales. Decision and Role
Prescription were measured with single item measures. Relevance was measured with
four items taken from paper 1. Credibility was measured with three items from paper 1
with two new items designed by the authors. Risk perception and Risk Propensity were
measured using items adapted from Sitkin and Weingart (1995). Details of the
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operationalization of the items are found in Appendix F.

3.4

RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT

In this section, I present the methodology followed in assessing the data, the
assessment of the measurement model, the results of the manipulation checks and then
the evaluation of the structural model.

3.4.1

Methodology

In performing the analysis of the data I utilized the Partial Least Squares methodology as
implemented in the SmartPLS tool (Ringle, et al. 2005). PLS is a second generation data
analysis technique (Gefen, Straub and Boudreau 2000) which tests not only the
structural model but also the measurement model in a single analysis rather than two
separate analyses as in the first generation techniques. Additionally, PLS is able to
identify path loadings across the entire model in a single run as opposed to multiple runs
required using regression techniques. This results in a more rigorous analysis than using
factor analysis and regression alone (Gefen, et al. 2000, p. 24). As regression analysis
does, PLS seeks to show rejection of a null hypothesis of independent variables having
no effect on the dependent variable while accounting for a significant amount of the
variance in the dependent variable (Gefen, et al. 2000, p.27).
PLS techniques perform the analysis by iterating between factor analysis and path
analysis until the change in variance explained is not significant. It then uses
bootstrapping to estimate the significance of the paths. “Neither of these PLS
significance estimation methods require parametric assumptions. PLS is thus especially
suited for the analysis of small data samples and for data that doesn’t necessarily exhibit
. . . multivariate normal distribution . . .” (Gefen, et al. 2000).
In our use of PLS, I performed the PLS calculation to generate the basic PLS values and
then used bootstrapping to compute the T-statistics for significance.

3.4.2

Demographics

Table 3.1 shows the demographic distribution of our subjects.
Table 3.1: Subject Demographics
Variable
Gender

Mean (Std. Dev.)
56 Male / 49 Female

Age

21.73 (4.6)

Years of Work Exp.

3.52 (4.48)

Years of IS Exp.

0.73 (1.48)

N

3.4.3

105

Measurement Model Assessment

Straub, Boudreau and Gefen (2004) reviewed the existing literature on instrument
validation and have provided guidelines for the assessment of the measurement model
of studies in the positivist tradition such as this study. They prescribe the following
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validation steps:
1) Construct Validity
a. Convergent Validity
b. Discriminant Validity
c. Factorial Validity
d. Reliability
2) Manipulation Validity
They further recommend that content validity, nomological validity and common methods
bias be evaluated.
In the following two sections, I review these validities for the study reported here.

3.4.3.1.

Examining the Reflective Measures

Convergent Validity. Convergent validity, how the items converge to measure a
particular construct, is assessed by examining the individual item validity, construct
reliability and average variance extracted (AVE) (Chin 1998). I examined convergent
validity for the reflective constructs by using confirmatory factor analysis, composite
reliability and Cronbach’s alpha and AVE to assess construct reliability. PLS performs a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) rather than an exploratory one as done in principal
components analysis. This means that it does not seek for the proper factors, but rather
confirms that the factor structure specified in the model is correct. In this study, the CFA
in Table 3.2 shows the following:

Table 3.2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Results
Construct

Relevance

Risk Propensity

Risk
Perception

Item

Item-toConstruct
Loading

Relev 1

.9203

Relev 2

.9605

Relev 3

.9419

Relev 4

.8927

Risk Prop 1

.8923

Risk Prop 2

.8333

Risk Prop 3

.8184

Risk Percept 1

.8399

Risk Percept 2

.8330

Risk Percept 3

.8249

Risk Percept 4

.8215
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Chin (1998) provides the guideline that the standardized loadings should exceed .707.
We see that the loadings here are all over .81 meeting this standard, providing evidence
of convergent validity
To assess construct reliability of the reflective constructs, the composite reliability, the
Cronbach’s alpha and the AVE for each construct is examined. As shown in table 3.3,
Table 3.3: Construct Reliability
Construct

Composite
Reliability

AVE

Relevance

.9621

.8639

Cronbach’s
Alpha
.9472

Risk
Propensity

.8892

.7282

.8143

Risk
Perception

.8988

.6895

.8508

Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability measure the internal consistency of the
constructs items. Cronbach’s alpha provides a lower bound on the reliability
measurement (Cortina 1993). Composite reliability without the assumption of equally
weighted indicators provides a closer estimate to the reliability figures given accurate
parameter estimates (Chin 1998). In all cases the values exceed the recommended 0.7
threshold for high reliability (Straub, et al. 2004). AVE measures the amount of variance
of the construct that comes from the indicators vs. that which comes from measurement
error (Chin 1998). The baseline guideline is 0.5 (Chin 1998), which was exceeded by all
our constructs.
Discriminant Validity. Discriminant validity, can be examined by examining the cross
loadings between items and constructs and examining the AVEs of the latent constructs
to ensure that they are greater than the square of the correlations among the latent
constructs (Chin 1998; Henseler, Hubona and Ringle 2008). Cross loading analysis in
PLS is conducted by computing the outer loadings of the items on the constructs in a
confirmatory factor analysis and then comparing the loadings of the items on constructs
other than its intended construct with its loading on its intended construct. This is shown
in table 3.4. Chin (1998) provides the guideline that a block of indicators should load
higher on the construct that it is intended to measure rather than others. Here, this
condition exists providing evidence of discriminant validity.
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Construct
Relevance

Risk
Perception

Risk
Propensity

Table 3.4: Cross Loadings
Item
Relevance RiskPerc
Rel1
0.9207
-0.3800
Rel2
0.9603
-0.4129
Rel3
0.9416
-0.3941
Rel4
0.8939
-0.4748
RPrc1
-0.2730
0.8388

RiskProp
-0.2307
-0.2816
-0.2476
-0.1759
0.0923

RPrc2
RPrc3
RPrc4
RPrp1

-0.2703
-0.4809
-0.4173
-0.2644

0.8324
0.8269
0.8232
0.1854

0.0868
0.1681
0.0899
0.8956

RPrp2
RPrp3

-0.1831
-0.1886

0.0817
0.0583

0.8341
0.8287

Additionally, the AVEs of the latent constructs were examined. The test here is to verify
that the square root of the AVE is greater than correlations among the constructs (Chin
1998).
Table 3.5: AVE vs. Correlations2
Relevance Risk
Risk
Perception Propensity
Relevance
Risk
Perception
Risk
Propensity

.9294
-0.4466

.8304

-0.2529

0.1346

.8533

The AVEs here are all greater than the correlations between the constructs showing that
good discriminant validity exists (Table 3-5).

3.4.3.2.

Evaluating the Formative Credibility Construct

Petter, Straub and Rai (2007) provide guidance on how to validate formative constructs
such as Credibility. They argue that the following steps should be taken to validate the
construct: 1) Examine the weightings of the items to ensure that they are all significant;
2) Examine the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the items to ensure that there is not
an excessive amount of destabilizing multi-collinearity. VIF values should not exceed
3.3.
The outer weights for the Credibility construct are reported table 3.6.

2

The square root of the AVE has been inserted on the diagonal.
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Table 3.6: Outer Weights of the Credibility Construct
Item

Weight

Cred1

1.9725

Cred2

1.9879

Cred3

3.9287

Cred4

0.8829

Cred5

1.1374

The items are all significant or near significant except for Cred4 and Cred5. These items
were dropped in the subsequent analyses.
Next, a regression analysis was conducted testing the three remaining items against the
decision construct to calculate the VIF. The results of the regression are shown in table
3.7.
Table 3.7: Variance Inflation Factors of the Credibility
Items
Item

Weight

Cred1

2.178

Cred2

2.621

Cred3

2.328

These items all score below the 3.3 level suggested by Petter, Straub and Rai and
therefore indicate low levels of collinearity.

3.4.4

Manipulation Checks

Manipulation checks were performed to ensure that Credibility and Role prescription
were effectively manipulated and that the Deaf Effect was induced. In Table 3.8, I report
the mean values of the variables for each of the four treatment conditions3. As expected,
the Credibility and Role Prescription variables move in the expected directions from cell
to cell indicating that the manipulations were successful.

3

For the reflective constructs, this was calculated as a simple average. For the formative
construct, credibility, this was calculated by using the outer weights for each item on the credibility
construct from the PLS analysis and multiplying those by the items’ responses and then
averaging.
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Table 3.8: Effects of Manipulations4

Role
Prescribed

Not Role
Prescribed

Variable

Low Credibility

High Credibility

Decision

4.12 (2.44)

2.96 (2.21)

Credibility

2.55 (1.47)

5.06 (1.49)

Role
Prescribed

5.31 (0.88)

5.42 (1.27)

N

26

26

Decision

5.30 (1.96)

3.15 (2.24)

Credibility

1.95 (1.24)

4.59 (1.48)

Role
Prescribed

2.19 (1.57)

3.12 (1.97)

N

27

26

Next I see, that the Deaf Effect was induced by our manipulations. When the bad news
reporter (BNR) was not credible and not role prescribed, the mean of the decision
variable was over five (5) indicating a decision to put the system into production. This is
in marked contrast to when the Credibility of the bad news reporter was high. In that
situation, there was a pronounced tendency to hold for further testing. A 2x2 multiple
analysis of variance (MANOVA) with interaction was conducted with perceived
Credibility and perceived Role Prescription as the dependent variables and the
manipulations as the independent variables. Table 3.9 shows the results of this analysis.

4

Mean (Standard Deviation).
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Table 3.9: Results of MANOVA Analysis
Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable: Role
Prescription

Dependent Variable: Credibility

Sum of
Squares

Sum of
Squares

F-value (sig)

F-value (sig)

Main Effect:
Role
Prescription
Manipulation

193.457

88.568 (.000)

5.041

3.396 (.068)

Main Effect:
Credibility
Manipulation

7.173

3.284 (.073)

81.888

55.174 (.000)

Interaction:
(Role
Prescription) X
(Credibility
Manipulation)

4.356

1.994 (.161)

0.033

0.022(.881)

For the manipulations to be considered to be effective, the main effects for each
manipulated variable should be strongly significant on its dependent variable and have
no significant relationship with the other variables. This is the case for both variables.
There are also no interaction effects. I conclude that the manipulations were successful.

3.4.5

Structural Model

With an adequate measurement model, I can now assess the hypotheses by examining
the structural model. Table 3.10 shows the R2values associated with each variable. For
the decision variable, this is .625. This is a very high amount of variance in the decision
explained by this model.
Table 3.10: R2 values for Latent
Variables
Latent Variable
R2
Decision

.625

Relevance

.530

Credibility

.230

Risk Perception

.217

Risk Propensity

.043
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Table 3.11: Summary of Hypothesis Results
Hypothesis

H1a: Role
Prescription of a bad
news reporter is
negatively associated
with continuance of
the current failing
course of action
H1b: Role
Prescription of a bad
news reporter is
positively associated
with the reporter’s
Relevance.
H1c: Role
Prescription of a bad
news reporter is
positively associated
with as the relevance
of the report of bad
news.
H2a: The level of
Risk Propensity is
inversely related with
Risk Perception.
H2b: The level of
perceived risk is
positively related with
discontinuance of the
current course of
action.
H2c: The effect of
Risk Propensity on

Path

Path
Coefficient

TStatistic5

Effect
Size

Power6

Credibility ->
Relevance
Credibility ->
Decision
Relevance ->
Decision

.594

7.73*

.697

.996

-.208

1.78*

.013

.060

-.398

3.45*

.258

.587

Role
Prescription
–>
Relevance

.222

2.55*

.111

.200

Role
Prescription
–> Credibility

.500

4.75*

.215

.463

Role
Prescription
–> Decision

-.017

0.22

Risk
Propensity –
> Risk
Perception

-.039

0.43

.007

.055

Risk
Perception –
> Decision

-.251

2.93*

.100

.177

Risk
Propensity –

.132

1.94*

.048

.098

0

.050

5

* = p < .05 level. One tailed tests were used (Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989) indicating that
significance was reached at a t-statistic of 0.98 (α=.05).
6

A post-hoc power analysis was done using G*Power v2.0 (Erfelder, Paul and Buchner 1996)
for each path tested. The R2 for the dependent variable of the path was calculated with and
without the path to compute the effect size. The effect size was then used as input to a power
analysis. For the analysis, α was set to .05 and the N value was set to 105 for both samples.
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Decision will be
completely mediated
by Risk Perception.
H2d: The Relevance
of the bad news
reporter is positively
associated with the
perception of risk in
the situation.

> Decision

Credibility –>
Risk
Perception

.387

3.63*

.154

.296

H3a: Male gender is
negatively
associated with Risk
Perception.

Gender –>
Risk
Perception

-.246

2.72*

.064

.118

H3b: Male gender is
positively associated
with Risk Propensity.

Gender –>
Risk
Propensity

.208

2.20*

NA7

NA

Gender ->
Decision

.002

0.08

.022

.069

H3c: The effect of
gender on Decision is
mediated by Risk
Perception and Risk
Propensity.

Table 3.11 shows the results of the structural path analysis. The paths of interest in this
study identified in paper 1 as significant were found to be significant in this study with the
exception of that from Gender to Decision which was not significant suggesting that its
influence is fully mediated by the effects of Risk Propensity and Risk Perception. The
power analysis shows that for all paths except for Credibility to Relevance, this
experiment had low power to bring the significant paths to light.
Of the Role Prescription hypotheses, Role Prescription was found to have a significant
effect on Relevance (H1a) and Credibility (H1b). It had no direct effect on the Decision
(H1c). The effect of Role Prescription is thus fully mediated through the determination of
Relevance.
Of the Risk Propensity hypotheses, Risk Propensity was not found to have an effect on
Risk Perception (H2a), a result which contradicts findings of Sitkin and Weingart (1995),
Keil and Wallace (2000) and Smith, et al. (2001). It is possible that the low power of this
experiment resulted in a failure to detect the relationship between Risk Propensity and
Risk Perception. It might also be that the addition of Gender changed the relationship
between Risk Propensity and Risk Perception. It could be that the relationship observed
between Risk Propensity and Risk Perception is actually the relationship between each
variable and Gender. It is also possible that the degree to which the relationship
between Risk Propensity and behavioral intention is mediated by Risk Perception is
dependent upon the context. More investigation would be warranted to understand what
7

Only one path was defined for Risk Propensity thus not allowing calculation of effect size or
power for this path.
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it is about this particular context that produced this result. Risk propensity was also
found to have a significant effect on Decision (H2c). Decision makers with a greater
propensity for risk tended to continue the current course of action. This is at variance
with our hypothesis, and that of Sitkin and Weingart (1995), that the effect of Risk
Propensity would be fully mediated through perception. Again, this may occur because
the path from Risk Propensity to Risk Perception was not significant or that the addition
of Gender eliminated the connection. More research is required to understand this effect.
Of the Risk Perception hypotheses, Risk Perception was found to have a negative effect
on the decision to continue (H2b). Credibility (H2d) had a significantly positive effect on
Risk Perception. Thus when a bad news reporter was perceived to be credible the
decision maker tended to have a higher perception of the risk of the project. This
perception of risk tended to motivate the decision maker to change the course of action.
Of the Gender hypotheses, as expected, males tended to have a higher Risk Propensity
(H3b) and lower Risk Perception (H3a). Additionally, it was shown that the influence of
Gender was completely mediated by Risk Propensity and Risk Perception. (H3c).
The results are shown graphically in figure 3.3.
Role
Prescription

H1a
.222
(T=2.55)*

H1b
.500
(T=4.75)*

H1c
-.017
(T=.215)

Message
Relevance
R2=.530
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(T=7.73)*
Credibility
R2=.230

-.398
(T=3.45)*

-.208

H2c
.132
(T=1.94)*

(T=1.78)*
H2d
.387
(T=3.63)*
Risk
Propensity
R2=.043

Decision
to
Continue
R2=.625

H2a
-.039
(T=.43)

H3b

H2b
-.251
(T=2.93)*

Risk
Perception
R2=.217

H3a
.246
(T=2.72)*

.208
(T=2.20)*
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H3C
.002
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3.5

DISCUSSION

The results of our experiment are in agreement with the results of paper 1 (figure 3). All
the paths that were significant in that experiment were significant in this study. This
study provides another confirmation that those relationships exist. These results
persisted despite the low power of the experiment showing the strength of these
relationships.
This study added Role Prescription to the factors that influence the determination of
message relevance. Role prescribed bad news reporters have enhanced Credibility and
their messages have increased relevance to the decision maker. Role Prescription’s
effects are mediated to the decision to continue the current course of action by its action
on Credibility and Relevance. Once the bad news report is considered relevant, the
decision maker then assesses it, influenced by their perception of the risk of the project
and their propensity to accept risk.
The risk variables seem to mediate the effect of Gender on Decision. This mediation
suggests that the Gender effect reported in the first study is actually the effect of
differential Risk Propensity and Risk Perception on the part of men and women; women
being more risk averse and more sensitive to risk than men. Based on the risk literature
reviewed here, these differences seem to be based more in how women and men are
socialized than in any innate biological difference. Women, prior to 1980, had a much
more pronounced differential than later studies perhaps as a result in the change in
women’s roles in society. It is perhaps the decision maker’s confidence in their decision
making capabilities that results in this difference rather than biology. The study also
suggests that perceived risk and the decision maker’s propensity to accept risk factors
into the analytical process used that results in the decision.
The R2 of the Decision variable did not change appreciably compared with study 1 (.625
vs. .618). This appears to be due to the fact that the addition of the risk variables simply
mediated the effect of Gender and that Risk Perception did not have a significant effect
on Decision. The addition of Role Prescription did increase the R2 of the message
relevance (.192 in paper 1 vs. .230 here) an effect size of .165 indicating that Role
Prescription has a moderate effect size on the Relevance variable.

3.6

CONCLUSION

I began this paper by asking the questions about whether the results of paper 1 were
due to Role Prescription causing the Credibility of the bad news reporter and what
caused the Gender effect on Decision. I saw that Role Prescription accounted for
approximately 22% of the change in Credibility and also influenced the assessment of
the Relevance of the message. Its effect on the Decision was mediated through
Credibility and Relevance. I also saw that Risk Propensity and Risk Perception mediated
the effect of Gender on the Decision to continue the current course of action.
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APPENDIX A: BOTH CREDIBILITY AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION
MANIPULATED NEGATIVELY

Instructions
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision
making.
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to
the next page.
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the
questions in order as the project leader would answer them.
This is not a test.
There are no right answers or wrong answers.
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this
room.
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries.
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of
the project.
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has
indicated that the system is ready to go.
At this stage, one of Blackstone’s other project leaders, Sandy, appeared at your door
and volunteered to review the project. Sandy is NOT well respected in the field and is
NOT particularly trustworthy. As a project leader, it is not Sandy’s job to review other
team leaders’ projects or to report perceived problems that might impact project
success.
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to
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rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment,
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t
understand then wished you luck and left your office
When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing
that, contrary to Sandy’s report, the system was ready to go
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he became angry and
indicated that Sandy had never successfully lead a project and often talks about things
without any expertise in the subject. He then pointed out that the VP of Information
Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be implemented by
next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In which case, you
had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were going to have to
explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he would hate to see
your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told you get with your
team and figure out what you were going to do.
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed
be fired.
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take.
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APPENDIX B: CREDIBILITY POSITIVELY AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION
MANIPULATED NEGATIVELY

Instructions
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision
making.
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to
the next page.
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the
questions in order as the project leader would answer them.
This is not a test.
There are no right answers or wrong answers.
4.

Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this
room.

Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries.
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of
the project.
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has
indicated that the system is ready to go.
At this stage, one of Blackstone’s other project leaders, Sandy, appeared at your door
and volunteered to review the project. Sandy is a well-respected leader in the field and
is very trustworthy. As a project leader, it is not Sandy’s job to review other team
leaders’ projects or to report perceived problems that might impact project success.
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to
rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment,
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t
understand then wished you luck and left your office
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When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing
that, contrary to the Sandy’s opinion, the system was ready to go
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he pointed out that the VP of
Information Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be
implemented by next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In
which case, you had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were
going to have to explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he
would hate to see your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told
you get with your team and figure out what you were going to do.
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed
be fired.
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take.
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APPENDIX C: CREDIBILITY MANIPULATED NEGATIVELY AND ROLE
PRESCRIPTION MANIPULATED POSITIVELY

Instructions
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision
making.
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to
the next page.
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the
questions in order as the project leader would answer them.
This is not a test.
There are no right answers or wrong answers.
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this
room.
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries.
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of
the project.
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has
indicated that the system is ready to go.
At this stage, it is Blackstone’s policy to have its own internal auditor, Sandy, review
the project. Sandy is NOT well respected in the field and is NOT particularly
trustworthy. The role of the internal auditor is to report any perceived problems that
might impact the success of the project.
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to
rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment,
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t
understand then wished you luck and left your office.
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When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing
that, contrary to the auditor’s report, the system was ready to go
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he became angry and
indicated that Sandy had never identified a serious problem and often talks about things
without any expertise in the subject. He then pointed out that the VP of Information
Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be implemented by
next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In which case, you
had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were going to have to
explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he would hate to see
your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told you get with your
team and figure out what you were going to do.
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed
be fired.
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take.
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APPENDIX D: BOTH CREDIBILITY AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION
MANIPULATED POSITIVELY

Instructions
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision
making.
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to
the next page.
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the
questions in order as the project leader would answer them.
This is not a test.
There are no right answers or wrong answers.
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this
room.
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries.
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of
the project.
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has
indicated that the system is ready to go.
At this stage, it is Blackstone’s policy to have its own internal auditor, Sandy, review
the project. Sandy is a well-respected leader in the field and is very trustworthy. The
role of the internal auditor is to report any perceived problems that might impact the
success of the project.
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to
rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment,
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t
understand then wished you luck and left your office.
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When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing
that, contrary to the auditor’s report, the system was ready to go.
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he pointed out that the VP of
Information Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be
implemented by next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In
which case, you had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were
going to have to explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he
would hate to see your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told
you get with your team and figure out what you were going to do.
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed
be fired.
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take.
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APPENDIX E: QUESTIONNAIRE
The latent variable associated with the item is listed in parentheses following the item
text.
Test Further
1. Please indicate what you will
decide, and how strong that
decision
will
be.
(Mark only one of the eight
boxes)

Move to Production

Definitely

Strongly

Somewhat

Slightly

Slightly

Somewhat

Strongly

Definitely

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

















2. Please explain the reasoning behind your decision.
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
3. Your gender (please circle one choice only):
Male
Female
4. Your age (whole numbers only):
____ Years
5. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience you have in any
capacity (whole numbers only):
____ Years
6. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience in information systems
(whole numbers only):
____ Years
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neutral

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

|

|

|

|

|

|

|















8. Sandy’s assessment was very
important in forming my decision.
(Decision)















9. My decision was most influenced
by
Sandy’s
assessment.
(Decision)















10. My decision was more influenced
by Sandy’s assessment than any
of the other views expressed.
(Decision)















11. This
project
has
a
high
probability of success. (Risk
Perception)















12. This project is in a positive
situation. (Risk Perception)















13. I believe that there is very little
risk in moving this project into
production. (Risk Perception)















14. I believe that there is high
potential for a positive result in
putting this project into production.
(Risk Perception)















15. Sandy is the most credible
person
in
the
scenario.
(Credibility)















16. Sandy is well respected within
the company. (Credibility)















17. Sandy is motivated by a desire to
see things done correctly for the
bank. (Credibility)















18. Sandy is very
(Credibility)

trustworthy.















19. Sandy has a lot of expertise in
this area. (Credibility)















7. Sandy’s assessment was highly
relevant in forming my decision.
(Relevance)
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neutral

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

20. Part of Sandy’s job is to review
projects
and
report
on
perceived problems that might
affect project success. (Role
Prescription)















21. I would choose a risky
alternative based on the
assessment of others on
whom I must rely (Risk
Propensity)















22. I would choose a risky
alternative relying on an
assessment that is high in
technical complexity. (Risk
Propensity)















23. I would choose a risky
alternative which could have a
major impact on the strategic
direction of my organization.
(Risk Propensity)















Chapter 3 – The Effect of Gender, Risk and Role Prescription

71

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect

APPENDIX F: DETAILS OF THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE
VARIABLES
Decision
As in chapter 2, Decision was operationalized as a single, eight (8) point semantic
differential scale question in which the subject was asked to choose to “Test Further” or
“Move to Production”. Anchor points for the variable were “Definitely Test Further” and
“Definitely Move to Production.” Intermediate points were “strongly”, “somewhat” and
“slightly” on each side of the scale. I used an eight-point scale to force the subject to
select one of the two alternatives presented. A lower value indicated a stronger desire to
change the course of action (i.e., to delay for testing). A higher value indicated a
stronger desire to continue the existing course of action (i.e. move into production). See
Appendix E, item 1, for the item that collected the Decision data.
Relevance
Here, I utilized the same scales employed in chapter 2. Relevance was operationalized
as a set of four, seven (7) point Likert scale questions anchored with “Strongly Agree”
and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and “neutral” in the mid-point. A lower value
indicated that the subject held the bad news reporter’s message to be of lower relevance
to the decision. The items used to elicit these responses are listed below. See also
Appendix E, items 7-10.
24. Sandy’s assessment was highly relevant in forming my decision.
25. Sandy’s assessment was very important in forming my decision.
26. My decision was most influenced by the Sandy’s assessment.
27. My decision was more influenced by the Sandy’s assessment than
any of the other views expressed.

Bad News Reporter Credibility
I utilized the three item measures developed in chapter 2 as a starting point and added
two additional questions to improve the scale reliability. As described above, I improved
the measurement of this construct by replacing one question, revising one and adding
two more items measuring Credibility. I did this to improve the reliability of the construct
over that reported in Cuellar, et al. (2006) which was somewhat low at 0.745, although
acceptable. I drew on the source credibility literature (Pornpitakpan 2004) to add two
questions dealing with the key dimension of Credibility: trustworthiness and expertise.
Additionally, I revised a question to reflect the effect of organizational power on
Credibility by asking about the bad news reporter’s perception in the organization. Bad
news reporter credibility was operationalized as a set of five, seven (7) point Likert scale
questions anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and
“neutral” in the mid-point. A lower value indicated that the subject believed the bad news
reporter to have lower Credibility. The items used to elicit this information are listed
below. See also Appendix E, items 15-19.
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1. Sandy is the most credible person in the scenario.
2. Sandy is well respected within the company.
3. Sandy is motivated by a desire to see things done correctly for the bank.
4. Sandy is very trustworthy.
5. Sandy has a lot of expertise in this area.

This construct was previously operationalized at a reflective construct. However, in
examining the items in the light of the new advice in Petter, Straub and Rai(2007), I find
that I must reclassify this construct as a formative construct. Following their decision
rules in table 2 of their paper, I recognize the following: 1) the direction of causality for
most of the items is from the item to the construct. Trustworthiness and expertise are
dimensions that define the perception of Credibility (Pornpitakpan 2004). Similarly, a
perception of a proper motivation and respect are causal factors of Credibility (Near and
Miceli 1995). However, the direct question about Credibility is reflective of Credibility
existing. 2) the indicators are not interchangeable or separable. To lose one would be to
underspecify the construct. 3) These indicators will not necessarily covary with each
other. Expertise and trustworthiness may vary separately from each other. The other
indicators are similar. 4) Antecedents of the indicators are different from each other.
Trustworthiness and expertise arise from two different sets of factors. Similarly, respect
and perceived desire will have different antecedents. I therefore conclude that this is a
formative construct which I are measuring with four formative indicators and a reflective
indicator.
Risk Propensity
I adapted the Risk Propensity measures used in Sitkin and Weingart (1995). Risk
propensity was operationalized as a set of three, seven (7) point Likert scale questions
anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and “neutral”
in the mid-point. A lower value indicated increasing reluctance to agree to a risky course
of action. The items used to elicit this information are listed below. See also Appendix E,
items 21-23.
6. I would choose a risky alternative based on the
assessment of others on whom I must rely
7. I would choose a risky alternative relying on an
assessment that is high in technical complexity.
8. I would choose a risky alternative which could have a
major impact on the strategic direction of my
organization

Risk Perception
For Risk Perception, I adapted the measures used in Sitkin and Weingart (1995). Risk
perception was operationalized as a set of four, seven (7) point Likert scale questions
anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and “neutral”

Chapter 3 – The Effect of Gender, Risk and Role Prescription

73

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
as the mid-point. A higher value indicated that the subject believed the project was more
likely to be successful, and therefore of lower risk. The items used to elicit this data are
listed below. See also Appendix E, items 11-14.
9. This project has a high probability of success.
10. This project is in a positive situation.
11. I believe that there is very little risk in moving this
project into production.
12. I believe that there is high potential for a positive
result in putting this project into production.

Role Prescription
Role Prescription was measured by a single Likert scale item created for this study, with
higher values indicating that the bad news reporter was role prescribed to report bad
news. This variable was used as a manipulation check. See Appendix E, item 20.
Control Variables
The following constructs were entered into the analysis as control variables.
Gender. Gender was dummy coded (female = 0 and male =1).
Age related information. Age and Years of Full Time Work Experience were entered in
chronological years reported by the subjects.
Class. The class from which the data was collected were dummy coded.
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4 EFFECTS OF SOCIETAL COLLECTIVISM ON THE DEAF
EFFECT
The previous studies have developed a model at the individual level of how the Deaf
Effect occurs (figure 4.1). At base, the Deaf Effect occurs when the decision maker
considers the report of bad news to be not important or irrelevant to be considered in
their understanding of the project. When the report of bad news is considered to be not
relevant the decision maker tends to decide not to change the course of the project. Also
involved in the decision are the decision maker’s propensity to assume risk and the
perceived level of risk in the project. The Credibility and Role Prescription of the bad
news reporter have been shown to strongly affect the perceived Relevance of the bad
news reporter’s message.

Role
Prescription

+

+

Message
R2=.530

+

Credibility
R2=.230
-

Decision to
Continue

.44
3
(T=
4.2
+2)*
*

Relevance

.1
0
3
(
T
=
Risk
0.
Propensity9
R2=.043 3)

R2=.625
-

Risk
Perception
2
R
R2=.217
=.217
+

+

Gender

Figure 4.1: Results of the Experiment from Chapter 3
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In this chapter, I examine another concept that might affect the occurrence of the Deaf
Effect, the decision maker’s view of societal culture. Decision makers have a view of the
societal culture: what it values and what it expects of them. These concepts might have
an effect upon their behavior by causing restraints on one form of behavior or enabling
another form (Archer 1995). In fact, It has been noted that cultural forces influence many
aspects of organizational leadership including such areas as behaviors expected of
leaders in particular situations (Hofstede 2001; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and
Gupta 2004). Thus it seems that examining the impact of societal culture on decision
makers would be of interest in the study of the Deaf Effect.
The previous studies reported in this dissertation were conducted with American
undergraduate students at a university in the southeastern part of that country. In terms
of cultural values, people in the United States are believed to be among the most
individualistic people in the world (Hofstede 2001; House, et al. 2004). In other societies
that are less individualistic, the effects of the independent variables on the decision to
continue or discontinue a course of action might be different. The collectivist
identification of self with the group might influence the decision maker to view bad news
reporters and their report differently than in more individualistic cultures. Similarly, an
unwillingness to decide against the consensus of their work group may cause decision
makers to decide in one direction although they might hold an alternative opinion.
Therefore, studying the effect of societal individualism-collectivism may shed additional
light on how the Deaf Effect occurs. In this study, therefore, I focus on the effects of
individualism-collectivism on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect. The research question is
therefore:
What is the effect of societal individualism-collectivism on the occurrence of
the Deaf Effect?

4.1

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

In this section, I provide a definition of culture based on that of Leidner and Kayworth
(2006). Then I discuss why I select the GLOBE framework of cultural values for use in
this study. Following that I discuss my selection of the values of institutional and in-group
collectivism showing why I chose them and how they affect the research model of the
Deaf Effect. I then propose several hypotheses regarding the effects of societal
collectivism.

4.1.1

Definition of Culture

As Straub, et al. (2002) and Leidner and Kayworth (2006) have pointed out, culture is a
term that has received a multitude of definitions. In this dissertation, I will be using the
term as Leidner and Kayworth use it: a consistent and uniform set of values that
underlies a society or organization. They indicate that while culture is manifested in
artifacts as well as values, it is more easily studied as values since artifacts require
interpretation and therefore are subject to interpretation bias. This has been the
dominant approach to culture (Leidner and Kayworth 2006) and is the approach followed
in this study.
This definition does not imply that culture is so uniform that all members of the society
hold all the values of that society in common. It is rather as Archer (1988) argues, there
is a set of cultural values that are dominant in the society and inform cultural practices.
These values became dominant as the result of interactions between social groups that
hold these values and others that espouse differing values. As a result of the action of
social power, these values are adopted by consensus. Even after the establishment of
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the consensus values, there are still other groups that seek to modify or abolish those
values in favor of a set of values that they hold. Thus members of a society may not hold
the values that inform cultural practices but to some extent they abide by them in order
to participate in the society.
Studies have shown that the societal influences loom large in the formation of the other
influences and on the creation of individual values. For example, House, Hanges,
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta (2004) cited ‘a wealth of literature’ that shows that
organizational values reflect a “variety of the aspects of the societies in which they exist”
(p. 76). Similarly, Smith (1992) suggests that even when similar organizational structures
are used, different national cultures give them substantially different meanings. Also,
Earley and Gibson (1998) found that congruence between national culture and
organization culture lead to higher job satisfaction and cooperative behavior.
Additionally, the level of individual-collectivism and leadership style is related to
organization effectiveness. These examples seem to suggest that societal values may
be important determinants of the values used in a decision making context. In this study,
therefore, I focus on the effects of the societal values on decision making.

4.2

CULTURAL VALUES FRAMEWORK

Accepting the importance of societal values in influencing a decision maker’s thought
processes, I now consider what framework of cultural values should be used. A
threshold consideration must first be discussed. The entire concept of studying national
culture has been criticized. Myers and Tan (2002) have criticized the entire enterprise.
The concept of “national culture” is problematic they argue. The concept of “nation state”
is recent; changes in form and makeup; and is perhaps being made obsolete by
globalization. It is also not true that each nation has its own culture; there are
subcultures to be found within any geographic boundary. The concept of national culture
is not that accepted by anthropologists who find that the relationship between national
culture values and work-related issues and attitude is not well explained by Hofstede’s
model. Baskerville (2003) places similar criticisms in the context of Hofstede’s work.
She contends that Hofstede’s definition of culture is outmoded and therefore his work
has had little uptake in the fields of sociology or anthropology and is not well cited in
those fields. Similar to Myers and Tan, she criticizes the concept of national culture.
Finally, she argues that the concept of using scales and outside observer status has
been rejected by the anthropological discipline and therefore is questionable. Hofstede
(2003) in a response to Baskerville, defending this approach, argues that his work has
been cited widely in organizational sociological literature, but has not been cited in the
anthropological literature due to little interest in that field in business related activities
and general antipathy to the business management field. This led to an ignorance of his
work in the social anthropology field. In terms of the national culture argument, he
agrees that the national level is perhaps not the best level of analysis for culture and that
nation states cannot be identified with national culture, but he finds that empirically his
scales correlate well with data from other sources. Baskerville, however, remains
unconvinced and argues that further examination of the replications that Hofstede claims
as validating his scales needs to be done (Baskerville-Morley 2005). Given that I am
undertaking a replication of a positivist study and that Hofstede style scales have been
replicated, I will adopt the use of this type of methodology for this study. The question
then is which set of scales to use.
The most prominent cultural values framework is that proposed by Hofstede (2001).
Based on a factorial analysis of internal survey results of IBM employees in 50 countries
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conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he derived four cultural values:
Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity. Later, after
additional research in Asian cultures, he added another dimension: Confucian
Dynamism or Long-Term Orientation. The Hofstede measures have been extensively
used within the IS literature including a study of IS project escalation (Keil et al., 2000)
and a study of the Mum Effect (Tan, et al. 2003). However, the Hofstede measures have
been criticized as lacking construct validity and other psychometric properties (Spector,
Cooper and Sparks 2001), and as being US/European or IBM centric (Baskerville 2003;
McSweeney 2002; Myers and Tan 2002). They have also been criticized as atheoretical
(House, et al. 2004). Also, the items used in the Hofstede measures mix organizational
and societal values with values of the individual and the collective. Since, in this study, I
am interested in investigating the effect of societal cultural values on the occurrence of
the Deaf Effect, Hofstede’s framework; with its items mixing organizational and societal
levels does not meet these requirements.
Recently, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research
Program (GLOBE) collaboration (House, et al. 2004) has proposed a framework of nine
cultural values that overcomes most of the criticisms of the Hofstede framework. This
framework appears to improve on that of Hofstede by, first, being theoretically based
versus simply being empirically derived. The GLOBE framework is based on a
conceptual model that reflects an integration of implicit leadership theory, value-belief
theory of culture, implicit motivation theory and structural contingency theory of
organizational form. Second, it seeks to eliminate societal and organizational centrism
by being developed by an international team of 170 researchers in 62 different countries
with middle manager subjects in those countries within 951 organizations in three
different industries. Thirdly, they employed a rigorous validation process that conforms to
the prescription of Karahanna, Evaristo and Srite (2002) for establishing cross-cultural
equivalence of measures. To avoid construct bias, Karahanna, et al. first suggest
informants in each culture “should be asked to describe the construct and associated
behaviors” (p. 49). For each construct, items were derived through interviews and focus
groups in several countries (Hanges and Dickson 2004, p. 124). These items were first
reviewed for appropriateness through the use of Q-sorting, item evaluation, and
translation and back translation by U.S. PhD students and then by Country CoInvestigators (CCI) in 38 countries. Item evaluation reports were provided by the CCIs to
inform GLOBE as to any words or phrases that were ambiguous or could not be
adequately translated. Problematic items were rewritten or dropped. Secondly,
Karahanna, et al. suggest that factor analysis and multi-dimensional scaling be used to
assess internal structural congruence. In two pilot tests involving results from 43
countries, the GLOBE investigators applied exploratory factor, reliability and aggregation
(rwg(J), ICC (1) and (2), Muthen multilevel confirmatory factor) analyses to assess the
validity of the items. To suppress item bias, the GLOBE researchers used the qualitative
methods described above to eliminate poor translation, and complex or inappropriate
wording. Fourth, the GLOBE framework presents four scales, two for measuring societal
values, two for organizational values. Within these, they have a scale for measuring
existing cultural values and one for measuring how the respondents believe the values
should be. Thus they remove the concern of cross measurement of society and
organization and how the society is now versus how it should be.
I therefore believe that these measures represent an improvement over the Hofstede
measures and so propose to use them in this study to measure cultural attributes.
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4.2.1

Selection of the Cultural Values Scale

As noted above, GLOBE provides four different instruments that measure the constructs
at two different levels, at the societal/organizational level and at the practices (as-is)/
values (should-be) level. The societal measures ask respondents to rate the society in
which they live as to the various cultural values. Similarly, the organizational scale
requests them to evaluate their organizations. The practices scales, of which there is
one for the society and one for the organization, ask respondents to rate a set of
practices relating to the surrounding society or organization, as it exists now. The values
scales, which also exist in a form for the society and one for the organization, requests
the respondents to assess what the practices ‘should be’ which gives a view of societal
values. In this study, I will use the societal practices scales to measure culture, as I am
interested in assessing practices (as-is) at the societal level. In this scale the
respondents are not providing their own values, but acting as individual raters to provide
their perception of the society’s practices. This measures precisely what is needed in
this study.

4.3

APPLYING THE GLOBE MEASURES TO THE DEAF EFFECT

4.3.1

Selection of Societal Collectivism

The nine factors proposed by Globe (House, et al. 2004) for measuring culture include
Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance,
Assertiveness, Gender Egalitarianism, Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, and
Human Orientation. In this research, I focus on societal collectivism because I believe it
to be the most appropriate dimension for explaining potential cross-cultural differences in
the Deaf Effect. Following Zhang, Lowry, Zhou and Fu (2007), I believe that societal
collectivism (the values of Institutional Collectivism and In-group Collectivism in a
societal context) is an appropriate choice because:
1. It allows us to develop a parsimonious model. Attempting to include all 9
cultural factors as independent variables would be too unwieldy. Thus,
researchers normally consider only one or two dimensions.
2. Societal collectivism is the most commonly used dimension in cross-cultural
research and has been shown to be a significant cultural factor in a wide
variety of studies.
3. Given the context of my study, it is logical to assume that societal collectivism
will affect how much credence is afforded to a bad news reporter who is not
on the project team when his/her report runs counter to the project team’s
consensus.
4. Given the nature of the experiment and the treatments used in this study, it
seems unlikely that differences in gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, and
humane orientation, would have a significant effect. Gender egalitarianism is
the degree to which a society minimizes gender role differences and promotes
gender equality (Javidan, House and Dorfman 2004). High gender egalitarian
societies have more women in positions of authority than low gender
egalitarian societies. In terms of the model already advanced, gender was
seen as affecting only the attitudes toward risk and not the perception of bad
news reporters or their message relevance. Assertiveness is the degree to
which individuals are forceful or confrontational with each other (Javidan, et al.
2004). Societies high in assertiveness value tough, direct behavior and
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communications. While valuing direct communications would seem to be
important, this quality is also valued by high performance orientation, which is
already included in the study. Humane orientation is the degree to which a
collective rewards individuals for being fair, generous, and caring towards
others (Javidan, et al. 2004). In high humane orientation societies, individuals
are other oriented and seek to act for the benefit of those they have
relationships with. This construct doesn’t appear to have any effect on the
constructs in the model beyond that of the collectivism variables which
encourage the decision maker to act in the interests of the collective..

4.3.2

The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect

Historically, collectivism has been considered to be a single construct (e.g. Hofstede,
2001). However, recently, consideration has been given to different forms of collectivism
(Triandis, 1995) and the breadth and complexity of that construct (Earley and Gibson,
1998). In the development of the GLOBE framework, they recognized during the
development of the measures that the construct empirically divides into two constructs
(Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii and Bechtold 2004). Their framework therefore divides societal
collectivism into two constructs: Institutional Collectivism and In-Group Collectivism.
These are two separate and uncorrelated constructs within the GLOBE framework.
Institutional Collectivism is associated with what Triandis referred to as “horizontal
collectivism” (Triandis 1995). Horizontal collectivism is characterized by a performance
orientation in which the goal is accomplished in a collective manner without the use of
aggression or power dominance. It is common in the Confucian Asian culture and the
Scandinavian cultures. In-Group Collectivism, on the other hand, is associated with the
concept of “vertical collectivism” (Triandis 1995). In cultures with a high degree of
vertical collectivism, close ties among family and clan are important, power distance is
important, but predefined workplace rules are less important (Gelfand, et al. 2004). InGroup Collectivism is not performance oriented, nor is it future oriented. This form of
collectivism is commonly found in South America and Africa.

4.3.2.1.

Institutional Collectivism

According to the GLOBE consortium, Institutional Collectivism is defined as “the degree
to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward
collective distribution of resources and collective action.” (Javidan, et al. 2004, p. 30). In
collectivist cultures, individuals are group oriented. They tend to view themselves as part
of a group and put group goals before their own. Duties and obligations are very
important to them. Institutional Collectivism also tends to be associated with higher
levels of uncertainty avoidance, which leads to a desire to use rules to resolve
uncertainty in the environment. I would expect then that decision makers in an
institutional collectivist culture would perceive that their society encourages them to
associate themselves with their work team and work on a team basis. They would,
however also see that they are encouraged to strive to follow workplace conventions.
Based on this description, in terms of the Deaf Effect, I make the following hypotheses:
since an institutional collectivist culture encourages decision makers to work with their
teams and stand with them, I hypothesize that, absent clear indications to the contrary,
decision makers in institutional collectivist societies will tend to side with the opinions of
their teams:
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H1a: Where the surrounding culture is characterized by a high degree of
Institutional Collectivism, decision makers will tend to side with the
opinion of the team in terms of whether to continue or discontinue a
course of action.
Additionally, since this type of culture encourages the tendency to side with their teams,
the decision maker would be also be less likely to perceive bad news reported from
outside their team to be relevant.
H1b: Institutional Collectivism decreases the relevance of a report of bad
news by a reporter external to the work team.
Finally, I note that the Institutional Collectivism construct is highly correlated with
uncertainty avoidance (Gelfand, et al. 2004). This correlation indicates that in uncertainty
avoiding cultures, people seek to regulate their activities through the establishment of
rules rather than making a determination when the situation arises (Gelfand, et al. 2004).
Thus, workplace conventions such as having an auditor review the project prior to
implementation and the formal designation of certain persons to be those who review
and report project status might moderate the effect of Institutional Collectivism to lower
the Relevance of the report of bad news. The report of a bad news reporter outside the
organization is hypothesized to receive lower Relevance (H1b). However, if the reporter
is role prescribed in a high Uncertainty Avoidance organization such as is often found in
institutional collectivist societies, then the Role Prescription may offset some or all of the
negative effect of Institutional Collectivism. Therefore, given this effect, I can see that a
decision maker influenced by Institutional Collectivism might take into consideration the
Role Prescription of a bad news reporter; giving the reports of those who are role
prescribed more Relevance. Thus the effects of Role Prescription might mitigate the
effect of Institutional Collectivism in decreasing Relevance. I therefore hypothesize that
H1c: Role Prescription moderates the effect of Institutional Collectivism on
Relevance.
In terms of the research model, as shown in figure 4.2, Institutional Collectivism operates
to defeat the bad news reporter’s message. First, by the decision maker siding with the
team, leading to a direct positive effect to continue the current course of action (H1a)
(assuming that that is the consensus of the team). Second, Institutional Collectivism
directly reduces the Decision of the bad news reporter’s message to the decision maker
regardless of their Credibility or Role Prescription (H1b). Finally, due to their desire to
follow workplace conventions, Role Prescription moderates the effect of Institutional
Collectivism on perceived Decision of the message such that the effect of Institutional
Collectivism is reduced when bad news reporters are role prescribed to report bad news
than when they are not role prescribed (H1c).
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Institutional
Collectivism
Role Prescription
+

(H1c) +

(H1b) -

(H1a) +

Bad News Reporter
Credibility

Relevance
+

of the message

Decision to
continue the
current course of action

Figure 4.2: Effect of Institutional Collectivism
(Grayed out terms are from the studies of papers 1 and 2)
4.3.2.2.

In-Group Collectivism

In-Group Collectivism is defined as “the degree to which individuals express pride,
loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or families” (Javidan, et al. 2004). In
contrast with Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, is associated with the
concept of “vertical collectivism” (Triandis 1995). These collectivists are more interested
in clan groupings than institutions. There are close ties between the clan members and
they are respectful of authority and have fewer rules than institutional collectivists
(Gelfand, et al. 2004). In-Group Collectivism is associated with higher power distance
and humane orientation and inversely with future orientation and uncertainty avoidance
(Gelfand, et al. 2004). Thus decision makers in high in-group collectivist societies would
be encouraged by that society to associate with the hierarchy in which they find
themselves and defer to its leadership. I therefore hypothesize that since in-group
collectivists tend to follow the leaders of their clan:
H2a: Where the surrounding culture is characterized by a high degree of inGroup Collectivism, decision makers will tend to side with the opinion
of the leadership in terms of whether to continue or discontinue a
course of action.
H2b: In-Group Collectivism decreases the Decision of a report of bad news
when it conflicts with the opinion of the leadership in terms of whether
to continue or discontinue a course of action.
Unlike Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism is not rule oriented and thus its
influence would not be moderated based on a work place rule. However, since in-group
collectivists tend to be more respectful of authority, this would give the opinions of
management a stronger weight. This would imply that if a bad news reporter was role
prescribed by management, it would lend them additional Credibility and Relevance in
the decision maker’s consideration. I hypothesize that a bad news reporter whose job as
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designated by the leadership is to report bad news in projects would tend to have more
Credibility and Relevance than one who is not role prescribed. Therefore:
H2c: Role Prescription moderates the effect of In-Group Collectivism on
Relevance.
In terms of the research model (figure 4.3), I hypothesize that In-Group Collectivism will
have a positive direct effect on the decision to continue the current course of action while
having a negative effect on the Relevance of the bad news reporter’s message. The
effect on Relevance will be moderated by the Role Prescription of the reporter as shown
in figure 4. Where the bad news reporter is role prescribed the effect of In-Group
Collectivism on Relevance will be weakened.
Role Prescription
+

In-Group

(H2c) -

Collectivism

+
(H2b)-

(H2a) +

+Bad News Reporter
Credibility

Relevance

Decision

of the message

to continue the current
course of action

Figure 4.3: Effects of In-Group Collectivism

The entire research model investigated in this study is shown in figure 4.4. I entered the
paths shown in the first two studies as significant in the model plus paths for the
hypotheses advanced here.
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+

Credibility

Gender

Risk
Propensity

+

+

+

Risk
Perception

+

Relevance

-

+

H1a +
Role
Prescription

H1c H1b -

Institutional
Collectivism

Decision

H2a +

H2c -

H2b -

In-Group
Collectivism

Figure 4.4: Complete Research Model Showing all Paths Examined
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4.4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The hypotheses advanced above were examined by use of a laboratory experiment
executed in different countries. Role Prescription and bad news reporter Credibility were
manipulated independently. The 2x2 factorial design, scenarios, questionnaire and
methodology developed in paper 2 were reused in this study. The questionnaire was
augmented by the addition of the GLOBE survey questions for capturing data related to
Institutional and In-Group Collectivism. Additional questions from the GLOBE survey
were added to cover the cultural variables used as controls in this study: uncertainty
avoidance, power distance, performance orientation, and future orientation. The cultural
values of Institutional and In-Group Collectivism are varied by selection of subjects from
countries determined by the GLOBE consortium study on leadership to possess levels of
Institutional and In-Group Collectivism that vary from high to low. The effects of culture
are analyzed by employing the subject’s responses to the cultural values items as an
indicator of their beliefs about the nature of the surrounding culture. These responses
were analyzed for cultural response bias, appropriate psychometric properties and
equivalence across the countries. They were then used in a PLS analysis to assess the
effects of the societal collectivism on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect.

4.4.1

Subjects

The subjects for this experiment were undergraduate students in introductory classes
within the business school or school of information sciences at major universities. This
population allowed selection of subjects relatively uniform in age, and experience. This
uniformity is held to reduce methods bias and ensure equivalence in the sample across
the cultures (Karahanna, et al. 2002), While the use of student subjects is subject to
debate, it was shown in chapter 3 that the central question to be resolved is that of how
to deal with the question of external validity. Following Cook and Campbell (1979) and
Calder, Phillips and Tybout (1981; 1982; 1983), it was argued that external validity can
be de-emphasized in favor of internal validity as long as the subjects employed respond
in the same direction as the target population. I also saw there that student populations
had responded similarly to practitioner populations in decision making studies and
therefore concluded that student subjects were appropriate for this research.
In order to insure variance in the cultural values that are of interest to this study,
countries were selected from the GLOBE survey that reflect Institutional and In-Group
Collectivism value scores that range from high to low. To make the determination of
whether the geography was high or low on this value, the GLOBE computed “bands” for
each cultural value were used. The GLOBE researchers rank ordered the scores for
each variable and then grouped them by bands that reflect a range in which the
differences between the scores are not statistically meaningful. The selected
geographies and GLOBE cultural values results are found in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: GLOBE values for the Selected
Geographies (House, et al. 2004)
Institutional
Collectivism

In-Group
Collectivism
GLOBE

Country

Value8

GLOBE
Band9

Value

United
States

4.2

B

4.25

C

Germany

3.56

C

4.02

C

China

4.77

A

5.8

A

Average
Value

4.25

Bands

Band

5.13
ABCD10

ABC

Thus the selected countries meet the requirements for manipulation of the collectivism
variables11. Germany is projected to provide the lowest levels of both types of
collectivism while China is to provide the highest levels and the USA should provide a
below average sample on both values. The USA sample will also allow replication of the
findings from chapter 3.

4.4.2

Experimental Methodology

The study was administered to the subjects as a voluntary activity in their classrooms.
Various collaborators in the subject countries administered the survey instrument.
Students were instructed to read the scenario presented to them and then answer the
questions in the questionnaire. The administrator was a native of the country and
followed a standard script provided to them. The sampling strategy ensured sample
equivalency by controlling for demographics, background and role. Administration bias
was controlled by using similar physical conditions, native language administrators and
using identical administration procedures. These steps are held to procedurally reduce
method bias (Karahanna, et al. 2002).

4.4.2.1.

Scenario

8

The scale for all variables in the GLOBE framework is 1 to 7. The range of values for
institutional collectivism is from 3.25 to 5.22. For in-group collectivism it is 3.53 to 6.36.
9

Band A is the highest range of values. Band B is next highest and so on. Institutional
collectivism has 4 bands. In-group collectivism has 3.
10

Greece is the only country in the “D” band at 3.25.

11

In my dissertation proposal, I included South Africa in the geographies. However, in
evaluating the data received from the site, it had poor psychometric properties and was unusable.
South Africa was therefore omitted in reporting the results.
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In order to independently manipulate Role Prescription and bad news reporter
Credibility, four different treatment scenarios were used as developed in chapter 3.
Subjects were asked to assume the role of a project manager responsible for
development of a new system for a bank and are informed that while they do not have
the technical knowledge to evaluate the quality of the system themselves, they have
learned that their team is a reliable source of information about the project status. The
team reports that the project is ready for implementation. A bad news reporter from
outside the team reviews the project and then reports to the project manager that the
project is a “disaster waiting to happen” and must be completely retested. The
organizational climate is described as one that values meeting deadlines above other
considerations.
In the high Credibility manipulation, the bad news reporter is described as trustworthy
and has expertise; in the low Credibility manipulation, the bad news reporter is described
as untrustworthy and lacking expertise. In the high Role Prescription manipulation, the
bad news reporter is described as an internal auditor whose job is to routinely audit IS
projects and report on project readiness. In the low Role Prescription manipulation, the
bad news reporter is described as another project leader whose job does not include
routinely auditing projects and who volunteers, unasked, to review the project.
In Germany, and China, to reduce item bias, the scenarios were translated from English
into German, and Chinese, respectively and then back translated by different individuals
to ensure fidelity in translation (Karahanna, et al. 2002). As part of this effort, names
were changed to native language names and locations were changed to locations in the
native countries. The questionnaire contained three different sections. The first part
requests the subject’s decision, rationale for the decision and demographic information.
The second part contains the items dealing with the constructs of the model from paper
2. The third part was composed of items from the GLOBE survey. The questions in
sections two and three were scrambled separately so that items relating to each of the
constructs were presented in a random order with the goal of reducing method bias.
The English versions of the scenarios were reported with study 2 in chapter 3. The
questionnaire used in this experiment is included in Appendix A.

4.4.2.2.

Constructs

Table 4.2 lists the constructs that were evaluated in this study and how they were
measured. All non-cultural value constructs are identical to those used in paper 2. The
cultural values constructs and measurements are taken from the GLOBE Form Beta
(societal practices scale) (GLOBE 2006).

Chapter 4 – The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect

87

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect

Table 4.2: Construct Categorization and Measurement Methodology
Construct

Type

How Measured

Source of the
Items

Decision to Continue
Current Course of
Action

Dependent Variable

One 8 point
semantic differential
scale item.

Same item as
used in
chapters 2 and
3.

Perceived Relevance
of the Bad News
Reporter’s Message

Endogenous
Independent

Four 7 point Likert
scale items

Same items as
used in chapter
3.

Credibility of the Bad
News Reporter

Exogenous
Independent

Five 7 point Likert
scale items

Same items as
used in chapter
3.

Risk Propensity of the
Decision Maker

Exogenous
Independent

Three 7 point Likert
scale items

Same items as
used in chapter
3. Derived from
Sitken and
Weingart
(1995).

Perception of Risk by
the Decision Maker

Exogenous
Independent

Four 7 point Likert
scale items

Same items as
used in chapter
3. Derived from
Sitken and
Weingart
(1995).

Role Prescription of
the Bad News
Reporter

Exogenous
Independent

One 7 point Likert
scale item

Same item as
used in
chapters 2 and
3.

Institutional
Collectivism of the
Ambient Society

Exogenous
Independent

Two 7 point Likert
scale items

GLOBE
Framework

In-Group Collectivism
of the Ambient Society

Exogenous
Independent

Four 7 point Likert
scale items

GLOBE
Framework

Power Distance of the
Ambient Society

Exogenous Control

Four 7 point
semantic differential
items

GLOBE
Framework

Two 7 point
semantic differential
scale items

One 7 point Likert
scale item
Uncertainty Avoidance

Exogenous Control

Three 7 point Likert
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of the Ambient Society

scale item

Framework

One 7 point
semantic differential
item
Performance
Orientation of the
Ambient Society

Exogenous Control

Two 7 point
semantic differential
items

GLOBE
Framework

One 7 point Likert
scale item
Future Orientation of
the Ambient Society

Exogenous Control

Five 7 point
semantic differential
items

GLOBE
Framework

In addition to the studied cultural values constructs of Institutional Collectivism and InGroup Collectivism, the constructs of Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Future
Orientation and Performance Orientation are entered as control variables on the
decision to continue the current course of action.
Reflective/Formative Determination. I applied the same reflective/formative
determinations from chapter 3 in this study. Relevance was treated as a reflective
variable; Credibility as a formative construct. Below, I discuss the nature of the GLOBE
constructs.
The GLOBE Consortium (House, et al. 2004) developed and treated their 9 constructs
as reflective constructs. However, in examining the items used in these constructs, it
appears that they are better treated as formative constructs.
Petter, Straub and Rai’s (2007) table 3 provides a set of decision rules for evaluation of
the constructs. They describe four rules for evaluation of constructs to determine
whether they are formative or reflective. First is the direction of causality. Reflective
items are manifestations of the underlying construct and therefore causality flows from
the construct to the measure. For formative constructs, the causality is in the opposite
direction. The items interact to form the manifestation of the construct. Second,
measurement interchangeability asks whether the items are interchangeable with each
other. For reflective measures, the items should be interchangeable with each other and
elimination of one item does not affect the determination of the construct. For formative
constructs on the other hand, the measures are not necessarily interchangeable as they
cause formation of the construct, therefore they cannot be removed without damaging
the measurement of the construct. Third, measure covariance asks whether the
measures statistically co-vary with each other. In reflective constructs, the items must
co-vary with each other. In formative constructs however, since they measure different
parts of the construct, the items will not necessarily co-vary with each other. In fact,
some items might vary in opposite directions if they represent countervailing forces on
the construct. Finally, they ask whether the items have the same antecedents and
consequences. Do the same causal factors motivate the answers to the items or are
they different. Items for reflective constructs, since they reflect the same value, will have
the same antecedents. Items for formative constructs will have different antecedents and
consequences.
In the sections that follow, I analyze each of these constructs to determine whether they
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are reflective or formative. The third factor, measure co-variance, is assessed in the
findings section.
Collectivism. The GLOBE consortium divides collectivism into two constructs:
Institutional (IC) and In-Group (IG) Collectivism. The items that measure these are
shown in the following table 4.3a:
Table 4.3a: Collectivism Items
IC – 1

In this society, leaders encourage group loyalty even if individual
goals suffer.

IC – 2

The economic system is design to maximize individual interests.

IC - 3

In this society being accepted by the other members of a group is
very important.

IC - 4

In this society individualism is more valued than group cohesion.

IG - 1

In this society, children take pride in the individual
accomplishments of their parents.

IG - 2

In this society, parents take pride in the individual
accomplishments of their children.

IG – 3

In this society, aging parents generally live at home with their
children.

IG – 4

In this society, children generally live at home with their parents
until they get married.

In these constructs, these items all tap into different facets of the construct each adding
a different aspect. The four Institutional Collectivism items assess the respondents’
views of what leaders encourage, the goal of the economic system, how people are
accepted and what is valued more in society. Similarly, the In-Group Collectivism
questions assess what children and parents take pride in, how the aging are cared for
and whether children live at home until marriage. They are thus not interchangeable and
they all have different antecedents. From this qualitative analysis, they are therefore
considered to be formative constructs.
Uncertainty Avoidance. The items used to measure uncertainty avoidance are listed in
table 4.3b.
Table 4.3b: Uncertainty Avoidance Items
UA - 1

In this society, orderliness and consistency are stressed, even at
the expense of experimentation and innovation.

UA - 2

In this society, people lead highly structured lives with few
unexpected events.

UA - 3

In this society, societal requirements and instructions are spelled
out in detail so citizens know what they are expected to do.

UA - 4

This society has rules or laws to cover almost all situations.
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In each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: orderliness,
structure of the lives, and detail of instruction. Therefore I see that they are not
interchangeable and have different antecedents. I therefore consider the construct as
formative.
Power Distance. The items used to measure power distance are listed in table 4.3c.
Table 4.3c: Power Distance Items
PD - 1

In this society, a person’s influence is based primarily on the
authority of one’s position as opposed to their ability and
contribution.

PD - 2

In this society, followers are expected to obey their leaders
without question as opposed to questioning them when in
disagreement.

PD - 3

In this society, people in position of power try to increase their
social distance from less powerful people as opposed to
decreasing it.

PD - 4

In this society, rank and position in the hierarchy have special
privileges.

PD – 5

In this society, power is concentrated at the top

In each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: source of
influence, obedience to leaders, activities of the powerful, privileges of the powerful,
concentration of power. Therefore they are not interchangeable and have different
antecedents. I therefore consider the construct as formative.
Future Orientation. The items used to measure future orientation are listed in table
4.3d.
Table 4.3d: Future Orientation Items
FO - 1

The way to be successful in this society is to plan ahead.

FO - 2

In this society, the accepted norm is to plan for the future.

FO - 3

In this society, social gatherings are usually planned well in
advance.

FO - 4

In this society, more people live for the future than live for the
present.

FO – 5

In this society, people place more emphasis on planning for the
future.

I see that in each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: path
to success, and whether life is lived for the future or the past. I see that they are not
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interchangeable and have different antecedents. I therefore consider the construct as
formative.
Performance Orientation. Finally, the items used to measure performance orientation
are listed in table 4.3e.
Table 4.3e: Performance Orientation Items
PO - 1

In this society, teen-aged students are encouraged to strive for
continuously improved performance.

PO - 2

In this society, major rewards are based on only performance
effectiveness (compared with other factors such as seniority etc.)

PO - 3

In this society, being innovative to improve performance is
generally substantially rewarded vs. not rewarded.

In each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: what students
are taught to do, how rewards are bestowed and how innovation is recognized. They are
not interchangeable and have different antecedents. I therefore consider the construct
as formative.
Summary. In the following table 4.4, I summarize the results of my assessment of the
constructs. I did not include Decision or Role Prescription in the table, as they are single
measure constructs. In the previous usage of these measures, those studies all reported
the constructs to have high item covariance (Cuellar, et al. 2006; Hanges and Dickson
2004). Since I determined that the constructs are formative, I will establish formative
construct processing within PLS by using the measure to construct connections instead
of the construct to measure connections.
Table 4.4: Categorization of Constructs as Formative or Reflective
Construct

Direction
of
Causality

Measure
interchangability

Nomological

Institutional
Collectivism

Measure
to
Construct

Not
interchangeable,
measure different
aspects of the
construct

Different
Antecedents

Formative

In-Group
Collectivism

Measure
to
Construct

Not
interchangeable,
measure different
aspects of the
construct

Different
Antecedents

Formative

Net
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Uncertainty
Avoidance

Measure
to
Construct

Not
interchangeable,
measure different
aspects of the
construct

Different
Antecedents

Formative

Power
Distance

Measure
to
Construct

Not
interchangeable,
measure different
aspects of the
construct

Different
Antecedents

Formative

Future
Orientation

Measure
to
Construct

Not
interchangeable,
measure different
aspects of the
construct

Different
Antecedents

Formative

Performance
Orientation

Measure
to
Construct

Not
interchangeable,
measure different
aspects of the
construct

Different
Antecedents

Formative

4.5

ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

Surveys were taken on paper, coded, and then keyed into spreadsheets and analyzed
using SPSS for descriptive statistics and manipulation checks and SmartPLS (Ringle, et
al. 2005) for measurement and structural model analysis.

4.5.1

Handling the Cultural Values.

I followed Ford, Connelly and Meister (2003) in the handling of the cultural values. They
make the following five points about how cultural variables should be handled:
1)

Values variables should have a theoretic reason for being incorporated into the
study.

In this study, it has been shown how the value of Institutional Collectivism is theoretically
projected to influence the Deaf Effect.
2)

The dimensions of the framework should be used for the purposes for which
they are intended.

The GLOBE framework was developed and operationalized at the societal and
organizational level. The object is to use the subjects as raters of the values of the
culture so that on an aggregate basis it provides a value the cultural values as perceived
by the respondents. Therefore, it yields a single value that can be applied to the entire
culture. However, there are reasons to not follow this particular approach. As has been
discussed above, it can be argued that there is a dominant culture to which members of
the society conform whether or not they agree with the values of the culture. Also, each
individual’s experience of that society is unique to that individual. For example, some
individuals may perceive the culture as favoring individual activity while others may
perceive it as favoring collective activity. These perceptions may have a different impact
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on the first than on the second. Therefore, it is inappropriate to apply the same value for
the cultural values for each member of the society. Therefore, the GLOBE cultural value
scales are utilized as measures of the individual perceptions of the ambient culture. This
approach is similar to that of Srite and Karahanna (2002) wherein they argue that to
apply the same cultural value to each subject in a particular culture is to commit the
ecological fallacy and argue that culture should be treated as an individual difference
value.
The GLOBE framework poses the questions in such a way as to collect the respondent’s
perceptions of the values of the culture in which they exist. Therefore, this is an
appropriate framework to use to collect the individual perception values. The instructions
for use indicate that the GLOBE framework has not been verified at the individual level
of analysis as they have been at the aggregate level (GLOBE 2006). I will therefore have
to validate the psychometric properties of the constructs as part of this study.
3)

Cultural values must be measured within the study

Ford et al. (2003) and other articles (Baskerville 2003; McCoy, Galletta and King 2005)
indicate that there may have been shifts in the cultural values of some countries from
those originally gathered by Hofstede or GLOBE. For this reason, it is inappropriate
simply to use values from prior studies and assume that they apply to our sample. I
therefore will measure the cultural values for our samples in the course of this study.
4)

When selecting the sample for the study, an effort should be made to select
populations expected to differ on the cultural variables under study.

As described above, I have selected geographies likely to have subject populations with
societal values which will have high, low and moderate levels of Institutional and InGroup Collectivism.
5)

Use the cultural values measures as independent variables, moderating
variables or control variables within the study.

Ford et al. (2003) argue that instead of collecting subject groups with differing cultural
values for the purpose of comparing the results between groups, they should be
measured and included in the structural model, if not as independent variables, at least
as control variables. Therefore in this study, I will collect measurements on Institutional
and In-Group Collectivism and include them in the structural model. Other cultural values
will be entered into the model as control variables on the decision. The remaining
cultural variables, power distance uncertainty avoidance, future and power orientation
will be entered as control variables into the model as having a direct effect on the
decision to continue an existing course of action.

4.5.2

Use of PLS.

SmartPLS (Ringle, et al. 2005) was used to assess the measurement and the structural
model. PLS is a second generation statistical analysis tool that provides the ability to
analyze the measurement model and the structural model in a single analysis. It also
allows analysis of complex path models, mediation and moderation that allow the
examination of constructs within its nomological net. This provides an increase in
functionality as opposed to first generation tools such as OLS regression. PLS is
appropriate when the model is in a domain where theory is weak or non-existent (Petter,
et al. 2007). Additionally, PLS is appropriate for studies doing hypothesis testing as is
being done here as opposed to studies that are testing theories for fit to data. For those,
covariance based SEM is superior (Henseler, et al. 2008).
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PLS requires the entry of the structural / measurement model to be entered prior to
analysis. The structural model used to test the hypotheses defined above is shown in the
figure 4.5 below:

UA*

PO*

FO*

PD*

FTE*

Age*

Credibility

R2=.251
Relevance

R2=.413

Decision

Role
Prescription

Risk
Perception
2
In-Group
Collectivism

R = .121

Institutional
Collectivism

Gender

Age*

- Control Variable

Figure 4.5: Structural Model Tested in this Study
Legend:
UA – Uncertainty Avoidance
FTE – Full Time Equivalent Work Experience
PO – Performance Orientation
FO – Future Orientation
PD – Power Distance
FTE – Full Time Equivalent Years of Work Experience
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4.6

RESULTS

In this section, I report the results of the study. The process that I followed to analyze
and report the data is as follows:
1) Test and Correct for Cultural Response Bias
Different cultures tend to respond to questionnaires of this type by either avoiding or
accentuating the extremes of the scales. Asian cultures tend to avoid the extremes
while Mediterranean cultures tend to avoid the middle of the scale (Hanges 2004). It
is therefore necessary to test for and correct this bias before doing further analysis
(van de Vijver and Leung 1997).
2) Report of Demographics
In this section the demographics of the study are reported.
3) Measurement Model Assessment
In this section, the measurement model is assessed to ensure that the psychometric
properties of the survey are appropriate.
4) Cross-Cultural Equivalence Testing
Here the responses are tested to ensure that they are equivalent to each other and
are unbiased
5) Manipulation Checks
Here, the Credibility and Role Prescription manipulations are checked to ensure that
they worked in all the geographies.
6) Structural Analysis
Finally, I report and interpret results of the PLS structural analysis.

4.6.1

Cultural Response Bias

As described above, culturally induced biases in how the respondents completed the
items can cause distortions in the data that would prevent comparisons of the data
across cultures. It is therefore necessary to test for these effects and if need be
correct them.
The classic procedure is described in Hanges (2004). If a subject is asked to
respond to a large range of constructs, the means and standard deviations of his/her
responses lose any construct specific content and reflect only the subject’s response
biases. Therefore the procedure is to create z-scores for each respondent using the
formula:

Standardization is a linear transformation that neither distorts the distribution of the
items nor changes their correlations (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 2003). Scale
scores for each construct are calculated based on both the original and standardized
scores. If a large correlation exists between the original items and the standardized
scores, the items are considered to be relatively free from cultural response bias.
I performed this test on the cultural variables, calculated as per GLOBE

Chapter 4 – The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect

96

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
specifications, and obtained a correlation of .919 between the two numbers. The
results are displayed in table 4.5.

Z Scores
Original
Scores

Table 4.5: Results of Cultural Response Bias Test
Country
UA
FO
IC
IG
PD
USA
-0.016
-0.217
-0.158 0.094
-0.296
Germany
-0.237
0.098
-0.060
0.215
-0.204
China
0.239
-0.160
-0.010 -0.403
-0.395
USA
3.535
3.185
3.267
3.751
3.013
Germany
3.228
3.820
3.532
4.001
3.280
China
3.939
3.163
3.468
2.782
2.805
Correlation
0.9191
Coefficient

PO
-0.198
-0.071
-0.067
3.224
3.515
2.891

It can be concluded that there is not an issue with cultural response bias in this
sample and therefore I will use the original scores in this analysis.

4.6.2

Demographics

The demographics of the study subjects are reported in figure 4.6.
Table 4.6: Demographics
USA

Germany

China

Total

N

153

139

171

463

Gender (F/M)

74/79

63/76

65/106

202/261

Age (SD)

21.82 (3.571)

21.62 (1.924)

20.28 (1.129)

21.19 (2.503)

Full Time
Work
Experience
(SD)

3.98 (3.872)

0.49 (1.093)

0.13 (0.456)

1.51 (2.899)

IS Exp

0.69 (2.076)

0.10 (0.542)

0.00 (0.00)

0.26 (1.264)

The demographics show that sample sizes are similar and age is statistically the same.
Gender shows more men to women in all the countries. In China, this excess of men is
particularly pronounced. Work experience is relatively the same except in the USA
where there is a significant amount of work experience. IS experience is very close to
zero across the board and since in China all subjects reported no IS experience, this
construct will not be used in the analysis.

4.6.3

Measurement Model Assessment

Straub, Boudreau and Gefen (2004) reviewed the existing literature on instrument
validation and have provided guidelines for the assessment of the measurement model
of studies in the positivist tradition, such as this. They prescribe that the following
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validation steps be performed:
1) Construct Validity
a. Discriminant Validity
b. Convergent Validity
c. Factorial Validity
2) Reliability
3) Manipulation Validity
They further recommend that content validity, nomological validity and common methods
bias be evaluated.
In the following two sections, I review these validities for the study reported here.
Factorial validity is assessed by the Confirmatory Factor Analysis tests reported below.

4.6.3.1.

Evaluating the Reflective Measures

Convergent validity, how the items converge to measure a particular construct, is
assessed by examining the individual item validity, construct reliability and average
variance extracted (AVE) (Chin 1998). Discriminant validity, how items differentiate
between constructs so that one item measures only one construct, can be evaluated by
examining the cross loadings between items and constructs and examining the AVEs of
the latent constructs to ensure that they are greater than the square of the correlations
among the latent constructs (Chin 1998; Henseler, et al. 2008). Factorial validity is
discussed in the section on cross loadings.
Convergent Validity. Convergent validity for the reflective constructs was examined by
using confirmatory factor analysis; PLS performs a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
rather than an exploratory one as done in principal components analysis. This means
that it does not seek for the proper factors, but rather confirms that the factor structure
specified in the model is correct. The benchmark value for the loading value is .707
although in exploratory studies such as this, .5 or .6 is common (Chin 1998). In this
study, the CFA in Table 4.7a shows the following results for the USA:

Table 4.7a: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results - USA

Construct

Item

Item-to-Construct
Loading

Relevance

Relev 1

.9102

Relev 2

.9478

Relev 3

.9435

Risk Percept 1

.8619

Risk Percept 2

.8656

Risk Percept 3

.8541

Risk
Perception
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Risk Percept 4

.6989

All factor loadings are over .69 in the USA sample. These values exceed the .707
benchmark value except for Risk Percept 4 which was very close. These values provide
evidence of convergent validity.
Table 4.7b shows the results from Germany.

Table 4.7b: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results Germany
Construct

Item

Item-to-Construct
Loading

Relevance

Relev 1

.8566

Relev 2

.9120

Relev 3

.9372

Risk Percept 1

.8978

Risk Percept 2

.9239

Risk Percept 3

.5240

Risk Percept 4

.5882

Risk
Perception

All factor loadings exceed the .707 benchmark value except for Risk Percept 3 and 4
which exceed the .5 value for exploratory studies(Chin, 1998). These values provide
evidence of convergent validity.
Table 4.7c shows the results from China.

Table 4.7c: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results - China

Construct

Item

Item-to-Construct
Loading

Relevance

Relev 1

.8374

Relev 2

.7892

Relev 3

.8559

Risk Percept 1

.8573

Risk Percept 2

.8530

Risk Percept 3

.7205

Risk
Perception
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Risk Percept 4

.7196

All factor loadings exceed the .707 benchmark value providing evidence of convergent
validity.
Reliability. To assess the reliability of the measures, the composite reliability, the
Cronbach’s alpha and the AVE were calculated for reach construct. Cronbach’s alpha
and composite reliability both measure the internal consistency of the construct’s items.
Cronbach’s alpha provides a lower bound on the reliability measurement (Cortina 1993).
Composite reliability without the assumption of equally weighted indicators provides a
closer estimate to the reliability figures given accurate parameter estimates (Chin 1998).
AVE measures the amount of variance of the construct that comes from the indicators
vs. that which comes from measurement error (Chin 1998). Table 4.8 illustrates the
values of these indicators for all three geographies.
Table 4.8a: Construct Reliability - USA
Construct

Composite
Reliability

AVE

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Relevance

.9528

.8707

.9256

Risk
Propensity

.7846

.5497

.5904

Risk
Perception

.8951

.6823

.8467

Table 4.8b: Construct Reliability - Germany
Construct

Composite
Reliability

AVE

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Relevance

.9309

.8101

.8881

Risk
Propensity

.7558

.5104

.5259

Risk
Perception

.8349

.5722

.7347
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Table 4.8c: Construct Reliability - China
Construct

Composite
Reliability

AVE

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Relevance

.8652

.6817

.7667

Risk
Propensity

.7281

.4952

.5772

Risk
Perception

.8711

.6397

.8062

As shown in table 4.8, in all geographies, for Relevance and Risk Perception,
Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite all exceed the threshold values of .7 standard for
construct reliability suggested by Straub, et al. (2004). The AVE exceeds the baseline
guideline of 0.5 (Chin 1998) for both of those constructs in all three countries. Risk
Propensity failed to achieve the requisite level of Cronbach’s alpha and therefore this
construct was omitted from subsequent analysis.
Discriminant Validity. To assess the discriminant validity of the measurement model,
the cross loadings of the items were examined. Cross loading analysis in PLS is
conducted by computing the outer loadings of the items on the constructs in a
confirmatory factor analysis and then comparing the loadings of the items on constructs
other than its intended construct with its loading on its intended construct. This is shown
in table 4.9.
Table 4.9a: Construct Cross Loading
Table - USA

Relevance

Risk
Perception

REL1

0.908

-0.481

REL2

0.947

-0.524

REL3

0.943

-0.484

RPerc1

-0.492

0.863

RPerc2

-0.411

0.872

RPerc3

-0.525

0.850

RPerc4

-0.285

0.707

Chapter 4 – The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect

101

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
Table 4.9b: Construct Cross Loading
Table - Germany

Relevance

Risk
Perception

REL1

0.861

-0.481

REL2

0.913

-0.524

REL3

0.937

-0.484

RPerc1

-0.492

0.899

RPerc2

-0.411

0.923

RPerc3

-0.525

0.535

RPerc4

-0.285

0.583

Table 4.9c: Construct Cross Loading
Table – China

Relevance

Risk
Perception

REL1

0.836

-0.481

REL2

0.782

-0.524

REL3

0.856

-0.484

RPerc1

-0.492

0.856

RPerc2

-0.411

0.853

RPerc3

-0.525

0.727

RPerc4

-0.285

0.727

Chin (1998) recommends that the loading on factors other than the target factor be less
than that of the posited latent variable. An exploratory factor analysis found that the
items in all geographies factored cleanly with a loading of over .698 for all items to their
constructs with negative loadings for the other construct (see appendix B for details).
Additionally, the AVEs of the latent constructs were compared against the correlations
with other constructs. The test here is to verify that the square root of the AVE is greater
than correlations with the other reflective constructs (Chin 1998). This test is shown in
table 4.10.
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Table 4.10a: AVE - USA
Relevance Risk
Perception
0.933

0.536

0.499

0.827

Relevance
Risk
Perception

Table 4.10b: AVE - Germany
Relevance Risk
Perc
0.904

0.519

0.239

0.757

Relevance
Risk
Perception

Table 4.10c: AVE - China
Relevance Risk
Perc
0.825

0.510

0.339

0.794

Relevance
Risk
Perception

The AVEs here are all greater than the correlations between the constructs showing that
we have good discriminant validity (Chin 1998).

4.6.3.2.

Evaluating the Formative Measures

Petter, Straub and Rai (2007) provide guidance on how to validate formative constructs
such as Credibility. They argue that the following steps should be taken to validate the
construct: 1) Examine the weightings of the items to ensure that they are all significant;
2) Examine the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the items to ensure that there is not
an excessive amount of destabilizing multi-collinearity. VIF values should not exceed
3.3.
In assessing the PLS outer weights, as shown in table 4.11, most of the weights for the
items were not significant on a two-tailed basis. Only one item was significant in all three
geographies, Cred – 3. Following the guidance in Petter, Straub and Rai (2007), I
determined to retain all of the items in order to maintain content validity. The VIF
analysis of the construct showed that all items have VIF values less than the 3.3 value
recommended by Petter Straub and Rai (2007).
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Table 4.11: T-Statistics of Outer Weights of Formative
Items
Item

USA

Germany

China

Cred – 1

1.7088

1.2871

4.8202*

Cred – 2

.0926

2.5815*

2.5728*

Cred – 3

2.6001*

6.4637*

5.0522*

Cred – 4

.3067

1.2387

2.1249*

Cred – 5

.3911

1.2398

.3193

IC – 1

1.1012

1.5306

.5371

IC – 2

.6440

.9472

.3445

IC – 3

1.2345

.8805

1.5462

IC – 4

1.2018

.9119

.9094

IG – 1

1.1723

1.6994

1.6061

IG – 2

1.0488

.3630

.2190

IG – 3

1.5618

.6195

.4687

IG – 4

.5543

.5959

1.3579

UA – 1

1.5153

1.3067

1.0530

UA – 2

.6893

1.1253

.0946

UA – 3

.0509

.9203

1.1586

UA – 4

1.1044

.8294

1.2201

PD – 1

1.1200

1.2585

1.2245

PD – 2

.8630

1.1145

1.3986

PD – 3

.7698

.4226

1.1736

PD – 4

1.0572

1.1630

.7497

PD – 5

.8305

.2461

.8839

FO – 1

.0475

1.2840

.8762

FO – 2

.8241

.2747

.0412

FO – 3

.5388

1.1154

1.3806

FO – 4

1.3604

1.5498

.3149

FO – 5

1.2233

1.3966

.7689

PO – 1

1.8498

.2461

.1484

PO – 2

.4483

.6021

1.8229

PO – 3

.7559

1.9303

1.0085
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4.6.4

Equivalence Checking

In conducting cross-cultural research, there are unique challenges that are not found in
research conducted within a single culture. Cultural differences extend to differences in
conception and response. These differences can manifest themselves in biases in
response to the items on a survey such as the one under consideration here. Thus
difference in response to a survey between different cultural groups can be due to other
factors besides the examined constructs. Procedural activities and post-administration
analysis must be done to establish that the responses of the different cultures are
equivalent prior to drawing any conclusions (Karahanna, et al. 2002).
The concepts of equivalence and bias are two aspects of the same idea (van de Vijver
and Leung 1997). A survey that has equivalence across cultures has few biases.
Similarly, a survey that has few biases is held to be equivalent. Karahanna, et al. (2002)
describe three types of bias: construct, method and item. This section describes how
each of these has been handled in this study. This analysis is done after the examination
of the measurement model as these techniques assume good psychometric properties
(van de Vijver and Leung 1997).

4.6.4.1.

Construct Bias

Construct bias exists when a construct measured is not equivalent across the different
geographies. This has to do with differences in conception and measurement of the
constructs across geographies. One of the approaches mentioned by Karahanna, et al.
(2002) is that of assessing internal structural congruence through techniques such as
factor analysis, multidimensional scaling and comparison of covariance matrices. The
most powerful method of detecting the presences of construct bias has been multi-group
confirmatory factor analysis (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). While I am not aware
of any procedure that has yet been advanced for formative constructs, Steenkamp and
Baumgartner (1998) have advanced a method for assessing measurement invariance in
reflective constructs based on confirmatory factor analysis.
Steenkamp and Baumgartner suggest that by examining first, configural invariance then
metric invariance and finally scalar invariance, one can assess measurement
equivalence. Configural invariance indicates that the same pattern of salient and nonsalient loadings should be found across cultures. Metric invariance indicates that the
loadings of the items on the construct are the same. Scalar invariance indicates that the
intercept of the regression equation is equivalent across cultures. For this study, since
the hypotheses are tests of path significance and there will be no comparison of mean
values across geographies, invariance only needs to be demonstrated up to metric
invariance (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).
These test were executed using Lisrel 8.71. Each construct was tested in separate runs.
Configural Invariance. Table 4.12 shows the results of the test for configurational
invariance. In this test, the factor loadings, variances, co-variances and error variance
were set free to test the fit of the loadings. (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). The
results show a perfect fit on the Decision variable and an acceptable fit on Risk
Perception (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993).
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Table 4.12 – Configural Invariance Results
Construct

Chi-square
Value

Chi-square
Significance

Relevance

0.0

1.00

Risk Perception

4.80

0.57

RMSEA

CAIC

0.00

176.08

Metric invariance. Metric invariance refers to the concept that the loadings for the items
must be the same across the countries. Table 4.13 shows the results of a test for full
metric invariance. In this test, the factor loadings were constrained to equality in all
geographies. The results show that this model is not a good fit for the Risk Perception
variable while it is for Relevance. This situation does not pose a fatal problem to the
study. Steenkamp and Baumgartner indicate that as a practical matter, achieving full
metric invariance frequently does not occur for various reasons. They suggest, following
Byrne, Shavelson and Muthen (1989) that partial metric invariance be employed. If a set
of items has configural invariance, and if at least one item is metrically invariant, then
analysis may proceed. In this study, we see that in the Relevance construct, two items
are metrically invariant and in the Risk Perception construct, one item is metrically
invariant. With partial metric invariance, this allows us to associate the focal construct to
other constructs in a nomological net (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).
Table 4.13: Metric Invariance Results

Construct

Chi-Square
Value

Relevance
Risk
Perception

2.94
30.45

Chi-Square
Significance

RMSEA
0.570
0.0024

CAIC
0.00
0.099

102.87
158.54

A series of partial metric equivalence test for Risk Perception was run by freeing
individual items across the geographies to attempt to find a model that fits the data.
Freeing the Perc-3 variable resulting in a Chi-Square value of 10.8 (significance of 0.37),
an RMSEA of .024 and a CAIC of 153.52. Thus this model shows that we have partial
metric equivalence.

4.6.4.2.

Method Bias

Karahanna, et al. (2002) indicate that method bias arises from issues with the instrument
or its administration so that subjects do not respond to the scales in the same way. As
discussed above, method bias can arise from differences in the subjects, differences in
administration of the survey (Karahanna, et al. 2002) or common rater effects, item
characteristics, item context, and measurement context (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee and
Podsakoff 2003). In this study, I addressed this bias procedurally by using student
subjects who provide a consistent group in terms of age and by administering the
instrument in similar locations (classrooms), having native proctors administer the
experiment in the native language of the students using a standard script. Additionally, I
used different scale anchors and formats, and intermixed the items on the questionnaire
so that items relating to a single construct would not be located together. However other
sources of this bias could not be addressed such as measuring the dependent and
independent variables at the same point in time at the location and using the same
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medium.
I also used a statistical test for method bias. While Harmon’s single factor test is
currently the most widely used, Podsakoff, et al. (2003) point out that there are several
limitations to this procedure. First, it is only an indication, but doesn’t control for method
effects. Second, it is also limited in that it assumes there is only one method factor when
there could be in fact multiple factors. They provide a number of different remedies they
consider to be superior to Harmon’s test that could be used to test and remedy method
bias depending on the characteristics of the study. In this study, the predictor and
criterion variables were obtained from the same source, and measured in the same
context. The sources of method bias cannot be identified, nor can they be measured at
this point in time. In this situation, they recommend a single method factor approach be
used in which a method variance latent variable be introduced into the model that
provides a measuring point for potential methods variance. This variable acts as a
predictor for the individual indicators of the model. When the methods variance variable
accounts for a significant amount of the variance of the indicator, a method bias problem
exists.
Liang, Saraf, Hu, and Xue (2007) have pioneered this approach in the IS literature. In
this study, I followed their approach to testing for method bias in PLS. I created a
separate methods variance latent variable to which all the indicators were attached as
reflective indicators. Then in order to create paths from both the methods variance
construct to the indicators, each indicator was created as a separate latent variable to
which the reflective indicator was attached as a reflective indicator. The original
substantive construct was then connected via a causal path to the indicator variable. The
indicator was then modeled as being caused by both the methods variance and
substantive indicators. The model was then bootstrapped and the path coefficients and tstatistics extracted. These results are shown in table 14a-14c for each geography. The
path coefficients act as loading factors. The test for method variance is to identify the
preponderance of significant paths where the substantive path is significant and exceeds
the method variance path. Where this occurs, method bias is held not be an issue.
Liang, et al, (2007) used an average loading and count of significant paths as the test. In
the following table 4.14, this information is provided. The details are provided in table
4.15.
Table 4.14: Summary of Findings from the Methods Variance Test
Average
Loading –
Substantive

Average
Ratio of
Loading –
averages
Method Var.

Percent
signif.
Substant.
Paths

Percent
signif.
Method Var.
Paths

USA

.411

.015

27.26

90

27.3

Germany

.453

.021

21.24

97

39.4

China

.453

.007

67.63

97

33.3

Given the much larger loadings of the substantive paths, the relatively insignificant
method variance path loadings and the three times larger number of significant paths for
the substantive paths vs. the methods variance paths, I conclude that there is a low risk
of methods bias in this study.
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Table 4.15a: Results of USA Test for Methods Bias
Substantive
Factor
Loading
(R1)

R12

Method
Loading
Factor (R2)

R22

Cred - 1

0.8369*

0.7004

0.0675

0.0046

Cred - 2

0.8468*

0.7171

-0.0613

0.0038

Cred - 3

0.6811*

0.4639

0.1447*

0.0209

Cred - 4

0.9306*

0.8660

-0.0721

0.0052

Cred - 5

0.9607*

0.9229

-0.0841

0.0071

Rel – 1

0.7983*

0.6373

0.1177*

0.0139

Rel – 2

1.0086*

1.0173

-0.0685*

0.0047

Rel - 3

0.9866*

0.9734

-0.468

0.2190

Construct

Indicator

Credibility

Relevance

Risk
Perception

Institutional
Collectivism

In-Group
Collectivism

Power
Distance

Future
Orientation

RPerc – 1

0.7429*

0.5519

-0.1368*

0.0187

RPerc – 2

0.8478*

0.7188

-0.0335

0.0011

RPerc – 3

0.7772*

0.6040

-0.0913*

0.0083

RPerc – 4

0.9707*

0.9423

0.3036*

0.0922

0.0321

0.0010

0.1327*

0.0176

IC – 2

0.2276*

0.0518

0.0295

0.0009

IC – 3

0.304*

0.0924

0.0579

0.0034

IC – 4

-0.0149*

0.0002

-0.0426

0.0018

0.6236*

0.3889

-0.0126

0.0002

IG – 2

0.3707*

0.1374

0.065

0.0042

IG – 3

0.6218*

0.3866

-0.0623

0.0039

IG – 4

0.4144*

0.1717

0.0242

0.0006

-0.5566*

0.3098

0.011

0.0001

PD – 2

0.5142*

0.2644

-0.1239*

0.0154

PD – 3

0.5301*

0.2810

0.0166

0.0003

PD – 4

0.7647*

0.5848

0.0668

0.0045

PD – 5

0.7359*

0.5415

0.0078

0.0001

0.1571*

0.0247

-0.0151

0.0002

IC – 1

IG – 1

PD – 1

FO -1
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FO – 2

0.0064*

0.0000

0.0911

0.0083

FO – 3

0.0806*

0.0065

-0.0565

0.0032

FO – 4

0.0277*

0.0008

0.128

0.0164

FO – 5

0.0369

0.0014

-0.1049*

0.0110

Performance PO – 1
Orientation

0.5367

0.2880

-0.0638

0.0041

PO – 2

0.6074*

0.3689

0.0191

0.0004

PO – 3

0.7353*

0.5407

0.0344

0.0012

Table 4.15b: Results of Germany Test for Methods Bias

Credibility

Cred - 1

0.9897*

0.9795

-0.124*

0.0154

Cred - 2

0.6788*

0.4608

-0.0008

0.0000

Cred - 3

0.324*

0.1050

0.5575*

0.3108

Cred - 4

1.2481*

1.5578

-0.404*

0.1632

Cred - 5

0.9376*

0.8791

-0.0219

0.0005

Rel – 1

0.6583*

0.4334

0.2286*

0.0523

Rel – 2

1.0887*

1.1853

-0.2003*

0.0401

Rel - 3

0.9584*

0.9185

-0.0236

0.0006

0.812*

0.6593

-0.0923*

0.0085

RPerc – 2

0.8969*

0.8044

-0.0309

0.0010

RPerc – 3

0.5558*

0.3089

0.0512

0.0026

RPerc – 4

0.729*

0.5314

0.1375*

0.0189

0.5093*

0.2594

-0.0779

0.0061

IC – 2

-0.563*

0.3170

0.0281

0.0008

IC – 3

0.0171

0.0003

-0.133*

0.0177

IC – 4

0.5899*

0.3480

0.0783*

0.0061

0.1758

0.0309

-0.1007*

0.0101

0.0811*

0.0066

-0.0129

0.0002

Risk
Perception

Institutional
Collectivism

In-Group
Collectivism

RPerc – 1

IC – 1

IG – 1
IG – 2

Method
Loading
Factor (R2)

R22

Indicator

Relevance

Substantive
Factor
Loading
(R1)

R12

Construct
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IG – 3

0.3727*

0.1389

-0.0386*

0.0015

IG – 4

0.3513*

0.1234

-0.006

0.0000

-0.4131*

0.1707

-0.11

0.0121

PD – 2

0.4976*

0.2476

0.1176*

0.0138

PD – 3

0.6513*

0.4242

-0.0023

0.0000

PD – 4

0.7974*

0.6358

-0.1172*

0.0137

PD – 5

0.7071*

0.5000

0.0131

0.0002

-0.154*

0.0237

-0.0479

0.0023

FO – 2

-0.2568*

0.0659

0.0267

0.0007

FO – 3

-0.4736*

0.2243

-0.0076

0.0001

FO – 4

0.8428*

0.7103

0.0088

0.0001

FO – 5

0.7827*

0.6126

-0.0274

0.0008

Performance PO – 1
Orientation

0.6207*

0.3853

0.0307

0.0009

PO – 2

0.4764*

0.2270

0.0371

0.0014

PO – 3

0.823*

0.6773

-0.0393

0.0015

Power
Distance

Future
Orientation

PD – 1

FO -1

Table 4.15c: Results of China Test for Methods Bias
Construct

Indicator

Credibility

Cred - 1

0.6741*

Cred - 2

0.5577*

Cred - 3

0.4359*

Cred - 4

0.9514*

Cred - 5

0.9097*

Rel – 1

0.6871*

Rel – 2

0.8484*

Rel - 3

0.9397*

RPerc – 1

0.7074*

RPerc – 2

0.8835*

Relevance

Risk
Perception

Substantive
Factor
Loading
(R1)

R12

Method
Loading
Factor (R2)

0.4544
0.3110
0.1900
0.9052
0.8276
0.4721
0.7198
0.8830

0.0343
0.0569
0.2054*
0.1674*
-0.07*
0.1323*
-0.0514
-0.0844*

R22

0.0012
0.0032
0.0422
0.0280
0.0049
0.0175
0.0026
0.0071

-0.1419*
0.5004
0.7806
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Institutional
Collectivism

In-Group
Collectivism

Power
Distance

Future
Orientation

RPerc – 3

0.6628*

RPerc – 4

0.9330*

IC – 1

0.4380*

IC – 2

-0.7331*

IC – 3

0.3715*

IC – 4

0.7514*

IG – 1

0.6472*

0.1956*

0.8705

0.6804*

IG – 3

0.5124*

IG – 4

0.6423*

PD – 1

-0.5645*

PD – 2

0.4479*

PD – 3

0.6338*

PD – 4

0.6989*

PD – 5

0.7209*

FO -1

0.1913*

0.5374

0.0265

0.1380
0.5646

-0.00001

-0.1584

FO – 4

0.8440*

FO – 5

0.7741*

Performance PO – 1
Orientation

0.6270*

PO – 2

0.5373*

PO – 3

0.7635*

0.0007
0.0000

0.4629
0.2626
0.4125

0.0015
-0.0056
-0.0401
0.0730*

0.0000
0.0016
0.0053

0.1259*
0.2006
0.4017
0.4885
0.5197

0.0159
0.0264
0.0550
0.0110
0.0190

0.0007
0.0030
0.0001
0.0004

-0.026
0.0366

FO – 3

0.0001

-0.0388

0.3187

-0.1746*

0.0383
0.0005

0.01

0.4189
IG – 2

0.0038

-0.0216
0.1918

FO – 2

4.6.4.3.

-0.0615*

0.4393

0.0305
0.0251
0.7123
0.5992

0.0007
0.0404
0.1260
0.0376*
-0.0050

0.0016
0.0159
0.0014
0.0000

0.0325
0.3931
0.2887
0.5829

0.0011
0.0019
-0.0313

0.0000
0.0010

Item Bias

Item bias is said to exist if respondents to an item of the same standing in different
cultural groups do not respond to the item in the same manner. Respondents in one
culture may give uniformly higher or lower scores on an item than those in another
culture or they might give a differential response, e.g. scoring lower on responses in the
lower part of the scale and higher on the higher part of the scale (van de Vijver and
Leung 1997). To prevent item bias, I used the cultural value measures from the GLOBE
consortium, which were developed by a multi-national group of investigators who
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reviewed the wording for complexity and cultural appropriateness. The other variables
did not have the advantage of that preparation. The items were translated by native
language speakers and back translated by native language speakers and reviewed until
the forward and back translations resulted in a correct transmission of meaning.
Following the recommendation of van de Vijver and Leung (1997), I used the analysis of
variance with score level as an independent variable to test for item bias. A linear
method such as ANOVA is appropriate for interval data such as is used in this study.
Nonlinear methods such as Item Response Theory are best for nominal data.
Additionally, it is superior to use conditional methods as opposed to unconditional tests.
Unconditional methods compute bias statistics on the whole sample while conditional
groups split the sample into score groups. Unconditional methods have been known to
fail to identify biased items. The ANOVA method described below is a conditional
method (van de Vijver and Leung 1997).
In this method, each culture is assigned a value and then the scores for each
respondent are summed and divided into groups of approximately size 50 or greater.
These groups are then analyzed under ANOVA to identify significance of the cultural,
score level variables and their interactions.
To perform the analysis, the following procedure was utilized:
1) Each geographic region was assigned a different value (USA=1, Germany = 2,
China = 3).
2) The sum of the all item scores was computed for each respondent. Similar to the
treatment of item response bias, by summing the scores of the items, the
substantive content is eliminated and only the respondent scoring remains as
described above for the response bias analysis. Therefore no different treatment
is required for formative constructs as opposed to reflective constructs.
3) Score cutoffs for 9 groups to ensure groups of 50 or more (462/50) were
calculated by using a Frequency command in SPSS.
4) A score level variable for each respondent was computed by recoding the item
scores based on the group cutoffs calculated in (3) (Score level = 1 for those in
the smallest group; 2 for those in the next group, etc.).
5) An ANOVA was then run against each of the items with the item as the
dependent variable and the score level and culture as independent variables.
The results of the Item Bias tests are reported in table 4.16.
Table 4.16: Results of Item Bias Test
Item

Culture
Significance12

Score Level
Significance

Interation
Significance

Decision

.187

.000*

.012*

Role Prescript

.004*

.000*

.090

Rel-1

.000*

.000*

.004*

12

* indicates significance at the .05 level.
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Rel-2

.000*

.000*

.039*

Rel-3

.000*

.000*

.003*

Cred-1

.001*

.000*

.007*

Cred-2

.000*

.000*

.178

Cred-3

.048*

.000*

.114

Cred-4

.000*

.000*

.322

Cred-5

.000*

.000*

.061

Risk Percept -1

.574

.023*

.205

Risk Percept -2

.417

.104

.391

Risk Percept -3

.192

.007*

.017*

Risk Percept -4

.000*

.209

.414

Instit. Coll. - 1

.075

.000

.023*

Instit. Coll. - 2

.000*

.041*

.892

Instit. Coll. - 3

.041*

.000*

.167

Instit. Coll. - 4

.000*

.071

.967

In-Group Coll. - 1

.000*

.000*

.001*

In-Group Coll. - 2

.001*

.000*

.604

In-Group Coll. - 3

.000*

.034*

.541

In-Group Coll. - 4

.000*

.001*

.019*

Uncert. Avoid -1

.000*

.008*

.336

Uncert. Avoid -2

.000*

.053

.335

Uncert. Avoid -3

.219

.016

.345

Uncert. Avoid -4

.000*

.020*

.394

Power Dist - 1

.000*

.174

.763

Power Dist - 2

.220

.000*

.017*

Power Dist - 3

.000*

.004*

.556

Power Dist - 4

.336

.000*

.293

Power Dist - 5

.008*

.000*

.360

Future Orient - 1

.000*

.002*

.498

Future Orient - 2

.010*

.001*

.235

Future Orient - 3

.354

.000*

.291

Future Orient - 4

.000*

.658

.662

Future Orient - 5

.001*

.947

.642
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Perf. Orient - 1

.000*

.000*

.703

Perf. Orient - 2

.000*

.005*

.760

Perf. Orient - 3

.000*

.004*

.811

The meaning of the significance scores is as follows. The score level indicates, if
significant, that individuals at lower score levels have lower scores than those at higher
levels. This test is not relevant to item bias (van de Vijver and Leung 1997). When the
culture and interaction terms are not significant, the item is considered unbiased. When
the culture variable is significant, this indicates that members of a culture are uniformly
biased to score either higher or lower than those in a different culture. This indicates that
scores from the culture with uniform bias will differ from scores in another by a constant
amount. When the interaction term is significant, the difference in cultural groups is not
invariant across score levels. The item discriminates better in one geography than
another (van de Vijver and Leung 1997). This is a form of non-uniform bias.
In this sample, we have a significant amount of bias in the items related to culture (74%)
and related to the interaction of culture with score level (26%). This would indicate that
for a large number of items there exists a uniform bias, while a smaller number have a
non-uniform bias. The source of the uniform bias can be due either to true cultural
differences which are the effects we are trying to study or to a systematic difference in
understanding of the item. In this study, I was expecting that the responses should be
systematically different across culture. So this result is not unexpected.
The effect of this non-uniform bias is very small. Table 4.16b shows the R2 value of a
regression of the item on the score level, culture and the interaction of score level and
culture for those items where the interaction term was significant. Note that the effect
size is at best weak for all of those items.

Table 4.16b: Effect Sizes of the Interactions
R2 Without
R2 with
Effect
Item
Interaction
Interaction Size

Rel - 1

0.232

0.259

0.036

Rel - 2

0.177

0.191

0.017

Rel - 3

0.171

0.198

0.034

Cred - 1

0.228

0.245

0.023

RPerc - 3

0.017

0.034

0.018

IC - 1

0.06

0.069

0.010

IG - 1

0.085

0.097

0.013

IG - 4

0.36

0.376

0.026

PD - 2

0.086

0.099

0.014

I conclude from this analysis that the non-uniform bias affects relatively few items and
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has only a weak effect so that I can disregard this impact in substantive analysis.

4.6.4.4.

Summary

To summarize the findings of this section, I found the following equivalence/bias existing
in this study:
1) No cultural response bias
2) Full configuration equivalence
3) Partial metric equivalence
4) No methods bias was detected
5) Found significant uniform cultural bias in 75% of the items and non-uniform
bias in 25% of the items. The non-uniform bias is a weak to non-existent
effect.
The implications for these findings for the study follow. No cultural response bias was
found in the data indicating that the data was not skewed by cultural factors. This study
also has configural equivalence and partial metric equivalence and therefore provides us
with the basic foundation of performing comparison across societies (Steenkamp and
Baumgartner 1998; van de Vijver and Leung 1997) and allows us to examine structural
relationships cross nationally (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). The finding of lack of
methods bias confirms this position. The uniform bias across the items is held to be a
result of cultural differences rather than item bias. The weak non-uniform item bias can
be ignored in the substantive analysis without grossly affecting our study, as I am not
attempting to compare values across geographies but only direction of effects and
structural positioning.

4.7

MANIPULATION CHECKS

In this section, I report on the analysis of the manipulations to ensure that they were
effective in all geographies. The desired results are a significant difference in the values
of Role Prescription and Credibility across the manipulations. I was also looking for a
significant difference in Decision score where Decision was high in the situation where
both manipulations were in the low condition and high where the manipulations were in
the high condition to show that the Deaf Effect was induced in this study.
Table 4.17a: Full Factorial Display of USA results
Credibility
Low
Decision
Relevance
Role
Prescription

High

High
3.79 (2.06)

Decision

3.46 (1.45) Relevance

2.97 (2.10)
5.22 (1.41)

Role Prescription

5.95 (0.93)

Role Prescription

6.24 (0.82)

Credibility

2.95 (1.02)

Credibility

5.74 (1.19)

Age

22.26 (3.75)

Age

21.11 (2.92)

FTE

4.25 (4.03)

FTE

3.26 (2.92)

IS Exp

0.26 (0.89)

IS Exp

0.58 (1.27)
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N

38

Decision

6.05 (1.99)

Relevance

Low

N

38

Decision

4.19 (2.37)

2.38 (1.59) Relevance

3.79 (1.56)

Role Prescription

2.22 (1.87)

Role Prescription

2.86 (1.99)

Credibility

2.62 (1.44)

Credibility

4.80 (1.26)

Age

22.50 (3.96)

Age

21.38 (3.49)

FTE

4.48 (4.51)

FTE

3.89 (3.87)

IS Exp

1.22 (3.27)

IS Exp

0.65 (1.90)

N

40

N

37

The USA results (Table 4.17a) show that Role Prescription varies over three points
across the treatments and Credibility over two points across the Credibility manipulation.
However, Credibility is also affected by the Role Prescription manipulation. Credibility
increases 0.3 points across Role Prescription manipulation in the low Credibility
condition and .9 across the high Credibility condition manipulation. Decision varies 3
points from the high Role Prescription, high Credibility to its opposite, low-low condition.
This indicates that the Deaf Effect was induced in this geography.

Table 4.17b: Results of MANOVA Analysis - USA
Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable: Role
Prescription

Dependent Variable:
Credibility

Sum of
Squares

F-value (sig)

Sum of
Squares

F-value (sig)

Main Effect:
Role
Prescription
Manipulation

480.894

213.214 (.000)

15.864

10.079 (.002)

Main Effect:
Credibility
Manipulation

8.252

3.659 (.058)

253.556

161.093 (.000)

Interaction:
(Role
Prescription) X
(Credibility
Manipulation)

1.173

0.520 (.472)

3.389

2.153 (.144)

It would be expected that the main effects manipulations would have a significant
relationship on the targeted variables (i.e. the Role Prescription manipulation on Role
Prescription and the Credibility manipulation on Credibility) but not on the other
dependent variable. We see this for the Credibility manipulation (Table 4.17b). However,
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for the Role Prescription manipulation, we see the effect on Credibility is also significant.
There is no interaction effect. While statistically significant at p <.05, the F-value and
sum of squares are quite small compared to the very strong Role Prescription variable. I
conclude from this that the manipulations were effective, but that Role Prescription
causes a small effect on Credibility.
Table 4.18a: Germany
Credibility
Low
Decision
Relevance

High

Role
Prescription

5.75 (2.06)

Decision

2.79 (1.44) Relevance

4.19 (2.20)
4.02 (1.43)

Role Prescription

5.78 (1.21)

Role Prescription

6.19 (0.48)

Credibility

2.92 (1.32)

Credibility

5.06 (1.21)

Age

21.66 (1.70)

Age

21.35 (1.05)

FTE

0.38 (0.98)

FTE

0.35 (1.05)

IS Exp

0.06 (0.35)

IS Exp

0.19 (0.79)

N

32

N

31

Decision
Relevance

Low

High

5.97 (1.99)

Decision

2.18 (1.16) Relevance

4.24 (2.48)
3.56 (1.71)

Role Prescription

1.76 (1.23)

Role Prescription

2.49 (1.87)

Credibility

2.14 (0.90)

Credibility

4.05 (1.43)

Age

21.70 (2.40)

Age

21.73 (1.39)

FTE

0.65 (1.38)

FTE

0.51 (0,90)

IS Exp

0.16 (0.69)

IS Exp

0.00 (0.00)

N

37

N

37

The German results show that Role Prescription varies over 3 points across the
treatments and Credibility over 1.9 points across the Credibility manipulation (Table
4.18a). However, Credibility is also affected by the Role Prescription manipulation and
Role Prescription is affected by the Credibility manipulation. Credibility increases 0.8
point across the Role Prescription manipulation in the low Credibility condition and one
point across the high Credibility manipulation. Role Prescription increases 0.4 points
across the Credibility manipulation in the high Role Prescription situation and .73 points
in the low Role Prescription situation. The Decision variable increased 1.8 points from
the high Role Prescription, high Credibility scenario to the low-low condition indicating
that the Deaf Effect had been induced.
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Table 4.18b: Results of MANOVA Analysis - Germany
Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable: Role
Prescription

Dependent Variable: Credibility

Sum of
Squares

F-value (sig)

Sum of
Squares

F-value (sig)

Main Effect:
Role
Prescription
Manipulation

512.753

295.854 (.000)

12.848

17.251 (.000)

Main Effect:
Credibility
Manipulation

10.292

5.939 (.016)

42.819

57.492 (.000)

Interaction:
(Role
Prescription) X
(Credibility
Manipulation)

1.009

0.582 (.447)

0.006

0.008 (.928)

As in the USA analysis, it would be expected that the main effects manipulations would
have a significant relationship on the targeted variables (i.e. the Role Prescription
manipulation on Role Prescription and the Credibility manipulation on Credibility) but not
on the other dependent variable. However, for the main effects manipulations, we see
that while the intended manipulations occurred, the effect on the untargeted dependent
variable is also significant (Table 4.18b). However, there is no interaction effect. While
statistically significant at p <.05, the effects are quite small compared to the very strong
intended main effects. I conclude from this that the manipulations were effective, but that
the manipulations cause a small effect on the other manipulation.
Table 4.19a: China
Credibility
Low
Decision
Relevance

High
Role
Prescription

Low

High
4.60 (2.75)

Decision

3.39 (1.19) Relevance

3.80 (2.63)
4.08 (1.16)

Role Prescription

5.26 (1.11)

Role Prescription

5.38 (1.32)

Credibility

4.56 (1.29)

Credibility

5.38 (1.32)

Age

20.14 (1.28)

Age

20.40 (1.07)

FTE

0.03 (0.17)

FTE

0.11 (0.32)

IS Exp

0.00 (0.00)

IS Exp

0.00 (0.00)

N

43

N

45

Decision
Relevance

5.33 (2.56)

Decision

2.84 (1.04) Relevance
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Role Prescription

3.05 (3.05)

Role Prescription

3.14 (1.86)

Credibility

4.22 (1.24)

Credibility

4.40 (1.32)

Age

20.15 (1.12)

Age

20.42 (1.03)

FTE

0.32 (0.83)

FTE

0.07 (0.23)

IS Exp

0.00 (0.00)

IS Exp

0.00 (0.00)

N

40

N

43

The Chinese results show that Role Prescription varies over two points across the
treatments, however, Credibility varies only 0.82 and 0.18 across the Credibility
manipulation (Table 4.19a). Also, Credibility is affected by the Role Prescription
manipulation. Credibility increases 0.3 across Role Prescription manipulation in the low
Credibility condition and .98 across the high Credibility manipulation. The Decision
variable increased approximately 1.5 points from the high Role Prescription, high
Credibility scenario to its low-low opposite indicating that the Deaf Effect had been
induced.
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Table 4.19b: Results of MANOVA Analysis - China
Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable: Role
Prescription

Dependent Variable: Credibility

Sum of
Squares

F-value (sig)

Sum of
Squares

F-value (sig)

Main Effect:
Role
Prescription
Manipulation

210.6999

92.154 (.000)

19.314

12.021(.001)

Main Effect:
Credibility
Manipulation

0.477

0.209 (.648)

10.651

6.629 (.011)

Interaction:
(Role
Prescription) X
(Credibility
Manipulation)

0,011

0.005 (.944)

4.638

2.887 (.091)

As in the previous analyses for the USA and Germany, it would be expected that the
main effects manipulations would have a significant relationship on the targeted
variables (i.e. the Role Prescription manipulation on Role Prescription and the Credibility
manipulation on Credibility) but not on the other dependent variable. However, for the
Role Prescription manipulation we see the effect on Credibility is also significant (Table
4.19b). There is no interaction effect. As shown in the table above, this results in a
significantly higher level of Credibility in the high Role Prescription manipulation but
there is still a significant variation in Credibility across the Credibility manipulation. I
conclude from this that the manipulations were effective, but that in China, as
hypothesized, Role Prescription has a large effect on Credibility.

4.7.1

Structural Analysis

In this section, I address first the main effects and then the moderation effects of the
cultural variables.

4.7.1.1.

Main Effects

The results of the analysis of my hypotheses are reported in table 4.20.
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Table 4.20: Results of Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis

Path Coefficient

H1a: Where the
surrounding culture is
characterized by a high
degree of Institutional
Collectivism, decision
makers will tend to side
with the opinion of the
team in terms of
whether to continue or
discontinue a course of
action

Institutional
Collectivism to
Decision

TStatistic13

Effect Size

Power14

In the scenario, the
team was indicating to
the subject that the
project was complete
and ready to be
implemented.
USA

-.0048

.7520

.0164

.074

Germany

.0511

.9323

.0076

.060

China

.03139

.3873

.0055

.058

H1b: Institutional
Collectivism decreases
the Decision of a report
of bad news by a
reporter external to the
work team.

Institutional
Collectivism to
Relevance

USA

-.0024

.5614

.0002

.050

Germany

-.0477

.6161

.0074

.060

China

-.0421

.4690

.0025

.053

H2a: Where the
surrounding culture is

In-Group
Collectivism to

13

A T-statistic greater than 1.96 indicates a two-tailed significance less than .05. Since the
hypotheses presented in this research are unidirectional hypotheses, we can use a one-tailed
significance test. Therefore a t-statistic greater than .98 indicates a significance less than .05
(Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989). A “*” indicates a significance greater that .05 level.
14

A post-hoc power analysis was done using G*Power v2.0 (Erfelder, et al. 1996) for each
path tested. The R2 for the dependent variable of the path was calculated with and without the
path to compute the effect size. The effect size was then used as input to a power analysis. For
the analysis, α was set to .05 and the N value was set to the sample size of the geography for
both samples.

Chapter 4 – The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect

121

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
characterized by a high
degree of In-Group
Collectivism, decision
makers will tend to side
with the opinion of the
leadership in terms of
whether to continue or
discontinue a course of
action

Decision

In the scenario used
here, leadership
indicated that they
would be disappointed if
the project was not
implemented as
scheduled.
USA

-.0408

.6413

.0125

.395

Germany

-.0189

.8015

.0026

.090

China

-.0038

.5014

.0011

.052

H2b: In-Group
Collectivism decreases
the Decision of a report
of bad news when it
conflicts with the opinion
of the leadership in
terms of whether to
continue or discontinue
a course of action.

In-Group
Collectivism to
Relevance

USA

.0090

.5961

.0000

.050

Germany

-.0051

.5092

.0195

.078

China

-.0365

.8730

.0387

.123

As can be seen, none of the hypotheses were confirmed. The effect size of each of the
cultural variables is very low with the exception of In-Group Collectivism to Relevance,
which has a moderate effect size. The statistical power of each of the links is also
extremely low. However, some interesting relationships can be derived from the results.
First, all the models provide confirmation that the basic model as demonstrated in paper
2 applies in all geographies. 1) Credibility of the bad news reporter is positively
associated with the Relevance of the report of bad news to the decision maker, which is
2) negatively associated with a decision to continue the current course of action. 3) Role
Prescription of the bad news reporter is positively associated with his/her Credibility and
the Relevance of the report of bad news (except in Germany). 4) Perception of risk in the
project is negatively associated with a decision to continue the current course of action.
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In attempting to account for the lack of significance, the study was rerun taking each of
the control cultural variables to the Credibility and Relevance variables in addition to the
Decision variable. As recorded above, all of the hypothesized paths were non-significant
except that for hypothesis H2b, the effect of In-Group Collectivism on Relevance. Below,
I examine the results for each geography and suggest some explanation for the unique
results obtained.
USA Main Effects Results

PD
-.076
(T=1.022)
Cred
R2=.215

.6091
(T=9.034)
Relev
R2=.588

.3201
(T=4.889)
Role
Prescr.

Decision

-.5475
(T=5.342)
.2699
(T=4.858)

R2=.641
-.3603
(T=5.549)

.4454
(T=6.4756)

Risk
Percep
t.
R2=.190

Figure 4.6: Significant Paths in USA Structural Model (only significant paths
shown)
In the USA, the cultural values are insignificant except for the power distance control
variable. In high power distance societies, power is differentiated into several classes,
each with a different amount of power and involvement in the society (Carl, Gupta and
Javidan 2004). The negative path coefficient indicates that when the decision maker
views the ambient culture as being a higher power distance culture that he/she tends to
discontinue the current course of action. This seems to indicate that when the decision
maker views his/her society as being high in power distance, they are more likely to deescalate. The reason for the failure of the collectivism hypotheses to be confirmed is not
obvious from the data. The In-Group Collectivism construct may be insignificant due to
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the action of the power distance control variable. According to the GLOBE consortium,
the power distance and In-Group Collectivism constructs are highly correlated (ρ=.55)
(Carl, et al. 2004). It may be that power distance is obscuring the effect of In-Group
Collectivism (figure 4.6).
Table 4.21a – Effect Sizes of the Variables in the USA
Model
Decision
Relevance

.204

Risk Perception

.134

Credibility

.003

Role Prescription

Relevance

Risk
Perception

0.503

.963

0.111

In the USA model (Table 4.21a), we see that Relevance and Risk Perception have large
effect sizes on Decision while Credibility has very small one. This indicates that in the
USA Relevance has the largest effect on the Decision. Relevance is influenced largely
by Credibility with Role Prescription having a small effect.
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Germany Main Effects Results

UA

FTE
.0594
(T=1.100)
Cred
R2=.181

-.139
(T=1.808
)

.7028
(T=13.811)
Relev
R2=. 587

.2941
(T=3.396)

Age

-.081
(T=1.509)

Decision

-.5201
(T=5.682)

.5434
(T=8.5048)
Role
Prescr.

R2=.661
8
-.2490
(T=2.958)
Risk
Percep
t.
R2=. 296

Figure 4.7: Significant Paths in Germany Structural Model (only significant
paths shown)

The German subjects also did not have the collectivism variables as significant factors in
their results. Moreover, the path from Role Prescription to Relevance of the message
was not significant as it was in the other societies. In discussing this finding with our
German colleagues, I understand that in Germany, internal auditors have a bad
reputation as being “time bandits”, in other words, they do not add value to a project but
rather simply audit projects after all work has been done and look to see if the right
boxes on the report are checked. In this view, any concern that they raise has little claim
to the decision maker’s attention and hence little relevance (Beck 2008). Since this is
based on discussions with practitioners, it is uncertain if students would have a similar
reaction to the report of bad news. This question deserves further research.
Also, uncertainty avoidance featured positively in the decision. High uncertainty
avoidance is associated with seeking more orderliness, consistency and structure within
a society. Thus high uncertainty avoidance societies tend to rely on policies and
procedures, formalized interactions, and show less tolerance for breaking rules (De
Luque and Javidan 2004). In this case it appears that when the German subjects view
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the society as being high in uncertainty avoidance, they view bad news reporting as a
deviation from workplace convention that creates uncertainty. This assessment weakens
the argument for de-escalation in the decision maker’s analysis and leads to a higher
tendency to reject the bad news reporter’s message and continue the current course of
action. It doesn’t cause the bad news reporter to lose credibility or their message
Relevance.
Table 4.21b – Effect Sizes of of the Variables in the
Germany Model
Decision
Relevance

.180

Risk Perception

.070

Credibility

.003

Role Prescription

Relevance

Risk
Perception

.727

.997

.000

In the Germany model, similar to the USA model, we see that Relevance and Risk
Perception have large effect sizes on Decision while Credibility has very small one. This
indicates that in Germany, as in the USA, Relevance has the largest effect on the
Decision. Relevance is influenced solely by Credibility with Role Prescription having no
effect.
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UA
FTE

-0784
(T=0.9972)
Cred
R2=.251

.552
(T=10.215)

-.0885
(T=1.042)

.0705
(T=1.139)

Relev
R2=.413
.3761
(T=6.7461)

-.2742
(T=3.5815)

.1030
(T=1.7979)

.3304
(T=4.872)
Role
Prescr.

-.0554
(T=0.9896)
In-Group
Collect.

Age

-.537
(T=1.19
4)

Decision

R2=.562
-.4953
(T=9.4766)
Risk
Percept.
R2=.121
.1585
(T=2.0883)
Gender

Figure 4.8: Significant Paths in the China Structural Model (only significant paths
shown)
Main Effects Results for China. Figure 4.8 graphically shows the significant paths in
the main effects model for China. As hypothesized, In-Group Collectivism results in a
decreased Relevance of the message. An out of group bad news reporter is viewed as
being outside of the hierarchy and thus breaking the chain of command. Since in the
scenario used in this experiment, the management team was very interested in putting
the system into production, and in an in-group collectivist society there is pressure to
defer to management, it seems that the Chinese decision maker considers the report of
bad news less relevant to his/her decision process than in a non-in-group collectivist
society. Institutional Collectivism has no significant effect on the Deaf Effect decision
process.
The control variable uncertainty avoidance appears as significant in the model with a
negative influence on Credibility. It may be that when the Chinese decision maker views
the society as being high in uncertainty avoidance, he/she sees the bad news reporter
as one who introduces uncertainty into the environment. The report of bad news
contravenes the received wisdom from the team and therefore is cause to lower their
trust in the bad news reporter, which results in decreasing his Credibility.
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Table 4.21c – Effect Sizes of the Variables in the China
Model
Decision
Relevance

.060

Risk Perception

.330

Credibility

.009

Role Prescription

Relevance

Risk
Perception

.590

.851

.027

In the China model, contrary to the USA and Germany models, we see that Risk
Perception has the largest effect size on decision while Relevance and Credibility have
very small ones. This indicates that the Deaf Effect operates differently in China. It is not
a function of the report of bad news but rather of the perception of risk. Credibility, in
China, unlike in the USA or Germany, does not have a large effect size on Risk
Perception indicating that there are other factors that the Chinese use to evaluate risk.
Relevance, similar to the USA and Germany, is influenced for the most part by
Credibility with Role Prescription having a small effect.

4.7.1.2.

Evaluation of the Moderation Effects

In this section, I evaluate hypotheses H1c and H2c, dealing with the moderating effects
of Role Prescription. At this time there is a controversy regarding the proper method to
use to evaluate moderation effects in PLS. Chin, Marcolin and Newstead (2003) have
advocated using the product indicator approach in which the indicator values of the main
effects and moderator variables are cross multiplied to compute the interaction value
indicators. They argue that this approach produces path coefficients for the interaction
effect that are closer to the true value of the parameter. In a subsequent article,
Goodhue, Lewis and Thompson (2007) have argued that this approach while increasing
accuracy of the parameter estimate also reduces statistical power; an effect that
increases with indicator count and sample size. They argue instead that the product of
sums approach be used. Under this approach, the indicators of the variables are
summed to produce latent variable scores, which are then centered and multiplied to
produce interaction term indicator values. Neither of these approaches can be used in
the current study as they both assume reflective constructs. Since Credibility is modeled
as a formative construct, a different approach is needed. Henseler, Hubona and Ringle
(2008) have proposed a two step approach which works with both reflective and
formative variables. The process is as follows:
1) A main effects model is run in PLS.
2) The latent variable scores (unstandardized) are extracted for the moderator
and the exogenous variable.
3) These scores are centered and element-wise multiplied to create the
interaction term.
4) The extracted latent variable scores and interaction term are loaded into the
PLS model and the model is rerun.
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5) The significance and effect size of the terms is evaluated.
6) Each interaction effect is modeled separately from all others.
7) In interpreting the path coefficients, the original paths are no longer main
effects but “single effects”, the effect that the variable has when the
moderator is zero.
Table 4.22: Summary of Moderating Hypothesis Results
Hypothesis

Path
Coefficient

TStatistic15

USA

.0657

1.1497*

.025

Germany

-.0172

.2159

-.009

China

-.0021

.1204

-.009

USA

-.0117

.1331

.017

Germany

.0563

1.2668*

.000

China

-.0322

.7170

-.008

H1c: Role Prescription
dampens the effects of
Institutional Collectivism.

H2c: Role Prescription
moderates the effects of InGroup Collectivism

Path

Effect
Size16

Role Prescription X
Institutional
Collectivism to
Relevance

Role Prescription X
In-Group
Collectivism to
Relevance

In evaluating hypothesis H1c, I found that the path is positive and significant only in the
USA. It is not significant in Germany or China. In the USA, the single effect of
Institutional Collectivism on Relevance was not significant and assumed to be zero. The
single effect of Role Prescription on Relevance was positive. This indicates that the
interaction between Institutional Collectivism and Role Prescription is one in which
Institutional Collectivism weakens the effect of Role Prescription (Cohen, et al. 2003).
The effect size is very low and is considered to be weak to non-existent so I conclude
that this weakening effect is very small.
For hypothesis H2c, we found that the interaction between In-Group Collectivism and
Role Prescription was significant only in Germany. However, in this case, the effect size
is zero which indicates that Role Prescription has no moderating effect on the operation
of In-Group Collectivism.
15

* = p < .05 level, one –tailed test

16

The effect size is calculated as

per Henseler, et al.

(2008).
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Carte and Russell (2003) suggest guidelines to prevent errors in the assessment of
moderation effects. I report the results of these guidelines to show that moderation has
been reported correctly.
1) Report effect size – This was done in table 20. The effect size was weak to nonexistent for the moderating variables.
2) Interpret main effects with moderating effects – This was done. I included the
main effects variables with the moderating variables.
3) Check for curvilinear effects – I found that there was a very low correlation
between Institutional Collectivism and Role Prescription in the USA (-.0112) and
between In-Group Collectivism and Role Prescription in Germany (.1043). Since
the correlations were low, the risk of confounding curvilinear effects with
mediation is low.
4) Clearly establish the causal ordering – This was done in the insights from
whistle-blowing literature section.
5) Report power analysis and sample size requirements – Following Cohen, Cohen,
West and Aiken (2003) we find for the USA Role Prescription and Institutional
Collectivism interaction effect that L=f2(n-k-1) = .025(157-3-1) = 3.825 which
yields a power close to .3, a low level. The N required to achieve a power of .8 is
n*=(10.8/.025+3+1) = 440. This indicates that there is a possibility that interaction
effect might be understated in this study. Replication with a large sample size is
needed. Similarly for the German In-Group Collectivism, Role Prescription
interaction, we find that since the interaction effect size is zero that the power is
zero and the number required to achieve a power of .8 is undefined.
6) Examine scale coarseness – In this study, respondents replied to Relevance, InGroup and Institutional Collectivism and Role Prescription on seven point scales
creating a potential 49 point interaction variable compared with a seven point
dependent score. Carte and Russell indicate that this exhibits a potential 50%
reduction in effect size due to this feature.
7) Report all transformations – no transformations were performed on the data prior
to analysis. In calculation of the moderator variables, the predictor variables were
centered, a linear transformation which does not affect R2 or path coefficient
values.
8) Report scale reliabilities – Being formative constructs, In-Group and Institutional
Collectivism don’t have reported scale reliabilities. Role Prescription was a single
item variable, so its reliability is 1.0. Thus the reliability of the interaction cannot
be reported.
9) When moderation is tested in PLS by separating samples in groups with different
memberships, different factor loadings and weights are computed for each group
for each latent variable. It is therefore necessary to test that the inter-item
covariance matrices with scales are equal using Box’s M to determine if the
construct contents as determined by item loadings within scales are the same
(Carte and Russell 2003). In this study, by using the two step approach
advocated by Henseler et al. (2008), this problem is avoided using the calculated
unstandardized latent variable scores for each of the indicator and dependent
variables in the analysis thus fixing the values so they are not recalculated. This
not only avoids this problem, but also assures correspondence with the main

Chapter 4 – The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect

130

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
effects analysis done.
The end result of this analysis is that the sample sizes used in this analysis are too small
which results in low power in testing for the moderation effect. Additionally, the
coarseness of the dependent variable results in a reduction of effect size as well. This
indicates that to overcome this downward bias the interaction effect detected must be a
strong one in order to be detected in such a low power experiment and we have a
potential type II error on the moderation analyses.

4.8

DISCUSSION

This study replicated the study reported in Chapter 2 in the USA, Germany and China.
The results of this study have shown that the pattern of association in the structural
model demonstrated in previous studies in the USA is found within Germany and China.
An exception to this is that in Germany, Role Prescription was not significant on
Relevance. While this might be due to German attitudes toward internal auditors,
additional research is required to understand why this should occur. However, while the
structural model is similar, this study shows that the effect sizes of Relevance of the
report of bad news and Risk Perception are different in the western cultures from that of
China. In China, the effect size of Relevance of the message was much smaller than
that of Risk Perception, indicating that the Chinese subjects consider the report of bad
news less important than their perception of the risk in the project.
The reason for this exchange in effect size is not evident from this study, however, I can
speculate that it might have to do with the difference in political cultures. In the western
societies with many individual freedoms, no history of government oppression in the
subjects’ lifetimes and no fear of serious personal retaliation for defying authority,
perceived risk may be held as less important than in China where the opposite
conditions hold. In this study, since we did not achieve complete metric invariance
between the subjects, we cannot make any comparison between the Risk Perception
measures between the cultures. Given that, I am left to hypothesize that in the mental
model of the Chinese students, they must be more risk averse or attach more
importance to perceived risk in their decision processes than western students as a
result of their political environment.
This study also showed that the decision maker’s perceptions of ambient culture have
little to no effect on the Deaf Effect. This is contrary to the deductions based on the
definitions of the cultural values described in House, et. al. (2004). In the USA, power
distance showed a negative effect on willingness to continue the current course of
action. In Germany, perceived uncertainty avoidance in the culture caused a willingness
to discontinue the current course of action. In China, perceived uncertainty avoidance
reduced the Credibility of the bad news reporter while In-Group Collectivism reduced the
Relevance of the report of project problems. The effect sizes of all of these effects were
small to non-existent. It is possible that the generally low power for all of the paths of this
experiment resulted in failure to achieve significance for these hypotheses. In which
case, a larger sample size might generate significance for the cultural values.
Alternatively, there might be a substantive reason for the failure of these hypotheses.
Per our model, I would argue that there are other aspects of the mental model that drive
the reactions to perceived cultural values.
What these aspects are is uncertain at this point, however, I can speculate several
reasons as to why this study achieved no significant different in response based on
perceived national culture. First, it is possible that the subjects were composed of
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several different cultural subgroups that resulted in a “cancelling out” of their differences.
Following Archer (1988, 1995), I recognize that while a society may have a dominant
culture, it is composed of several agencies (groups of actors sharing a similar
experience that have a similar viewpoint) which based on their positions in society can
have different perspectives of the ambient society. Thus it may be that the members of
the different agencies have divergent viewpoints of the culture and this has resulted in a
“regression to the mean” when their responses are aggregated together resulting in a
similarity of response across the different geographies. To resolve this issue would
require separation of the different geographies into the different agencies, which would
have differing responses. The instrument used here did not contain sufficient information
on which to make such segregation.
An alternative explanation is that other aspects of the cultural environment are more
important to the individual’s values makeup than the ambient national culture. One
possibility here is that the professional culture of information systems is the same across
the world resulting in a commonality of response. There is some evidence for this.
Couger (1986) in a study of Singaporean and American programmers and analysts
found that the two different cultural groups had substantial similarities in motivational
characteristics despite the different geographies and significant demographic
differences. While the level of professional enculturation to be found in students at the
sophomore level is likely to be low, another form of cultural homogeneity can perhaps be
found in the common experiences as young people. Given the spread of western ideas
via the internet and popular culture, it may be that college sophomores of the US and
China may share a great deal in terms of values.
A third reason may have to do with nature of measures themselves. The GLOBE
framework, while it appears superior to that of the Hofstede framework in terms of
content validity, appears to need additional work on cross-country validation. The
constructs they have identified are clearly formative as opposed to reflective as they
have described them. The items, in this study, are beset by a systematic uniform item
bias in different cultures leading to an inability to compare across countries. This creates
a concern about the validity of the framework the validity of the framework and results
reported when using the framework as described by the GLOBE consortium unless
rigorous equivalence testing has been done to prove the equivalence of the metrics
across countries. Similarly, the constructs used to measure the Deaf Effect also possess
uniform item bias. It might be that the bias found or other deficiencies in the measures
has resulted in a suppression of the cultural differences between the cultures.

4.9

CONCLUSIONS

I began this chapter with the question as to whether societal collectivism would change
the causal linkages in the model of the Deaf Effect or whether in fact the Deaf Effect
occurs. In a replication of the study in chapter 3 across the USA, Germany and China, I
found that the respondents’ perspective of societal practices as operationalized by the
GLOBE framework had very little effect on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect. The Deaf
Effect model was shown to replicate in Germany and China much as it is in the United
States. The implication of this is that the mental models associated with evaluating
reports of bad news within projects are similar in the three geographies examined.
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THIS STUDY

Test Further
1. Please indicate what you will
decide, and how strong that
decision will be.
(Mark only one of the eight
boxes)

Move to Production

Definitely

Strongly

Somewhat

Slightly

Slightly

Somewhat

Strongly

Definitely

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

















2. Please explain the reasoning behind your decision.
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

3. Your gender (please circle one choice only):

Male

4. Your age (whole numbers only)

Female
____ Years

5. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience you have in any
capacity (whole numbers only):
____ Years
6. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience in information
systems (whole numbers only):
____ Years
7. My native country is: ________________________________________
8. In what country have you been living the longest? ____________
For how many years?____
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Very Far

9. Regardless of your nationality,
how far are you from a strict
adherence to the values and
culture of the country you are
living in?
10. How far are your own culture
and values from the culture and
values of the country you are
living in?

Neutral

Very Near

|

|

|

|

|

|

|
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21. My decision was most
influenced by the Sandy’s
assessment. (Relevence)

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree


|


|

Slightly
Disagree

Neutral


|


|

Slightly
Agree

Agree


|


|






















on
23. projects
Sandy isand
wellreport
respected
perceived
within the problems
company.that might
affect
project
(Credibility) success. (Role
Prescription)






















13. Sandy’s assessment was very
important in forming my
decision. (Relevance)















14. I would choose a risky
alternative based on the
assessment of others on
whom I must rely. (Risk
Propensity)















15. Sandy is motivated by a desire
to see things done correctly
for the bank. (Credibility)















16. I believe that there is high
potential for a positive result
in putting this project into
production. (Risk Perception)















17. My decision was more
influenced by the Sandy’s
assessment than any of the
other views expressed.
(Relevance)















18. Sandy is the most credible
person in the scenario.
(Credible)















19. This project has a high
probability of success. (Risk
Perception)















20. I would choose a risky
alternative relying on an
assessment that is high in
technical complexity. (Risk
Propensity)















21. My decision was most
influenced by the Sandy’s
assessment. (Relevence)















11.
has
a lot
of expertise
in
22. Sandy
I believe
that
there
is very little
this
area.
(Credibility)
risk in moving this project into
(Riskjob
Perception)
12. production.
Part of Sandy’s
is to review
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24. I would choose a risky
alternative which could have a
major impact on the strategic
direction of my organization.
(Risk Propensity)















25. Sandy is very trustworthy.
(Credibility)















26. This project is in a positive
situation. (Risk Perception)





























27. Sandy’s assessment was
highly relevant in forming my
decision. (Relevance)
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neutral

Slightly
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Agree

In this section, we are interested in your beliefs about the norms, values and practices in your society.
In other words, we are interested in the way your society is – not the way you think it should be.
There are no right or wrong answers, and answers don’t indicate goodness or badness of the society.
Please respond to the questions by checking the box that most closely represents your observations
about your society.

28. In this society, orderliness and
consistency are stressed, even
at the expense of
experimentation and
innovation. (Uncertainty
Avoidance)


29. The way to be successful in
this society is to (Future
Orientation)






Plan
Ahead































Neither
Agree or
Disagree






The Authority of
One’s Position






Strongly
Agree






Planned well in
advance

Spontaneous
(planned less than
an hour in advance)




Plan for
the Future

Strongly
Disagree


33. In this society, social
gatherings are usually: (Future
Orientation)



One’s Ability and
Contribution to the
Society


32. In this society, leaders
encourage group loyalty even if
individual goals suffer.
(Institutional Collectivism)



Accept the
Status Quo


31. In this society, a person’s
influence is based primarily on:
(Power Distance)



Strongly
Agree

Take
Events as
They
Occur


30. In this society, the accepted
norm is to: (Future Orientation)

Neither
Agree or
Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

(2 or more weeks in
advance)
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34. In this society, children take
pride in the individual
accomplishments of their
parents. (In-Group
Collectivism)

Strongly
Disagree


35. The economic system in this
society is designed to
maximize: (Institutional
Collectivism)

























Neither Agree
or Disagree
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Only Performance
Effectiveness





Neither Agree
or Disagree





Strongly
Agree

Performance
Effectiveness
and other
factors (for
example
seniority or
political
connections)





Strongly
Agree

Neither Agree
or Disagree

Strongly
Disagree





Obey their leaders
without question

Only factors other
than performance
effectiveness (for
example, seniority or
political connections


40. In this society, societal
requirements and instructions
are spelled out in detail so
citizens know what they are
expected to do. (Uncertainty
Avoidance)



Strongly
Disagree


39. In this society, major rewards
are based on: (Performance
Orientation)



Collective
Interests

Strongly
Disagree


38. In this society, people lead
highly structured lives with few
unexpected events.
(Uncertainty Avoidance)



Question their
leaders when in
disagreement


37. In this society, teen-aged
students are encouraged to
strive for continuously improved
performance (Performance
Orientation)



Strongly
Agree

Individual
interests


36. In this society, followers are
expected to: (Power Distance)

Neither Agree
or Disagree



Strongly
Agree
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41. In this society, being innovative
to improve performance is
generally: (Performance
Orientation)

Not Rewarded


42. In this society, parents take
pride in the individual
accomplishments of their
children. (In-Group
Collectivism)

Somewhat
Rewarded





Strongly
Disagree





Substantially
Rewarded





Neither Agree
or Disagree
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Agree
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43.
has
rules or laws
51. This
In thissociety
society:
(Institutional
to
cover:
(Uncertainty
Collectivism)
Avoidance)

Very Few
Individualism
Situations is
more valued than
group cohesion




52.
44. In this society, children
people in
generally
at home
their
position oflive
power
try towith
(Power
parents
until they get married.
Distance)
(In-Group Collectivism)
45. In this society, rank and
position in the hierarchy have
special privileges (Power
Distance)
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APPENDIX B: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANCE AND RISK
PERCEPTION CONSTRUCTS
Table B.1: Factor Analysis in the USA Sample
Item
Relevance
Relevance – 1
.865
Relevance – 2
.892

Risk Perception
-.229
-.271

Relevance – 3

.921

-.206

Relevance – 4

.896

-.229

Risk Perception - 1
Risk Perception - 2

-.337
-.206

.757
.846

Risk Perception - 3

-.357

.761

Risk Perception - 4

-.061

.802

Table B.2: Factor Analysis in the Germany Sample
Item
Relevance
Risk Perception
Relevance – 1
.832
-.181
Relevance – 2
.860
-.232
Relevance – 3

.892

-.279

Relevance – 4

.906

-.182

Risk Perception - 1
Risk Perception - 2

-.317
-.311

.797
.854

Risk Perception - 3

-.118

.503

Risk Perception - 4

-.064

.703

Table B.3: Factor Analysis in the China Sample
Item
Relevance
Risk Perception
Relevance – 1
.748
-.295
Relevance – 2
.716
-.152
Relevance – 3

.837

-.196

Relevance – 4

.837

-.113

Risk Perception - 1
Risk Perception - 2

-.391
-.194

.707
.838

Risk Perception - 3

-.251

.698

Risk Perception - 4

-.018

.814
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5 A CASE STUDY OF THE DEAF EFFECT OCCURRING IN AN
IS PROJECT STATUS REPORTING SYSTEM
5.1

MOTIVATION

In the previous chapters, the Deaf Effect was studied at the individual level of analysis.
In chapter 2, a basic model of the Deaf Effect was created and an examination was
made as to whether this model could explain why a decision maker would not respond to
a report of bad news by changing the current course of action. It was seen that the
perceived Relevance or importance of the report of bad news was strongly related to the
willingness to change the course of action. In chapter 3, I expanded this model by
examining the decision maker’s individual perceptions of the Role Prescription of the bad
news reporter and risk involved in the project combined with his Risk Propensity. In
chapter 4, I expanded that research to include the effects of the social environment in
terms of individuals’ perceptions of national culture variables. In this paper, I move from
the individual level effects to examine organizational effects on the occurrence of the
deaf effect.
When we move to the organizational level, we shift our attention from the psychology of
the individual social actors to the actions of the role-positions that are occupied by social
actors and the institutional structures that condition their action. We are not so much
interested in what occurs within the minds of the role incumbents as we are with the
effects of organizational structures and culture upon them that impel them toward certain
actions. Thus we want to analyze the structures and culture with a view toward
understanding how they affect the behavior of role occupiers.
To illustrate this point, at the individual level, I defined the Deaf Effect as when an
individual decision maker doesn’t hear, ignores or overrules a report of bad news to
continue a failing course of action. We consider the psychological factors that might
cause this such as the perceived Credibility and Role Prescription of the bad news
reporter and the Risk Propensity and Risk Perception of the decision maker. At the
organizational level, we ask what organizational factors might cause the report of bad
news to be ignored or overruled by decision makers. I therefore look at several
organizational level situations that might cause the phenomenon to occur. For example:
as various literature (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Near and Miceli 1995; Tourish and
Robson 2006) points out, decision makers may surround themselves with those who
agree with them, the organizational culture may impel them toward a particular decision,
or managers’ actions may cause bad news reporters to suppress or distort their
message so that it does not have the impact that it should have. Thus, at the
organizational level, the Deaf Effect manifests itself in actions by organizational actors
that
1) Attenuate the salience of the message so that it does not reach the
decision maker or
2) Distort the message so that it loses its status as a report of bad news by
the time it reaches the decision maker or
3) Obscure the message by raising the level of “background noise” in the
environment so that upon reaching the decision maker, it is not heard or
understood as a report of bad news.
Examples of these effects are numerous in the literature. For example, messages of bad
news may be attenuated by “yes men” who filter out messages that they believe

Chapter 5 – A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
management does not want hear (Dunbar and Goldberg 1978). Similarly, overwork and
stress or an excess of information can create “background noise” that prevents the
decision maker from hearing bad news (Wissema 2002). Likewise, managerial systems
and behaviors might cause the reporters of bad news or those who are responsible for
passing the message along to distort the message in an effort to curry favor or avoid
retributive behavior (Athanassiades 1973; Smith, Iacovou and Thompson 2007; Snow
and Keil 2002)
This definition is distinct from the Mum Effect in that when the Mum Effect occurs, the
bad news reporter is prevented or dissuaded from transmitting the bad news whereas
when the Deaf Effect occurs, the report of bad news is transmitted, but either its salience
is attenuated, the level of background noise rises so that it loses salience or the
message is distorted so that it is no longer recognized as a report of bad news. Thus
organizational forces that suppress the generation of the bad news report are proper
subjects of Mum Effect analysis. When that message is transmitted, but attenuated,
obscured or distorted by organizational forces between the transmitter of the report and
the decision making receiver, this is the Deaf Effect.
Since I am examining an organizational phenomenon, it is necessary to examine the
organizational environment in which it occurs. The research questions explored by this
study are:
1) What organization structures and forces might cause attenuation, distortion,
or obscuring of a report of bad news
Additionally, in the previous chapters, the research was conducted with laboratory
experiments using student subjects. In laboratory experimentation, the experimenter
attempts to “close” the field of research to isolate the mechanisms being studied
(Bhaskar 1998). While this allows the experimenter to focus on the object of study it
presents an artificial situation that may or may not represent how an effect may occur in
the “wild”. Omission or inclusion of a “boundary variable” can affect the generalizability of
the results of the study (Fromkin and Streufert 1976). Additionally, as discussed in
chapter 3, while student subjects can serve as a proxy for professionals in theory testing
studies, to test the external validity of the resultant theory it is necessary to use
professional subjects in a real life setting. Thus while the previous chapters have
demonstrated the internal validity of the model, this chapter moves to investigate the
external validity of the model. Thus the questions that are investigated here are
2) How well does the model of the Deaf Effect examined in the laboratory fit the
real world occurrences of the Deaf Effect?
3) What additional variables could be included in the model?
Therefore, in this chapter, the investigation moves from the laboratory to the field. This
chapter reports on a study of a project in which there were a series of bad news reports
within the project that were ignored or overruled and the project went on to fail.
This chapter first reports on background literature that might have explanatory value for
the organizational effect; then, the methodology that I used to collect and analyze the
data. Next, it reports the findings of the study. Following that is a discussion of results
The final section reports on the conclusions reached.

5.2

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

In this section, I review literature that shed light on organizational factors that might lead

Chapter 5 - A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

144

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
to the occurrence of the Deaf Effect.
The decision maker does not operate in a vacuum. There are organizational forces
surrounding the decision maker that have an effect on whether he/she receives the
message or that cause him/her to act differently that he/she would otherwise choose to
act. I organize these forces into three categories: attenuation, distortion and obscuration.

5.2.1

Attenuation

In this situation, organizational factors may cause the salience of a report of bad news to
be lowered (attenuated) within the organization. For example, managers may establish
systems to ensure that they only receive a certain kind of information (Tourish and
Robson 2006). They may not establish formal upward feedback mechanisms and
encourage, consciously or unconsciously, subordinates to filter out unwelcome
messages before they reach the leaders (Morrison and Milliken 2000). Manager reaction
to bad news reports can lead to the occurrence of the Mum Effect, but it can also cause
reporters of bad news to “turn down the volume” on a report of bad news to the extent
that it loses salience.
In other literatures, we see that the existence of groupthink, when a group of people
share opinions and assess situations in the same manner (Wissema 2002), can be an
organizational characteristic that could cause organizational deafness. Groupthink forms
when a homogenous team is unchanged for a long period (Hambrick and Mason 1984;
Wissema 2002). Groupthink tends to cause rigidity of response which is acceptable for
routine problems but leads to difficulties when the decision making team encounter novel
or ill-defined problems (Filley, et al. 1976; Janis 1972). Groupthink may also be
exacerbated by the presence of “yes-men.” Managers might surround themselves with
those who agree with them. The “yes-men” filter out messages that disagree with the
situation as perceived by the managers thus preventing the message from reaching the
decision makers with the consequence that bad news reports are not acted on (Dunbar
and Goldberg 1978). This not only reinforces the groupthink, but also leads to the
situation in which management perceives the situation much differently from those at a
lower level in the organization.
Additionally, appropriate information may not be available to identify whether a crisis is
occurring either through lack of information systems or organizational silence (Tourish
and Robson 2006; Wissema 2002). Bureaucratic organizations in general suppress the
effectiveness of whistle-blowing unless there are formal mechanisms to encourage
internal whistle-blowing that operate as described. Thus a low bureaucracy organization
or a bureaucratic organization with a formal whistle blowing mechanism will tend to
respond more favorably to whistle blowing than a bureaucratic organization with no
formal mechanism (Near and Miceli 1995).
Similarly, Near and Miceli’s(1995) model of whistle-blowing effectiveness describes the
effect of organizational structure and values on the ability of the whistle-blower to effect
change in organizational behavior. They argue that the organizational characteristics
that affect the organization’s willingness to change direction or behavior in response to
whistle-blowing include the perceived appropriateness of whistle-blowing; the climate of
support/non-support of whistle blowing; and the level of bureaucracy in the organization
structure. Appropriateness refers to the situation that arises when the organization views
whistle blowing as a legitimate response to problems. Where whistle blowing is viewed
as a legitimate function, the organization is more likely to change its behavior; whistle
blowing is part of the ethical culture of the organization.
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The organizational climate refers to whether an organization encourages or discourages
either the wrongdoing or blowing the whistle. In terms of the Deaf Effect, it refers to
whether the organization encourages or discourages maintenance of the current course
of action. Where the current course of action is held to be the approved method of
operation, whistle blowing is held to be less effective in changing the current course of
action.

5.2.2

Distortion

By distortion, I refer to a change in the content of the message to make the message
more acceptable to the recipient. It can also add linguistic cues designed to make the
decision maker perceive the report of bad news as less serious than it actually is. Snow
and Keil (2002) and Snow, Keil and Wallace (2007) have indicated that the true status of
a project to be reported is distorted by first, errors in understanding of the actual status
and then by bias. The direction of this bias is held to be twice as likely to be in an
optimistic direction as a pessimistic one (Snow, et al. 2007). This positive distortion of
the report of bad news results in a softening of the impact or a reduction in the
perception of the seriousness of the problem to the decision maker causing it to appear
less serious to the decision maker.
Even when formal feedback seeking mechanisms are implemented, management may
create a climate for distortion of bad news messages through their reaction to the bad
news (Morrison and Milliken 2000). Similarly when management attempts to force
upward feedback by intrusive supervision, distortion of reports of bad news is likely to
occur (Athanassiades 1973; Smith, et al. 2005).
Smith, Iacovou and Thompson (2007) have reported on a multiple case study of 9
projects reporting to an IT oversight board (ITOB). Utilizing regulatory theory (Scholz
1984; Scholz 1991), they found that auditors and reporters assess each other’s signals
in their dealings with each other and based on their perception of the meaning of the
signals adopted a certain strategy. The auditors could adopt a “conciliatory” or “
adversarial” strategy and the reporters could adopt a “full reporting” or “misreporting”
strategy. These signals can be distorted by “noise pollution” caused by ineffective
signaling. These studies illustrates that the signals used by auditors can affect the
reporting strategy of the bad news reporter resulting in distortion of the message into
one which does not communicate a serious problem to the decision maker which could
cause the Deaf Effect.

5.2.3

Obscuring

An unclear organizational structure or weak culture could also lead to occurrence of the
Deaf Effect (Wissema 2002). Where there is an unclear division of responsibilities,
signals indicating problems in a project can be missed as managers assume that others
are attending to those signals. A weak culture does not provide guidance to the bad
news reporter as to how or to whom to report bad news. This could result in the signal
being lost in wrangling over how to respond or who is to respond to the signal, a
misdirection of the bad news report or even its suppression (Mum Effect).
Alternately, one manager may be overwhelmed and ignore the signal or may have so
many things to attend to that the report may be lost or ignored in the clutter (Wissema
2002). Similar effects may result from stress and exhaustion.
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5.3

METHODOLOGY

To address my proposed research questions, I performed a case study of a project
status reporting process employed by a State Government IS organization (SISO) in the
southeastern USA. This project status reporting system requires “critical” IT projects,
projects with budgets over $1 million, to report status to an executive panel on a periodic
basis to ensure that these projects progress satisfactorily. The process also requires
agencies with projects over $5 million to hire an Independent Verification and Validation
(IV&V) Vendor who audits their project processes. The project report and the IV&V
report are then reviewed at an Executive Critical Panel Review (ECPR) meeting with the
state’s COO, CFO, CIO and Director of the Office of Planning and Budget (OPB).
My relationship with the subject organization limited the choice of methodologies that
could be employed. As part of the nature of our study agreement, I did not have access
to become a participant or participant observer into the process. Thus ethnographic
studies were not available as a method for this research as they require immersion of
the researcher in the environment to gain a “native” understanding of the cultural context
in order to translate the meaning of the culture to those reading his/her account (Prasad
1997). I therefore performed a case study of this process. Case study is appropriate in
situations where the phenomenon is “broad and complex” and where the phenomenon
cannot be examined outside of its context (Dube and Pare 2003). In this situation, the
project status reporting process as described below is a multi-step process and could
not be examined outside of its context.

5.3.1

Site Selection

To research the influence of organizational structures on the Deaf Effect, I needed to
have a research site in which there would be 1) reports of project problems; and 2) a
series of organizational interactions before the report of bad news reaches the decision
maker in order to surface organization message attenuation, distortion or obscuring. The
SISO project reporting process described below satisfied both of those requirements. It
was instituted in order to surface project problems so that they can be identified and
corrected to ensure that projects successfully complete. It also satisfies the second
condition by the sequential process of reviews. Within the context of reviews there are a
number of opportunities for the messages of bad news to be attenuated, distorted or
obscured. I gained access to the site based on SISO’s desire to have the process
audited. SISO had invested significant resources in developing the process and it
consumed substantial resources in operating. They desired to have the process
reviewed to ensure that it was effective and to understand how to make it more effective.
They were also concerned about “surprises” that occurred in the process; where
progress was reported to be good but the ultimate results were less than that reported.
I examined three projects that were tracked in that process. In two projects, Alpha and
Beta, there were no occurrences of the Deaf Effect nor were there adverse surprises in
the reporting project status to the ECPR panel. In the third project I examined, Gamma,
there were occurrences of the Deaf Effect and there was a major surprise. Project Alpha
is an in-progress project; a major effort by the state Health Services department to
implement a new outsourced health care claims processing system that will result in the
replacement of one outsourced vendor with another. The vendor was to provide the
software and operate the service for the state. It is anticipated that the vendor will go
through a two-year period of developing modifications to their standard system to meet
the state requirements prior to implementation in 2010. During the time of my analysis, it
went through an extended RFP process and the beginning of the design and
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development process. Project Beta was also an in-progress project to develop and
implement a new system to track the progress of children under supervision by the state
Department of Human Services. In this project, a vendor team had modified packaged
software and worked with an Agency project team to implement the software in each of
the school districts in the state. This project was in the final implementation stages when
I observed its status reporting process. Project Beta had experienced a serious problem
with vendor performance subsequent to its first pilot installation that resulted in action by
members of the ECPR panel. The third project, Gamma, was a completed project, a
turn-key student information system development project for the state education
department which sought to extract information from information systems in the school
districts to build a student information database. In this project, an RFP was issued for
the turn-key development project, a vendor team was selected, commercial software
was customized and development completed. The project team and IV&V reported this
project as being on track until the first production rollout at which point it was found to be
seriously defective. Following a year-long remediation effort, this project was complete at
the time of the data collection.
In the discussion that follows, I analyze the third project, Gamma, as it is the project that
exhibited the Deaf Effect. The other two projects, Alpha and Beta are included to project
contrasting examples of projects in the same environment in which the Deaf Effect did
not occur.

5.3.2

Data Collection

Data collection took place from April, 2007 to July, 2008 and was accomplished by use
of interviews and observation. I interviewed all the ECPR critical panel members, all
SISO attendees of the ECPR meetings, the project managers and the IV&V personnel
as well as other stakeholders in SISO and the agencies. The interviews with the critical
panel members were arranged by the SISO director and lasted 30-40 minutes each. I
directly arranged the interviews with the SISO, project and IV&V personnel. Table 5.1
shows the interviewees and their roles (pseudonyms are used for all names to ensure
anonymity). All formal interviews were recorded. Due to sensitivity of the conversations,
two interviewees requested that the recorder be turned off part way through the
interview. For these and for informal interviews that occurred ad hoc during the course of
the study, notes were taken as soon as possible during the interview and these
summaries of the interviews were made as quickly as possible after the occurrence. I
used snowball sampling to acquire interview subjects. When it was discovered that the
Deaf Effect had occurred in project Gamma, additional interviews were scheduled to get
a more in depth perspective of the project events. A total of 19 people were interviewed
in 24 interviews resulting in18 hours and 35 minutes of recordings across all three
projects. I interviewed the SISO personnel, key members of the project teams and the
ECPR members.
Table 5.1: Interviewee types and Number of Interviews
Code

Role

Alan

State COO, ECPR Panel member

1

Waylon

State CFO, ECPR Panel Member

1

Toby

Director, Office of Planning and
Budget, ECPR Panel Member

1
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Phillip

SISO Director, State CIO, ECPR
Critical Panel

1

Patsy

Deputy CFO, ECPR Member

1

Sherman

SISO Critical Panel Facilitator

2

Harvey

CIO, County 1 School District

1

Oswald

CIO, County 2 School District

1

Robert

Project Alpha Executive Project
Director

1

Lee

Project Beta Executive Project
Director

1

Forrest

Project Gamma Executive Project
Director

1

Jackson

Project Gamma, Technical Project
Manager

1

Thomas

CIO Project Gamma

1

Braxton

Contractor Project Manager

1

Dolores

IV&V Project Gamma

3

Joaquin

IV&V Project Gamma

3

Frederick

CIO, Project Alpha

1

Ambrose

SISO Critical Panel

1

Isabella

SISO Critical Panel Member

1

I used a semi-structured interview approach using a set of questions developed for each
interview. The initial questions were formed around the theories that informed the
background investigation of the original study and organizational factors that affect the
formation of the Deaf Effect. For example, from the organizational communication
literature I sought to identify how the reports of bad news were received within the
projects or the status reporting process (Tourish and Robson 2006). From the whistleblowing effectiveness literature, I examined the organizational climate regarding bad
news reporting and willingness to respond to bad news (Near and Miceli 1995). I
examined the nature of the interactions in the status reporting process to see if there
were conditions that might cause distortion of the message (Athanassiades 1973; Scholz
1991; Smith, et al. 2005).
Observation was accomplished by attendance at the regularly scheduled meetings. I sat
in an inconspicuous location and observed the subjects discussed, seating
arrangements and style of interaction. I was an observer, not a participant in the
meeting. Careful notes were taken during the meetings. I did not focus on any particular
area but simply recorded the events, topics and tone of the conversation as it occurred.
The meetings observed are listed in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Data Collection Meetings
Type of Data Collection

Number of Interviews or
Observations Made

ECPR Meetings Observed

9

SISO Critical Panel meetings
Observed

10

Dashboard Creation Cycles
Observed

1

A total of 20 meetings were observed.
During the various observation and interview sessions various documents were collected
such as copies of the dashboards, meeting agendas, project descriptions, and reports.
Observation and interview notes, transcripts and documents collected were stored in
notebooks in chronological order forming a project database.

5.3.3

Data Analysis Phases

In analyzing the data, I employed the following process. For the interview data, I listened
carefully to the recordings and made transcripts of them. I then carefully read through
the transcript data. I extracted sections of each transcript and placed them in word
documents under a category title corresponding to the concept describing their contents.
I then reviewed the text sections under each category to ensure consistency by
rearranging them and creating new categories as necessary. For the observational data,
I reviewed the notes taken at each meeting to identify common patterns and events.
These data were incorporated into the analysis of the transcript data.
I examined the data for the structure of each project in terms of governance and, method
of reporting for the SISO project status reporting process. For each project, I constructed
the actual method by which the dashboard was created for submission to the SISO staff.
I also reviewed the data on the background of the project managers and the conduct of
the various review meetings that occurred during the process.
I then created a history of each of the projects constructed from comments made by all
interviewees. Recognizing that project Gamma had several occurrences of the Deaf
Effect during its history, I focused on this project to identify the organizational and
reporting environment around the project to see if any of those conditions might have
induced the occurrence of the Deaf Effect.

5.4

FINDINGS

In this section, I report the findings of the study. First, I discuss the structure of the
projects including a discussion of the project manager, the project’s relationship with the
IV&V vendor, and its steering committee structure. Then, the SISO ECPR process as
designed by SISO and as observed in practice is described including how each project
constructs the dashboard document. Finally, a history of each project is given with a
focus on project Gamma.
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5.4.1

Structure of the Projects

The state government is headed by the elected Governor, who in this southeastern
state, appoints a Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). All
non-constitutional agencies (not headed by an elected official) report to one of these two
C level executives. The financial agencies report to the CFO, the others to the COO. The
Governor exerts direct control over these agencies. While the constitutional agencies
nominally report to the Governor, in practice they run as independently of the Governor
as possible, especially if the office holder is of the opposite political party. In this study,
two of the agencies involved report to the COO, the third, project Gamma, is a
constitutional office holder. In projects Alpha and Beta, the Executive Project Director of
the project reported to a CIO. In project Gamma, the Executive Project Director
functioned as a CIO in addition to his other responsibilities.

5.4.1.1.

Project Manager

Project Alpha. The Executive Project Director (EPD) for project Alpha, Robert, was an
experienced IT project manager. Formerly the Director of Operations for SISO, he had
entered the state government in 1997 as a consultant for Keane managing 278
consultants responsible for all the Y2K activities for the state and eventually became
director of operations for SISO managing 600 people. Earlier in his career, he had been
project manager for Unisys implementing similar systems for other states (Interviewee
Robert, EPD Project Alpha).
Project Beta. The Executive Project Director, Lee, was a SISO employee. When this
project was begun, SISO sourced and provided project managers to agencies if they
needed an experienced trained program manager and did not have or could not recruit
one on their own. SISO would provide a project manager on a chargeback basis to the
agencies. This process has now been discontinued as a cost saving measure
(interviewee Phillip, SISO Director). This project director was hired from Deloitte and had
experience with five other similar projects (Interviewee Lee,EPD, Project Beta).
Project Gamma. The Executive Project Director of project Gamma, Forrest, was an
academic with some previous IT consulting experience. While his IT experience was
primarily in the banking arena, he held an M.S. in CIS and an Ed.D. in Educational
Information Systems. He had worked with the Agency Commissioner in other roles and
after the Commissioner assumed her current position, he was recruited to be the
executive director while an assistant professor at a state college.
Forrest was considered to be supremely confident in his ability and power. In his
interactions with the project steering committee, he was considered to be arrogant and
condescending to them (Interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project
Manager). As the project went along he was viewed as promoting himself more than the
project (Interviewees Jackson,Project Gamma Technical Project Manager and Harvey,
CIO, County 1 School district). Forrest was considered to be very knowledgeable but
control oriented, as Sherman (SISO ECPR facilitator) indicated
… he was a guy who liked to be in control, he was a guy who thought he knew
everything that was going on, that he could control all those pieces on the board
and there was a big scene that he was going to come out the victor in. I don’t
think there was any necessarily deceit on his part. … I think he knew what he
was doing. I think Forrest understood, definitely understood education, definitely
understood the laws, definitely understood what they had to do from a
requirements perspective, knew a lot of the policy so he had a very good
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understanding of the environment. I don’t know how well, … he understood the
technology … (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR facilitator).

5.4.1.2.

Steering Committee Structure and Commissioner Involvement

Each project maintained a steering committee to provide advice and direction to the
project. Those of projects Alpha and Beta were similar in composition and role, while
that of Gamma varied significantly.
Project Alpha. The Project Alpha Project Governance body was composed of very high
ranking people from the Agency and SISO. It included the Agency Chief of Staff, CIO,
the Medical Policy Chief, CFO, Chief Legal Officer, Inspector General, and the state
CIO. This committee meets monthly and receives a more detailed project review than
the ECPR (Interviewee Robert, EPD Project Alpha). The Commissioner or her
representative attended all meetings of the ECPR.
Project Beta. Project Beta’s Executive Steering Committee was also composed of very
high-ranking people from the Agency and SISO. The Commissioner and two Deputy
Commissioners of the Agency, the Agency CIO, the state CIO and Director of SISO
Project Management Office and the policy analyst from the Office of Planning and
Budget were members of the committee. This committee met monthly and received a
status report from the Executive Project Director. The IV&V and the Executive Project
Director briefed the Commissioner on project status each month.
Project Gamma. This steering committee was substantially different from that of the
other projects studied. In those projects, it was a high-ranking policy making and
involved decision body for the project. In project Gamma, while it had 29 members and
the Chief Deputy, the Agency head responsible for policy, the Education Policy Advisor
from the Governor’s office, and a Deputy Director of SISO as members, it was largely
populated with subordinates of district CIOs and other district employees. The steering
committee was a therefore relatively informal body that was largely used to discuss
requirements. As the project progressed, the body met more and more infrequently.
(Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District) The Commissioner and deputy
Commissioners received their information about the project from the executive project
director (Interviewees Forrest, EPD Project Gamma, and Delores, IV&V Projects Alpha
and Gamma) and did not attend the ECPR meetings on a regular basis (Interviewee
Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). Unlike other projects the IV&V contractor did not
have access to the Commissioner (Interviewee Delores, IV&V Projects Alpha and
Gamma).

5.4.1.3.
Relationship Between the Project and the Independent Verification
and Validation Vendor (IV&V)
IV&V was a contracted relationship between the agency and an independent consulting
firm. SISO contracted with the IV&V consultancy and then billed the charges back to the
agency. IV&V is perceived by the agencies to be very expensive. (Interviewee Phillip,
SISO Director). The process that the IV&V followed to collect the data that they used for
their analysis was to attend major project management meetings in which project status
was discussed. They also collected appropriate documents and met with the project
managers independently of the meetings in order to collect additional data where there
were gaps in their understanding of the project status or plans. As part of their
attendance at the meetings, they would offer feedback on the project management
practices and suggestions for improvement. The focus of the analysis of the IV&V was
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based on the internal practices of the project and on meeting both work and budget
related milestones, organizational readiness for implementation and risk and issue
management (Interviewees Dolores, IV&V Project Gamma and Joaquin, IV&V Project
Gamma). They did not collect any data from users as to the level of fit of the system with
their requirements (Interviewee Dolores, IV&V Project Gamma). Nor did they include any
review of project outputs for fit with implementation. Thus they sought to monitor project
behaviors rather than outcomes. The implicit theory employed is that if the behaviors are
correct then the results will be correct. This focus resulted in at least three projects
where requirements definition errors were uncovered in the ECPR meetings. In project
Epsilon, a fixed asset tracking system, at an ECPR meeting it was discovered that as the
system was about to be implemented, there was a requirement to track several
thousand vehicles that had not been considered before. Similarly, in project Beta, the
conversion program specification inaccuracies were only discovered in a pilot test.
Finally, in project Gamma, the system developed was totally inadequate for the needs of
the users. This was only discovered after a pilot had been completed.
The project managers had a uniformly positive view of the IV&V vendor (Interviewees
Forrest, EPD Project Gamma,Robert, EPD Project Alpha, Lee,EPD, Project
Beta,Thomas, CIO Project Gamma, and Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). Instead
of being a simple auditor, the IV&V functioned additionally as a consultant that provided
value to the project. The project directors looked for the IV&V to be an active participant
in the project:
You know almost every time the IV&V vendor takes a position of such independence
that they become not a team member, OK? And so, what I counsel them on is
look guys, you know,... your input is valuable to us but you can't just sit back and
point fingers and then write a document a week later. You know, what you've got
to do is bring these issues up in meetings and become part of an active
communicator within the team meetings that we're having. You're one of the
team. Your view is independent, but consider yourself to be one of the team with
the rest of the team members seeing that you're making a contribution. What
we've done is we've run all our processes that we've defined for managing the
project, … by IV&V for input before we finalize them. Especially, [Dolores], I
mean she has great ideas. … [You] get a lot farther if the IV&V person is on the
team and just contributing you know. So that’s the relationship that we built with
all of our IV&V. (Interviewee Robert, EPD Project Alpha).
There was some concern about “going native” in the projects:
Well, there are some going native … It actually happened in a couple of cases. I
could see it in the Paris project, where the IV&V was more …[an] agency-aligned
person. And then we even had one, on the AMP project, where the agency head
actually changed our contract without us knowing about it to tell the IV&V what
they needed to do in a couple of cases. So I think it should remain [the way] it is
now with an IV&V contract with GTA, not with the agency. (SISO Interviewee
Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator)
This idea of being part of the team resulted in a motivation to resolve any differences
between the project and the IV&V vendor. This resulted in construction of dashboards of
great similarity.
Well, you know, [having the project dashboard different from the IV&V dashboard] is
obviously a concern. You don't want that. Now, so you've got to manage that.
You got to manage that so that doesn't occur. If you don't do that, then you're not
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doing your job. Once again, its gets back to you know sometimes you get to a
point where there's just a difference of opinion on something and I've run over
there with those and Dolores' in the red and I'm …in the yellow and I'll just put my
position on the table, she puts hers on the table. That’s the way we go. You try
not to have that be the scenario. (Interviewee Robert, EPD Project Alpha)
You try not to be too out of sync because then you go in and it's like, "Why is there
the difference"? Either IV&V is not talking to the agency and explaining and
recommending in all of that to the agency or the agency has a reason for them
not accepting it, but IV&V still feels strongly about it. Hopefully, you don't have
that type of an issue. (Interviewee Dolores, IV&V Projects Alpha and Gamma).
One ECPR member noticed that there is a “melding” between the dashboards produced
by the IV&V and the projects.
… I'd say what I've noticed is a kind of melding of the grading and the evaluations by
the IVV and the departments. I think that's positive. I don't think a little
contention's bad because that's substantially the reason for the IVV. And
sometimes the IVV can be a little too negative frankly there. That's somewhat
their job. (Interviewee Alan, State COO, ECPR member).
The ECPR panelists had a generally good perception of IV&V although they also viewed
the IV&V as not being perfect.
I'm not necessarily [going to] take IV&V's word for it. I've worked for plenty of
consultants and you know, that if you're somewhat detached from the situation,
you may not have all the information, so I don't take one [It] as gospel. You
know, it’s probably somewhere in the middle…to me it’s more of a general
indicator rather than anything that you can really bank on. (Interviewee Toby,
Director, Office of Planning and Budget, ECPR Member)
I mean you know sometimes maybe the IVV, they take the other side too strongly
and maybe they should kind of know where you stand. They're not going to
come in and tell you everything is hunky dory when it’s not but sometimes they'll
come and point out all the possible flaws and possibilities of things going wrong
and then you have to … weigh that [with what] with the agency is telling you
about all the things they don't think they're doing wrong. (Interviewee Alan, State
COO, ECPR member)

5.4.2

The SISO Status Reporting Process

5.4.2.1.

History.

Under state law, SISO has the mandate to prescribe procedures for procurement of
technology resources and to provide oversight of program management for all large
(over $1 million) technology projects. Following a major disaster in 2003 with the
implementation of a Medicaid Management Information System, the Executive Critical
panel process was created (Interviewees Alan, State COO, ECPR member and Isabella,
SISO Critical Panel Member). The panel consisted of the state COO, CFO, CIO, and
Director of the Office of Planning and Budget (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR
Facilitator). Acquiescence to the process was achieved because most of the agencies
reporting to the panel reported to members of the panel (Interviewee Isabella, SISO
Critical Panel Member). Those who did not report to members of the panel but to other
constitutional officers participated based on the relationship of the officers to the

Chapter 5 - A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

154

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
Governor (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). The object of this panel was to
inform the panel members of the impact that these projects have on the state
government, to ensure that business drives the technology decisions and to ensure that
decisions that go across agencies are made in the Governor’s office (SISO 2006). In
2004, the state legislature passed a resolution encouraging the departments and
agencies of the state to engage the services of an IV&V vendor for their information
technology projects over $1 million and for all procurement activities over $5 million
(Balfour, Stephens and Johnson 2004). This led to the basic structure of the ECPR.
Following the project Gamma disaster in 2006, the SISO review meeting was added to
the process (Interviewee Isabella, SISO Critical Panel Member).

5.4.2.2.

The SIS Project Reporting Process: As Described

The SISO project reporting process was a multi-stage process centered on the
development of a “dashboard” reporting document. This document is developed in a
dialogic process between a project team and the IV&V vendor and then refined through
a series of reviews with increasingly senior levels of management until it is finally
reviewed by a C-level executive committee (figure 5.1). The normal time span for one
cycle of this activity is approximately one month (Interviewee Ambrose, SISO Critical
Panel).
As shown in figure 5.1, the Project Status Report Generation Process was described as
a multi-stage process in which the report of status (dashboard document) and indication
of problems goes through potentially five iterations before it is reviewed by the Executive
Critical Panel Review (ECPR). The first stage is the initial creation of the dashboard
document. The IV&V vendor and project team simultaneously create versions of this
document and then through interaction between the IV&V vendor and project team,
discrepancies between the two versions are resolved. The dashboards are then
reviewed by the business process owner of the project after which they may be revised
again. The third stage is a review with the executive sponsor. Following this review, the
documents may be revised again. The fourth stage is the review with the SISO executive
leaders, following which the documents may be revised again. The final review is the
ECPR panel meeting in which state government C-level executives review the project in
terms of both dashboards to determine the impacts on other projects, ensure that
business needs are met, and ensure that cross-agency decisions are made by the
Governor’s office (SISO 2006).
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the SISO Project Status Report Generation Process
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5.4.2.3.

The SISO Project Reporting Process: As Executed in the Projects

In the three projects that I examined, I did not find that the process as described in
5.4.2.2 held. While there were interactions at the project level, I did not observe any
interaction as described in the process above the project level. In project Alpha, the data
for the dashboards were developed primarily at regular weekly project team meetings
held immediately prior to the due date of the dashboards. I observed that the IV&V and
project personnel created the dashboard document separately and a meeting was held
to compare the documents. At this meeting minor changes were made to the project
dashboard. These changes were made because the program manager wished to add
some detail. No changes were made to the IV&V dashboard. This meeting was held the
day that the dashboard documents were due to SISO.
We meet with our IV&V vendor before those meetings with GTA and the Governor's
panel. And there are sometimes when we're in disagreement. And so we discuss
that before hand and understand each other's position. We don't make an
attempt to… [change] to the way that IV&V is perceiving things but we do tell
them if we disagree with something that they put in there. And they have made
changes... and so have we, its gone both ways. You know we've come up with a
yellow and they say no, this is really red and so we'll sit and say you're really
right and we'll go with them. So we... there's collaboration that takes place
between us and IV&V (Alpha Program Manager, Robert, EPD Project Alpha).
IV&V Interviewee Dolores informed me that the documents would be sent over to the
SISO personnel with a copy sent to the Commissioner. A meeting might be held with the
Commissioner prior to the Critical Panel meeting if necessary but no revision to the
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Figure 5.2: The Dashboard Creation and Review Process in Projects Alpha and Beta
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dashboard was done. Between the SISO review and the ECPR meeting, no revision is
done unless the SISO meeting and the ECPR meeting occurs in different months (figure
5.2).
With regard to project Beta, the process seemed to be almost identical. I observed that
the IV&V and dashboard was created on the date that it was due and a copy was sent to
the project manager. I was informed by Lee that he usually got the IV&V dashboard and
if there were no issues, he would copy it and forward it to the SISO personnel. However,
the dashboards submitted to the process were not identical and often showed variation
in the colors. Interviewee Dolores indicated that the project dashboard was usually sent
over a day or two late.
In both of those projects, there was a notable drive to not be too “out of sync” with the
IV&V person on the project:
You try not to be too out of sync because then you go in and it's like, "Why is there
the difference"? Either IV&V is not talking to the agency and explaining and
recommending in all of that to the agency or the agency has a reason for them
not accepting it, but IV&V still feels strongly about it. Hopefully, you don't have
that type of an issue. (IV&V Interviewee Delores, IV&V Projects
Alpha and Gamma)
The development of the “dashboard” document was definitely perceived as a secondary
activity. The project managers of Alpha and Beta indicated that they had other status
reporting mechanisms that they used and that the dashboards were constructed from
those. Additionally, I observed that the dashboard documents were developed at the last
minute before the due dates and were often delivered slightly late (less than 24 hours).
In project Gamma, the process was different. At the time that this project was running
(2004-2006), there was no separate review by the SISO staff (Interviewees Isabella,
SISO Critical Panel Member and Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator) and the
Commissioner was not required to attend the ECPR meetings and in fact her attendance
was spotty (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). There were project team
meetings similar to those in projects Alpha and Beta. IV&V attended all project
management meetings. There was a “big meeting” with a large number of people and a
smaller meeting with just the PMs and IV&V. Following those, the project management
subcontractor created a dashboard document and sent it to an agency manager who
used it created an agency version of the dashboard (Interviewees Braxton, Contractor
Project Manager, and Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). IV&V
created a version and this version and the project version were reviewed in a meeting
with the IV&V vendor, Agency policy manager, Project Manager and Executive Project
Director (Interviewees Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager, Dolores,
IV&V Project Gamma, and Joaquin, IV&V Project Gamma). After this meeting
adjustments were made in the documents as agreed in the meeting and the Executive
Project Director would update the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner by himself
(Interviewees Forrest, EPD Project Gamma, Dolores, IV&V Projects Alpha and Gamma,
and Joaquin, IV&V Project Gamma).
During the development timeframe, serious problems became known with the
functionality of the software provided by the software contractor as well as with their
performance to schedule (Interviewees Braxton, Contractor Project Manager, and
Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). Apparently, the schedule
performance of the subcontractor was discussed in the project team meetings and was
picked up by the IV&V but the functionality issues were not. These issues were
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discussed during at least one juncture with the Agency project management including
the option to stop the project, but no change in direction was made (Interviewee Braxton,
Contractor Project Manager).
The reporting process used in project Gamma is shown in figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: The Dashboard Creation and Review Process in Project Gamma

As a last note on the status reporting, a desire on the part of the Project Directors to
control the message about the status of the project was observed. At the end of our
observation period, SISO introduced a one-page status document to be provided to the
ECPR members to reduce the level of effort required ECPR members to gain an
understanding of the status. SISO proposed to generate this document based on the
dashboard documents provided by the projects. Robert, EPD Project Alpha, expressed a
desire to create the document himself as opposed to reviewing the document generated
by SISO so that he could ensure that the message he wanted to send was conveyed.
Similarly, Forrest attempted to control all the messages going out of the Gamma project.
He was the only team member to communicate to the Commissioner and her deputy.
Likewise, he controlled the conversation at the ECPR meetings (Interviewee Jackson,
Project Gamma Technical Project Manager).

5.4.3

A History of the Projects

During the timeframe of the study, project Alpha began and project Beta terminated.
project Gamma had terminated its first phase and was preparing for its second phase.

5.4.3.1.

Project Alpha
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At the beginning of our observation of the process, project Alpha was at the close of the
procurement stage. An RFP had been issued. A decision had been made, the contract
negotiated and the agency was waiting for a federal government approval on the award
and contract amount. This approval was withheld until the end of 2007. During that time
period, the panel was used to discuss how to involve the Governor or the COO to
resolve the issues. After Notice of Intent to Award was issued at the end of January,
2008, the losing vendor protested the award, the protest was denied and the project
finally began in the April, 2008 time period. The plan is for a two year designdevelopment-implement with an implementation date of July, 2010.

5.4.3.2.

Project Beta

At the beginning of the study in June, 2007, project Beta had completed development
and was approaching deployment of the system at a pilot in one county. The biggest
concern was with the data conversion from an old system to the new system. The
schedule was very aggressive to implement by mid 2008 with no slack. After the pilot
implementation, there were over 100 defects in the conversion process noted, and no
mitigation plan was in place. By October, there were still problems with the conversion
vendors. A repeatable process was not in place and there was discussion in the ECPR
meeting that the vendors needed to have a meeting with the Governor or the state COO
to explain why their performance was so poor. The project director indicated that they
had taken a driving role with the vendor to get the conversion done. A decision was
made to give them another chance before bringing the vendors to the Governor. In
November, the situation had improved; they were preparing for a two county pilot and
believed that the conversion had been reduced to a repeatable process. By January, the
conversion issues had been resolved and the two county pilot was successful. At the
February panel meeting, the first mass rollout of 72 counties was successful and they
spent time discussing lessons learned from the project. By April the second rollout had
been successfully accomplished, the last rollout was planned for June, 2008 and the
handover to the Agency operations staff was being discussed.

5.4.3.3.

Project Gamma

This was not the first attempt to develop a student information system. Various attempts
had been made over the past 20 years (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator).
The immediate past attempt was in 1998,
[It was created] with the idea that we would have one student management system
for every district in the state and that was put through RFP and everything and
SAP won that. And after 8 months, they hadn't gotten one district working. So [if
that were] …extrapolated out to 181 districts we were looking at 181 years and
they took a look at the project and it was shelved. So there had been
considerable, especially [among] the people in the legislature who had been
there that long, … expectations placed and expectations not delivered upon so
when we got to this iteration of the project, it was almost deemed as a failure to
begin with (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).
This is amplified by the former Governor:
… the state spent at least $85 million on unsuccessful earlier efforts, including one
championed by Gov. [X] when he was Governor.
"I spent $50 million trying to put together a student information system that would
work, and it frustrated the heck out of me," said Mr. [X], (Dillon 2006).
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The Beginning of the Project. This particular effort began in 2003 when $14.5 million
was set aside to develop the system (Dillon 2006). This system was to be constructed to
respond more effectively to requirements from the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and
to replace a set of technologically obsolete legacy systems (Interviewee Thomas, CIO
Project Gamma). The executive project director, Forrest, was brought in by the new
agency Commissioner (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District) in July, 2003
(Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). He was charged to “get the project done”
within the budget outlined (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma) by December,
2005 (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). He was given the opportunity to hire a
staff that was dedicated to this project alone and did not have any other responsibilities
within the agency. (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). The technical project
manager, Jackson, was hired in November of 2003. The initial steering committee for
this project was put together by the Governor. It was actually a group of advisors
including business executives, other state agencies, the school districts and also the
agency. The committee developed a list of 21 objectives that this project would
accomplish (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).
After these goals were established, that steering committee was disbanded and another
was formed as described in section 5.4.1.2 and at first the project director met often
with the committee and with the CIO of the state’s largest school district. The exact
frequency is unknown, however it was described as frequent and very heavy
(Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District). This interaction continued to be
very heavy until the RFP was issued (interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District).
Development of the RFP was very rapid. Development started in December 2003 and it
was released in late February 2004 (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). When
the bidding process was completed, ContractCo won the contract.
They were more of the management, [and] oversight and brought in the team. They
purchased or subcontracted with DatabaseCo, which was at the time the …
leading database provider for districts’ data warehouses, not state. They were
getting into the state market. They also contracted with ReportingCo to do the
reporting piece (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).
The RFP was very light on technical requirements. It was set at a very high level to allow
the vendors to supply their knowledge to the project (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project
Gamma). While the districts had input through the steering committee, most of the
requirements were provided by Jackson because of his knowledge of data warehousing
applications (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). Although, the 21 goals of the
project were included in the RFP they were not stressed to ContractCo and in fact the
onsite contract personnel did not know what they were until relatively late in the process.
(Interviewee Braxton, Contractor Project Manager).
The RFP was awarded in June, 2004 (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). The
project used a classical waterfall style software development process (Interviewee
Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). The detailed project plan was submitted in August, 2004
(Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). The requirements statement was
developed and signed off in the first six months. The design documents were
developed and signed off in next six months (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project
Gamma).
The Development Phase. As development on the new system began, it was recognized
that the existing legacy systems were “a train wreck”(Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1
School District). While the data collected by the legacy systems was noted for its
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accuracy (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma), the existing mode of data
collection from the districts was extremely slow (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1
School District). The legacy systems were placed under the control of Forrest, who
received the title of CIO for the department, and an effort to improve the performance
was undertaken as the new system would not be online until 2006 (Interviewee Forrest,
EPD Project Gamma). Thomas was brought on board the department to be the head of
legacy applications support and perform this project. This project was very successful.
The length of time that it took to load the data from the largest district in the state was
reduced from 15 hours to 35 minutes (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School
District).
The development of the new system created strains on the relationship of the project to
the school districts. The amount of communication between Forrest and the districts
which at first was very copious (especially Harvey) slowed after the RFP was issued and
dried up to a trickle. Meetings with the steering committee became less frequent. Also, a
two-year effort to develop a common data structure for the reporting data was
abandoned in favor of the data structure provided by the vendor DatabaseCo’s system,
which caused ill will among the districts (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School
District). Finally, the new data required by the data warehouse required a revision of the
files sent from the districts to the central office. This required the districts to work with the
vendor that provided their student information system to get a new data feed created.
This was viewed as an “unfunded mandate” placed upon the school districts
(Interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager).
First Occurrence of the Deaf Effect. During 2005, it became obvious that there were
problems with the product supplied by DatabaseCo. They were missing their due dates,
often waiting until the last minute to inform ContractCo of the delays (Interviewee
Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). ContractCo had to provide personnel to
DatabaseCo in order to try to maintain the project schedule (Interviewee Jackson,
Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). Additionally, the DatabaseCo system did
not provide the level of data editing provided by the legacy systems, nor did it have the
status and error reporting capabilities the legacy systems provided (Interviewees
Thomas, CIO Project Gamma and Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). There were
several closed-door meetings without the IV&V vendor in which ContractCo pointed out
to Forrest and Jackson that the DatabaseCo had functional deficiencies such that it
wouldn’t work as promised. ContractCo management raised the topic of delaying or
canceling the project (Interviewee Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). Forrest chose
not to respond to these issues. This constitutes an occurrence of the Deaf Effect.
During this time period, as the project reported to the ECPR panel, the overall project
was reported as being in “green” status, while the schedule was reported in “yellow”
status. Serious concerns with the system capabilities were not reported or were
minimized by Forrest (Interviewees Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager
and Braxton, Contractor Project Manager).
Second Occurrence of the Deaf Effect. The project was completed and went to pilot
test in October 2005. This took the form of partial database loading at a single district.
While the pilot was successfully completed, Jackson became concerned enough with
the project performance to raise these concerns to Forrest in an email. The root of his
concerns was that the project director was over promising and ran the risk of under
delivering the project. He cited concerns with project communication, the data loading
process, and operations and maintenance. He felt that more communication was
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needed with the eventual users to describe the exact features of the system rather than
simply communicating concepts to the leaders. He was very concerned about the data
loading routines since the system required 12-20 hours of work to prep the data before
loading it into the data loading templates. Additionally, the project team was receiving
push back from the district SIS vendors on preparing the data loading routines for the
new system. There were additional concerns about the ability to manage the vendor
relationships in the operational period. Jackson recommended that instead of a full
rollout that only a small “pilot” group of 20-25 districts be implemented to provide an
opportunity to identify and correct issues without hurting the project reputation in all the
districts. (Jackson 2005). Forrest did not accept this advice, saying it was politically
impossible to back off (interviewees Forrest, EPD Project Gamma and Jackson, Project
Gamma Technical Project Manager). This was another occurrence of the Deaf Effect.
Third Occurrence of the Deaf Effect. Following that pilot, the project was declared
complete and ready for implementation. The rollout to the districts began in March,
2006. This took the form of another pilot in which the data loading was done with both
the legacy and the new system (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). The
revamped legacy data loads were much cleaner and much simpler than the new
system. The lack of edits in the new system and the length of time required to generate
the data for the loading resulted in significant dissatisfaction at the district level with it.
At the same time, Jackson wrote a memo to Forrest expressing why he thought that the
system would fail. Forrest became angry with him and retaliated by cutting him out of
meetings and information flow (interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project
Manager). This was the third occurrence of the Deaf Effect.
Forrest indicated that he did not act on the reports of bad news from Jackson because
first, it wasn’t politically feasible:
I think at one time there they wanted to delay the entire process another year and
[emphasize that this was only a pilot test of the system] and I said, Jackson, you
have got to understand, politically that is not feasible. You know because one of
the things that you learn in government is …first of all any technological system
has got to be operationally feasible, it has got to be technologically feasible and it
has got to be economically feasible. Well when you are dealing in government it
has got to be political and sometimes political feasibility trumps all and that is just
a fact of government. [Politically feasible means] you can’t sort of back track
once you have gotten to a point and said we are at this point, then if you come in
and back track you don’t back track you fix the problem going forward. That was
the point I made (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma).
Forrest also believed that Jackson did not see the big picture. He kept Jackson working
on project Gamma and Thomas working on the legacy systems without any cross project
communication (Interviewee Forest). So that each never really understood what the
other was doing.
[When Jackson] came on board … we were having tremendous data collection
problems and he and I were the ones who helped make the decision that …, we
are going to redo, [not repair the old system]. We just got to make it survive until
we get this system up. But then when we brought in Thomas and … they took
over and started improving it, it [improved] so much … but of course [Jackson
wasn’t] involved in that, so he had never seen that piece. Well I had seen both
sides. So I felt comfortable with it. I don’t think [he] ever did (Interviewee
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Forrest, EPD Project Gamma).
The “Melt-Down” and De-escalation. The project status changed to red in June, 2006
due to the fact that there was enough resistance to the system from the users in the
districts that it was considered to be impossible to hide the poor status from the ECPR
panel (Interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). The ECPR
took this change in status as an indication of deception (Interviewees Toby, Director,
Office of Planning and Budget, ECPR Member; Waylon, State CFO, ECPR Member;
Patsy,Deputy CFO, ECPR Member; Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). They repeatedly
referenced project Gamma as an example of a project in which they had an unpleasant
surprise. The following quotes are all responses to a question about whether there were
any surprises in the reporting to the panel.
yeah, [project Gamma]. We had been given information all along that project was on
time and on budget and maybe that’s a little too strong but we had been given
information that it was OK. It was progressing and turned out that it wasn't OK
and it wasn't progressing. …We had to escalate it so that [the Commissioner]
was involved and some of her leadership. That's the one that kind of jumps off
the page at me that really the information, it wasn't good information basically.
(Interviewee Alan, State COO, ECPR member)
Yeah, the one [that] comes to mind [is project Gamma]. There was some scope and
mission change and creep over time that I'm not quite sure was entirely detected.
… I didn't discover it, but it coincidentally happened to be about the time that we
discovered, "whoa, this original concept of student information system and the
Governor's idea or in the Governor's original vision isn't exactly what we think
we're seeing." Now it resolved itself and I think we're to a good place. Kind of [a]
compromise position. But, so that was one.. (Toby, Director, Office of Planning
and Budget, ECPR Panel Member)
…[project Gamma] is a good example. They held back certain pieces of information,
even during the critical panel, and then when it finally came up, they got blasted.
(SISO interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator).
Following the disclosure of the serious problems with project Gamma, a de-escalation
process was pursued. Forrest decided to change the data loading mechanism from
using the new method that had proved problematic (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project
Gamma). It was determined that they would investigate using the legacy data collection
mechanism to front end the data warehouse and the state ID system. Over the next two
months, Thomas planned this activity. Jackson who had led the project effort resigned in
August, 2006. At about the same time, Forrest stepped down as agency CIO
(Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).
Apparently, no communication of this activity was made to the districts, because in
October, 2006, a delegation went to the deputy Commissioner to protest using the new
system for the next year’s reporting (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District).
About the same time, the relationship manager for ContractCo met with the deputy
Commissioner and reported serious problems with the project as currently structured
(Interviewee Braxton, Contractor Project Manager).
Thomas became the agency CIO about that same time. The project then followed a
course of integrating the legacy data collection with the data warehouse and the ID
system along with development of additional reports requested by the districts. In doing
this activity, they expended the funds allocated for the project and completed the project
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with operational funds (Interviewees Thomas, CIO Project Gamma and Patsy, Deputy
CFO, ECPR Member).
Forrest left the employ of the department and returned to his college at the end of 2006.
The project continued under the direction of Thomas until it was declared complete in
August 2007 (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).
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Figure 5.4: Timeline of Project Gamma
Chapter 5 – A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

166

Jan

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect

5.5

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The findings of this study show two status reporting issues. First, there was distortion of
status reporting to the ECPR panel in the case of project Gamma. Second, that the Deaf
Effect occurred in the case of project Gamma while it did not occur in the cases of
project Alpha and Beta.
The findings of this study also show that the existing SISO status reporting process is
dependent upon the voluntary disclosure of information by the projects. Projects Beta
and Gamma encountered similar problems. How they responded to the problems
determined the success or failure of the process. Project Beta responded by disclosure
of the problems to the panel, which led to their resolution. Project Gamma responded by
a systematic reduction in communication about the problems, which resulted in the
ultimate failure of the project. Despite the monitoring by the IV&V, the SISO process and
a steering committee, the project Gamma management was able to avoid disclosure of
the issues until the first attempt at implementation. This illustrates that the IV&V, which
acquired its information largely through attendance at various project management
meetings, was dependent upon the project team in order to get information to assess the
status of projects.
Table 5.3 illustrates the differences in the information gathering opportunities between
projects Alpha and Beta and project Gamma. The Agency Commissioner in projects
Alpha and Beta was highly involved in the monitoring process as part of the steering
committee, as a participant in the ECPR process. They also received status reports
directly from the IV&V vendor. In project Gamma, however, the Agency Commissioner
was largely left out of the process. SISO was involved in the process as part of the
steering committee and by virtue of their review meeting prior to the ECPR meeting in
projects Alpha and Beta. In project Gamma however, GTA was not involved in the
process. Agency executives and stakeholders populated the steering committee in
projects Alpha and Beta whereas that of project Gamma was comprised of relatively lowlevel stakeholders.
Table 5.3: Differences Between the Projects
Project Alpha

Project Beta

Project Gamma

Involvement of
Commissioner

Part of Dashboard
Review Process

Part of Dashboard
Review Process

Oblivious
(Interviewee
Harvey, CIO,
County 1 School
District)

GTA Review
Meeting

Part of Process

Part of Process

Not part of process

Steering Committee

Formal, Populated
with top department
and SISO personnel

Formal, Populated
with top department
and SISO personnel

Informal. Populated
with low-level
department
personnel
(Interviewee
Harvey, CIO,
County 1 School
District). No SISO
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personnel
(Interviewee
Sherman, SISO
ECPR Facilitator).
IV&V Participation
in Project Meetings

Yes

Yes

Yes

Full Disclosure of
Issues in Project
Meetings

Yes

Yes

No (Interviewee
Braxton, Contractor
Project Manager)

IV&V Access to
Commissioner

Yes

Yes

No (Interviewee
Joaquin, IV&V
Project Gamma)

EPD Agency
Reporting structure

To CIO

To CIO

Acted as CIO,
reported to
Commissioner

State Government
Relationship

Reports Directly to
Governor

Reports Directly to
Governor

Reports to
Constitutional
Officer

Results

In process. No
issues noted.

Finalizing. Major
issue occurred in
7/06 but overcome.

Finalized in 12/05
but determined to
have failed in 10/06.

5.5.1

Distortion of the Message

The distortion of the status report in project Gamma occurred in the reporting of status of
project Gamma as “green” during the development and pilot stages of the project, when
by testimony of the project management (Braxton, Contractor Project Manager and
Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager), the status was actually “yellow” or
“red”. The responsibility for the distortion was placed on Forrest. Table 5.4 displays the
various theories that were discussed in section 5.2.2 that might cause distortion of the
message and whether they occurred in project Gamma.
Table 5.4 – Distortion Causing Conditions in Project Gamma
Source of
Distortion

Theory /
Source

Condition in Project Gamma

Errors of
Understanding

Status
Reporting Bias
(Snow and Keil,
2002)

This condition does not seem to
exist. Braxton, Jackson, Forrest
agreed on the facts. They differed
on the required action.

Bias in
Reporting

Status
Reporting Bias
(Snow and Keil,
2002)

In the history of project Gamma,
we see evidence of self-efficacy, a
political interpretation of facts and
a control fixation.

Upper
Echelons
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(Hambrick and
Mason 1984)
Reaction to
Management
Responses to
Reports of Bad
News

Critical Upward
Communication
(Tourish and
Robson
(2006),Morrison
and Milliken
(2000))

Forrest had not experienced any
bad repercussions from reporting
bad news on this project. The
actual responses by the ECPR
and SISO were very encouraging
as reported by project Beta.
However, Forrest did not know
this.

Intrusive
Supervision

Athanassiades
(1973)

No evidence exists that show that
Forrest considered the supervision
intrusive.

Adversarial
Approach by
Regulators

Regulatory
Theory (Scholz
1984, 1991)

No evidence exists that an
adversarial relationship existed
between IV&V, SISO, or ECPR
and Forrest.

The table shows that the theories that had been considered in section 5.2.2 do not
explain the occurrence of distortion in the status report of project Gamma with the
exception of Snow and Keil’s status reporting theory. Status reporting distortion may
occur as a result of misunderstanding of the situation (Snow and Keil 2002; Snow, et al.
2007). This situation did not occur in project Gamma. Jackson and Braxton indicated
that there were serious problems. Forrest did not disagree with the facts, but rather with
the seriousness and the proposed solution. Similarly, the responses of supervisors and
regulators may cause distortion (Athanassiades 1973; Morrison and Milliken 2000;
Scholz 1984; Scholz 1991; Tourish and Robson 2006). In project Gamma, we do not see
any adverse responses to bad news by management, IV&V or the ECPR panel to
Forrest that would cause such distortion. However, the findings do show potential biases
to reporting in that Forrest considered the situation in which he found himself a highly
political situation in which he felt he had to control the communications of the project so
that the project would be viewed correctly. Thus he would bias the reporting in an effort
to avoid loss of power.
There is however, another theory which could add additional insight into this situation:
agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory seeks to
address the situation in which one party (the principal) delegates work to a second party
(the agent) under a contractual relationship. Two problems arise under the contract: the
agency problem where the goals of the principal and agent differ and it is difficult and/or
expensive for the principal to verify that the agent is fulfilling his desires. This manifests
itself in two issues: moral hazard in which the agent does not perform as agreed under
the contract (shirking) and the principal does not have the information or the ability to
acquire the information to verify the performance of the agent; and adverse selection in
which the agent misrepresents his abilities in order to get the job and the principal
cannot verify his statements. The second issue in the agency relationship is risk sharing
in which the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The object of the
theory is to identify the most effective contracting mechanism between them; whether
behavior based or outcome based mechanisms are more effective (Eisenhardt 1989).

Chapter 5 – A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

169

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
Two studies have applied agency theory in escalation situations. Harrison and Harrell
(1993) investigated adverse selection. They found that managers who initiated
unprofitable projects tended to consider them. This is due to the information asymmetry
that existed which allow them to hide their incompetence. Where adverse selection did
not exist, the agents behaved in the interests of the principal. Tuttle, Harrell and Harrison
(1997) investigated moral hazard conditions in IS implementation situations. They found
that agency theory predicted the behavior of students in moral hazard situations well. In
laboratory experiments students indicate willingness to implement systems with known
quality issues under conditions of moral hazard. This result was tempered with the
finding that this effect is moderated by the individual’s moral code. In some cases, it
overrides self-interest to not implement the system.
In the situation of project Gamma, a definite moral hazard situation existed. Moral
hazard exists when an agent has an incentive to not perform as expected by the
principal and information asymmetries exists so that the principal cannot verify the
performance of the agent (Eisenhardt 1989; Tuttle, et al. 1997). In that project, as
discussed above, Forrest viewed his position as politically charged and that the
maintenance of his position required the perception that all was well with the project.
There was therefore a significant temptation to shirk. Similarly, table 5.5.1 shows that
significant information asymmetries existed. Forrest controlled the communications
external to the project so that external entities only received the information he wanted to
provide them. Project Gamma therefore conforms to an agency theoretic view of project
reporting.
Thus in this situation, I suggest that Forrest’s perception of a highly politicized
environment and need to control the information flow created an incentive to distort the
status of the project which when combined with the information asymmetries in the
project created a moral hazard situation resulting in distortion of the project status in the
reports to the ECPR and the Agency Commissioners.

5.5.2

Evaluating Project Gamma using the Individual Model from this
Dissertation.

The findings of this study showed that the Deaf Effect occurred at least three times in the
case of project Gamma. This section addresses how well the model developed in
chapters two through four explains the occurrence of the Deaf Effect in project Gamma
and then addresses additional factors that could be added to the model that are
illustrated in the case study.
The individual model developed in the previous chapters placed the subject in a
particular organizational environment. For the model to be validly applied, it must first be
ascertained that that environment existed in this case.
Four factors were included in the environment used in the scenarios:
1) External pressures that moved the decision maker to continue the current course
of action;
2) A decision maker who could not perform the evaluation on his/her own;
3) A report of bad news that did not communicate the potential disaster situation in
terms that unambiguously indicated a coming disaster;
4) Severe time constraints on the length of time to evaluate the situation and make
a decision that prevented either evaluation of the situation or cut off alternative
solutions.
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There is no direct evidence of Forrest’s superiors constantly pressuring him to deliver.
However, it is obvious that he felt some pressure. He stated that he had been brought in
“to make it happen” whereas it had failed twice before. When presented with issues by
Jackson, he repeatedly stated that it was “politically impossible” to take any alternative
course. On the second point, Forrest did not have the technical skills to evaluate the
technical performance of the project. He was reliant upon the representations of others.
Third, while in retrospect, the warnings of the October, 2005 memo seem very prescient,
at the time, Forrest may have been able to rationalize continuing by considering them to
be overblown or perhaps he considered them capable of resolution by other means.
Lastly, he definitely felt pressure to deliver a system by 12/05, which prevented him from
considering any other alternatives at that late date.
Given that the same conditions existed in the case that existed in the experiments, I now
consider whether the model developed in chapters two, three and four holds in this case.
Since there was an occurrence of the Deaf Effect, based on the model, we would expect
that 1) the message of bad news was not considered relevant by the decision maker; 2)
that there would be a perception of little risk in the project; 3) there would be a
perception of low credibility in the bad news reporter; and 4) the bad news reporter
would be not role prescribed to report bad news.
Considering point 1, in the findings, there are statements that Forrest considered
Jackson’s concerns to be irrelevant because they were 1) politically not feasible and 2)
not based in knowledge of everything going on. He stated that a system had to be
technically, operationally, economically and politically feasible and political feasibility
would trump all other concerns. This meant that in order to maintain his political position,
he couldn’t back track on the course of action. Therefore, given the situation, the report
of bad news was not as relevant to the decision as the political factors, so, we see here
a low Relevance ascribed to the report of bad news.
Considering point 2 above, in the findings we see no indications that Forrest perceived
the risk in the project to be exceptionally high or at least not beyond his capability to
manage it. He believed that Jackson did not know about his work with the legacy
systems that were going to resolve the data loading problem and therefore Jackson’s
concerns did not escalate his perception of risk. He also perceived the legacy data
collection system as his contingency plan in the event of failure of the project data
loading system. Therefore, given that he perceived he had multiple paths to accomplish
his goal, he did not perceive that there was a high risk of project failure..
Considering point 3, the credibility of the bad news reporter, we understand from source
credibility literature that Credibility is formed from two primary constructs, trustworthiness
and expertise (Pornpitakpan 2004). We see that Forrest held the reporter, Jackson in
high regard. He considered him an excellent project manager. But he felt that his
knowledge of what was going on in the rest of the project was lacking. He therefore
lacked expertise. Therefore, his Credibility was low in this area.
For point, 4, Role Prescription of the bad news reporter, we see that there was no
specific aspect of his job which required Jackson, who reported the bad news in this
project, to “blow the whistle” on the project. However, it is usually assumed that a project
manager will report serious project problems to his superiors.
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Considering these factors within the model developed above, we see the following
conditions (figure 5.4). Forrest considered the risk of the project as low which would
have the effect of reducing his willingness to change course of action. Because Forrest
considered Jackson to lack complete knowledge of the situation, he had a lowered
opinion of his credibility as a bad news reporter. This low Credibility acted to lower the
perceived Decision of the report of bad news. While Role Prescription of the bad news
reporter is seen as high, given the combination of low Credibility with high Role
Prescription, we have seen that the effect size of Credibility is greater than that of Role
Credibility

Risk
Perception

-

LOW

Low
-

-

+

Relevance

Low
Role
Prescription

-

Decision

Continue

+

High
Figure 5.5: Variable Settings in the Case of Project Gamma
Prescription (chapter 3) resulting in a low Relevance of the message. The low Credibility
would also act to lower the perceived risk of the project. Given this set of conditions, a
low relevance and low Risk Perception, the model predicts that Forrest have continued
the current course of action which is what I found.
Thus the individual model holds in predicting the decision to be made by the decision
maker in this situation.

5.5.3

Examining Other Escalation Factors

In this section, I seek to expand the model to identify other factors by examining the
other escalation determinants as defined in Staw’s (1997) classification of escalation. I
examine each one in turn

5.5.3.1.

Illusion of Control

One of the determinants for project escalation referenced by Staw (1997) is that of
optimism and illusion of control. Keil, Depledge and Rai (2007) found that when a
subject perceived that they had the ability to market around software quality issues they
were more likely to not recognize the software quality problems and to escalate the
commitment to the project by shipping a defective software product.
In the current case, the project manager was supremely confident in his knowledge and
abilities and it is therefore possible that he might consider himself able to deal with a
software product with issues on implementation. In terms of the model, it can be
hypothesized that when a project manager perceives that he has substantial skills and
Chapter 5 – A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

172

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect
abilities that can exert control over the project outcome, it might cause him to perceive a
report of bad news as less relevant. I could also hypothesize that his perceived abilities
might come into play in the decision whereby he decides that he can compensate for
problems in the product and thus overrule a relevant report of bad news.
I then make the following propositions about the illusion of control:
P1) Illusion of Control will reduce the relevance of the report of bad news to the
decision maker.
P2) Illusion of Control will increase willingness of a decision maker to continue the
current course of action.

5.5.3.2.

Highly Politicized Environment

Staw (1997) also describes a social determinant of escalation that derives from highly
politicized environments. In these types of environments, to stop a project or admit error
can lead to loss of power, standing or position. Once a project is bound to the manager,
the manager’s identity can be linked with the project’s fate. This can lead to escalation if
the manager attempts to maintain his reputation by putting more effort into retrieving a
failing project.
In project Gamma, we see that in response to Jackson’s bad news reports and requests
for de-escalation, Forrest responded that it was politically infeasible meaning that once
started down the path, to back track is not possible, they would have to correct the
problems that occur going forward.
Thus in terms of the model, a perception of a highly politicized environment may act on
the decision maker by suppressing the relevance of the report of bad news in favor of
defending his political position. It may also impact the decision maker by introducing the
consideration during the decision process that while the report of bad news is perceived
to be important, it is overruled by political aspects of the situation to continue the current
course of action.
I make the following propositions about a politicized environment:
P3) A highly politicized environment will reduce the relevance of the report of bad
news to the decision maker
P4) A highly politicized environment increases the willingness of a decision maker to
continue the current course of action.

5.5.3.3.

Revised Model

The existence of other escalation factors shows that there are two additional areas of
research that can be examined, that of illusion of control and the politicization of the
environment.

Chapter 5 – A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

173

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect

Credibility

+

Risk
Perception

+

-

+
-

Relevance
Role
Prescription

Decision

+
Illusion of
Control

+

-

+
Politicized
Environment

Figure 5.6: Revised Model with Additional Constructs
5.6

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have seen that Project Gamma contained three occurrences of the
Deaf Effect. In evaluating the situation, we see that the individual model of the Deaf
Effect was consistent with the situation that occurred. The decision maker continued the
current course of action in an environment where he perceived low risk of continuance
and where the relevance of the report of bad news was reduced by the highly political
situation and a perceived lack of credibility by the bad news reporter on this issue. This
lack of credibility was perceived because of the lack of knowledge that the reporter had
on the entire situation.
We also saw that the case supports the addition of two new constructs to the model:
illusion of control and highly politicized environment which are held to potentially reduce
the relevance of the bad news report and increase the willingness of the decision maker
to continue the current course of action.
Separate from the occurrence of the Deaf Effect, we saw that the distortion in the report
of the status of the project to the reviewing panel to be consistent with the predictions of
agency theory. In this case, information asymmetries existed between the decision
maker and the reviewing panel. Additionally, the perceived politically charged situation
created a powerful motivation to shirk which in the presence of the information
asymmetries that existed would create the distortion of the message to the reviewing
panel. Thus having made his decision in accord with our model of the Deaf Effect, the
EPD of project Gamma distorted his report of project status due to a perceived political
environment enabled by information asymmetries that existed.
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6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This chapter seeks to summarize and bring together the results of the four studies to
propose a consolidated model and draw out some implications for research and practice.

6.1

LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS

While there are other situations in which the Deaf Effect might occur, in the laboratory
experiments I explored the Deaf Effect as it occurs under the environmental conditions
of 1) an environment which places strong emphasis on meeting deadlines and budgets;
2) pressure from peers and management to retain the current course of action in a
project; 3) inability for the decision maker to analyze the data and determine the situation
for himself; 4) a report of bad news which is ambiguous in establishing the severity of the
issue; and 5) time pressure. The following findings with respect to the occurrence of the
Deaf Effect hold across multiple experiments:
1) The continuance of the current course of action depends upon the perceived
relevance of the report of bad news and the perceived risk of the project to
achieving the desired end result.
The consistent pattern of significant paths throughout all the lab experiments is shown
below:

Credibility

+

Risk
Percept.
-

+

+

Relevance

Role
Prescr.

-

Decision

+

Figure 6.1: Common Significant Paths in Laboratory Experiments

The Relevance of the bad news report and perceived risk in the situation are the key
direct effects on the decision to continue the current course of action. The effect sizes of
variables show that Relevance has a large effect on Decision, while Risk Perception has
a moderate effect in the western countries. In China, however, the perception of risk is
the most important variable with a large effect size. Relevance has only a small effect
sizes.

Chapter 5 – A Case Study of the Deaf Effect

Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect

Table 6.1 – Effect Sizes of Relevance, Risk Perception, and
Credibility on Decision
Relevance

Risk
Perception

Credibility

Study 1

.921

NA

.055

Study 2

.104

.061

.032

Study 3 - USA

.204

.134

.003

Study 3 – Germany

.180

.070

.003

Study 3 – China

.060

.330

.009

The path from Credibility to Decision was significant in study 1 and in study 3 – China
models and was near significant in study 2. The effect sizes of this variable were
however very small.
This finding shows that the decision to discontinue a course of action is made differently
in western countries vs. China. In the west, Relevance has a moderate effect size while
Risk Perception has a small to moderate effect size. Thus, the decision to continue a
course of action is made largely upon how important the decision maker considers the
report of bad news with some consideration of the risk of the project. However, in China,
the perception of risk is the most important factor. Risk perception has a large effect size
whereas the Relevance of the bad news report has a small one. The reason for this
exchange in effect size is not evident from this study, however, as I speculated in
chapter 4, it may be do to the difference in political cultures. In the western societies with
many individual freedoms, no history of government oppression in the subjects’ lifetimes
and no fear of serious personal retaliation for defying authority, perceived risk may be
held as less important than in China where the opposite conditions hold. In this study,
since we did not achieve complete metric invariance between the subjects, we cannot
make any comparison between the Risk Perception measures between the cultures.
Given that, I am left to hypothesize that in the mental model of the Chinese students,
they must be more risk averse or attach more importance to perceived risk in their
decision processes than western students as a result of their political environment.
2) The Relevance of the report of bad news depends upon the Credibility and Role
Prescription of the bad news reporter.
As shown in the table below, the effect sizes show that Credibility has a very large effect
on Relevance in all the studies while Role Prescription has only a small to non-existent
effect.
Table 6.2 – Effect Sizes of Role Prescription
and Credibility on Relevance
Study
Study 1
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Credibility

Role
Prescription

.160

NA
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Study 2

.483

.064

Study 3 - USA

.504

.111

Study 3 – Germany

.000

.000

Study 3 – China

.410

.019

This finding indicates that the effect of Role prescription and Credibility is completely
mediated by the Relevance of the bad news report,indicating that the function of these
two constructs is to indicate whether the message is relevant to be considered.
3) Credibility has a positive effect on the perception of risk in the project
Credibility has a moderate effect size in China and the US and a large effect size in
Germany. This indicates that the report of bad news from a credible reporter increases
the perceived level of risk in the project.
Table 6.3 – Effect Size of
Credibility on Risk Perception
Study

Effect Size

Study 1

NA

Study 2

.159

Study 3 - USA

.226

Study 3 –
Germany

.417

Study 3 – China

.117

4) These findings are stable across cultures
As shown in study 3, the significance of the paths and direction of paths is the same
across all the cultures with some exceptions. Gender to Risk Perception and Risk
Propensity is significant in study 2 and in the study 3 China sample but not in study 3
USA or Germany samples. Similarly, Credibility is significant to Decision in study 1 and
in the study 3 China samples and near significant in study 2. This indicates that these
paths are probably weakly significant. The results will vary based on the sample.
The major difference across the samples is the fact that Role Prescription does not have
a significant effect on Relevance in the German sample. This was hypothesized to be
due to a pervasive belief in Germany that auditors fulfill a non-value added role within
the projects and therefore Role Prescription would not make a bad news reporter’s
message more relevant. This finding deserves further study.
5) This model has strong explanatory power for Decision.
As shown in the table below, the R2 of the Decision variable is over .56 in all the studies
and over .6 in all the studies in western cultures. This indicates that the model has a high
explanatory power for the Deaf Effect.
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Table 6.4 – R2 of the Decision
Variable
Study

6.2

Decision R2

Study 1

0.618

Study 2

0.612

Study 3 - USA

0.641

Study 3 –
Germany

0.661

Study 3 – China

0.562

CASE STUDY

In this case study, the project status reporting system of a southeastern state in the U.S.
was examined. In addition to observing the creation of the status reporting document
(the dashboard) and the status reporting meetings, a detailed case history of project
Gamma, a development effort to create a student information system was conducted.
The results of this case history showed distortion of the status message as transmitted
to the decision maker and an example of the occurrence of the Deaf Effect.
The case of distortion was found to lie in the biases brought to the status reporting
process by the Executive Project Director (Snow and Keil 2002; Snow, et al. 2007)
consisting of a political interpretation of the facts, a control fixation and self-efficacy.
These biases however only provided a motivation for the distortion. The information
asymmetries that were allowed to exist made it possible for the Executive Project
Director to distort the message and prevent this distortion from being detected. Agency
theory was used to explain how the distortion occurred. The biases created a motivation
to shirk while the information asymmetries created the opportunity.
The examination of project Gamma also resulted in the confirmation of the findings of
the laboratory experiments and the addition of new potential constructs: illusion of
control and politicization of the environment. I also proposed four new propositions about
the effect of those constructs.
P1) Illusion of Control will reduce the relevance of the report of bad news to the
decision maker
P2) Illusion of Control will increase willingness of a decision maker to continue the
current course of action.
P3) A highly politicized environment will reduce the relevance of the report of bad
news to the decision maker.
P4) A highly politicized environment will increase the willingness of a decision maker
to continue the current course of action.
These new constructs are incorporated into a revised model (figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2: Revised Model with Additional Constructs
6.3

CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
AND PRACTICE

6.3.1

Limitations

In the cross-cultural study, the item biases and lack of demonstrated scalar equivalence
creates an inability to compare means across the different geographies. Therefore while
we know that the relationships are similar, we cannot know if the relationships are the
same strength across geographies. Similarly the low power and coarse scales used in
the laboratory experiments result in a lowered effect size in the moderation analyses.
The moderation effects may be understated in this study.

6.3.2

Implications for Research

This dissertation has contributed to the scientific knowledge about bad news reporting by
developing and testing a model of the Deaf Effect at the individual level. It has shown
that one reason for the Deaf Effect is the determination by the decision maker that the
report of bad news is not relevant to be considered in determination of the future course
of action of the project. This determination is based upon the Credibility and Role
Prescription of the bad news reporter.
There are several directions for future research. There are other variables that should be
examined such as the message characteristic variables. Future studies should examine
such areas as message salience, recency, primacy and linguistic cues to determine how
these characteristics of messages allow the message to break through or be lost in the
background clutter or how they affect message relevance. Additionally, while the
literature indicates that female decision makers have less confidence in their decisions,
future studies should investigate this attribute of self-confidence and other beliefs about
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themselves explicitly rather than using gender as a proxy.
These studies have only examined a project situation in which there were the following
four conditions:
1) External pressures that moved the decision maker to continue the current course
of action;
2) A decision maker who could not perform the evaluation on his/her own;
3) A report of bad news that did not communicate the potential disaster situation in
terms that unambiguously indicated a coming disaster;
4) Severe time constraints on the length of time to evaluate the situation and make a
decision that either prevented evaluation of the situation or cut off alternative
solutions
There should be studies of the Deaf Effect that would be carried out in different
situations. For example, as seen in the case study, self-efficacy and illusion of control
may play a part. Studies in environment where the Deaf Effect occurred without external
pressure or time constraints and the decision maker had or believed that he had the
knowledge to determine the situation for himself should be undertaken to determine if
self-efficacy could induce the occurrence of the Deaf Effect in those environments.
This study also utilized the GLOBE metrics to assess the respondents’ view of the
ambient culture. The use of these metrics resulted in insignificant differences in
response to the cultural values across the different geographies. The values returned
also differ significantly from that reported in House, et. al. (2004) (figure 6.5).
Table 6.5 – Comparison of Calculated GLOBE Variables vs. that Reported by
the GLOBE Study
Calculated from this Study
UA
FO
IC
IG
PD
PO
Germany
3.23
3.82
3.53
4.00
3.27
3.53
China
3.94
3.16
3.47
2.78
2.81
2.89
USA
3.54
3.19
3.27
3.75
3.01
3.22
Reported in House, et. al. (2004)
Germany
5.22
4.27
3.56
4.02
5.25
4.25
China
4.94
3.75
4.77
5.8
5.04
4.45
USA
4.15
4.15
4.2
4.25
4.88
4.49

The differences exist in both value and rank order. For example, in Institutional
Collectivism, while the value for Germany returned by this study is very similar to that
developed by the GLOBE study, those of China and the USA are very different (1.3
points lower for China and .95 points for the USA). Additionally, China was highest in the
GLOBE sample by 1.19 points over Germany. In the results from this study, their scores
are virtually identical with Germany being slightly higher.
This could be due to a number of differences in the samples. The GLOBE metrics were
developed and operationalized for middle-management professionals. It could be that
the perceptions of students of societal values are significantly different that those of
middle-management professionals. Alternatively, it could be that the measures do not
mean the same thing to students as to professionals (item bias). Or it could be that the
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items require a certain level of experience that students do not possess (item bias).
These results might indicate that these measures are only appropriate for use with
middle-management professionals. Other possible causes could be that cultural values
have shifted in those regions in the 14 years since the GLOBE study was performed.
Additional research is required to validate these metrics for groups other than those
under which the GLOBE consortium validated them.

6.3.3

Implications for Practice

For practitioners, this study points to some ways to avoid occurrences of the Deaf Effect.
One key enabler of the Deaf Effect is a “high performance environment” characterized
by unnecessarily short deadlines and lack of tolerance for project management errors.
While there is always a need for deadlines and gross mismanagement should not be
tolerated, there should be in addition a “quality” emphasis in which, it should be stressed
that where possible a quality product should be delivered even if some dates are
missed.
For role prescribed bad news reporters such as auditors, every effort should be made to
increase their credibility within the organization. Source credibility theory suggests that
steps should be taken to increase their perceived expertise and trustworthiness. Keil and
Robey (2001) have suggested that increasing the size of the audit staff, management
support for the audit function, preservation of their independence and being able to add
value to projects improve the credibility of the audit function. The actions of the IV&V
vendor in the case study point toward a way that this can be achieved. By walking the
fine line between independence and team membership, they contributed to the team by
suggesting improvements to the methods used in the projects and then audited them on
conformance to those “best practices”.
Since Role Prescription enhances the Credibility of the bad news reporter, management
should make reporting of bad news a component of each employee’s job. They should
be trained to report bad news on the project to their leaders and up the chain of
command as necessary to ensure project success. The effects of Risk Propensity and
Risk Perception indicate that perhaps factors used in the selection of project leaders
might include their propensity to accept risk. Management should ensure that they do
not select “daredevils” for the role of project leaders. Similarly, all project decision
makers should be trained to identify project risks so that when identified they might be
more willing to change project direction and avoid failure.
Another implication for practice concerns status-reporting systems. In the case study
illustrated herein, the system as practiced avoided errors due to internal project
management practices such as schedule adherence and internal risk and issue
management. However, as was seen, at least three projects going through the process
experienced requirements failures two resulting in serious crises. This may result from
two aspects of the process: implementation of the IV&V activity only at the construction
phase of the project and use of behavior controls to monitor the projects.
Until the advent of project Alpha in 2007, IV&V was typically implemented only after the
implementing contractor was assigned. This allowed the projects to go through the RFP
development and bid process without independent review allowing for requirement
errors to be passed through to implementation phase where the requirements were not
reviewed by IV&V resulting in issues in implementation. IV&V should be placed at the
beginning of the process to ensure that proper steps are taken to ensure correct
requirement analysis.
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The IV&V review process is largely that of reviewing the processes used and
conformance to milestones such as schedule and budget. As described above, this
review is limited to internal project controls and does not include requirements, the
process therefore cannot ensure that the system developed can be successfully
implemented or meets the need of the users. To close this gap, two additional activities
can be undertaken. The IV&V can work with the users to ensure that the system meets
their requirements and expectations and can be implemented.
Another approach can be to implement the use of outcome controls. Agency theory
suggests that outcome controls are more likely to motivate the agent to behave in the
interests of the principal (Eisenhardt 1989). Outcome based controls are also a good
way to pass risk to the agent and to resolve the goal conflict that occurs between
contractors and outsourcing organizations (Eisenhardt 1989). To implement outcome
controls, the outsourcing organization should require the contractor to use a more
iterative approach to development such as prototyping, extreme programming or at least
requirement interim useful deliverables. This approach would allow the outsourcing
organization to verify that the contractor is meeting the requirements of the information
system project. The use of outcome-based controls would also prevent the distortion of
status reporting. By requiring frequent small deliverables of functionality, it prevents the
status report from being distorted by either misunderstanding of the facts by the project
manager or by bias as shown in the case study.
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